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Abstract 
 
 
 
THE LEGAL EDUCATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
 
 
Thomas Jefferson’s legal education offers a unique insight 
into the authoritative foundations of modern constitutionalism 
and sheds light on the revolutionary effort to digest American 
political experience according to the scientific legacy of 
Western jurisprudence.  
Much attention has been dedicated by contemporary 
literature to the sources of Jefferson’s thought. However, the 
interpretations offered over the past fifty years have told us 
more about Jefferson’s political alignment, than of his 
comprehensive engagement with the many strands and several 
authorities the Western legal tradition.  
The dissertation offers a study of Jefferson’s engagement 
with European jurisprudence. It tries, in particular, to connect 
Jefferson’s constitutionalism with medieval and early modern 
authorities addressing questions of sovereignty and religious 
freedom. These trans-Atlantic connections point equally to 
Common Law sources, as well to Continental Romano-
 iii 
Canonical jurisprudence and challenge, at the same time, the 
very distinction between the two traditions.  
In selecting the sources, preference has been given to those 
that belonged to Jefferson’s personal library. And, amongst 
these, particular attention has been dedicated to the ones that 
bear Jefferson’s annotations or inscriptions.  
The Introduction presents Jefferson’s copy of the 
foundational treatise on modern public law: Jean Bodin’s  Les 
Six Livres de la Republique. Although Jefferson’s engagement 
with Bodin constitutes one of the main themes of the entire 
dissertation, the Introduction focuses mostly on the markings 
inscribed by Jefferson in his copy of the Republique and 
suggests that Jefferson may have been drawn to this work as it 
addressed  the nature of power and of its constitutional 
limitations beyond any contingent concern.  
The dissertation’s first part is then dedicated to the 
exploration of Jefferson’s doctrine on sovereignty. It assumes, 
as its starting point, Jefferson’s “Bartolist” doctrine on tyranny. 
The first chapter traces the development of this doctrine from 
the Middle Ages to Modernity. It also evaluates the force of its 
various arguments in Jefferson’s own historical understanding 
of the conditions that defined the struggle for independence as 
the rational outcome of a legal process. The second chapter 
investigates, instead, the legal titles placed by Jefferson at the 
origins of the Americans’ lawful acquisition of power –
expatriation, conquest, and citizenship – and their connection to 
the European jurisprudence on the iura naturalia. The third 
 iv 
chapter closes the first part of the dissertation with an 
examination of Jefferson’s later reflections on the exercise of 
power. It focuses, in particular, on a two distinct groups of 
letters, dedicated to the independent exercise of sovereign power 
by each living generation, according to a Bodinian 
understanding of sovereignty, and to the constitutional relevance 
of intermediate bodies, maintained by Jefferson in keeping with 
Montesquieu. 
The second part of the dissertation is dedicated to religious 
freedom. The fourth chapter provides an examination of 
Jefferson’s participation in the “Grotian moment” and illustrates 
his understanding of religion as the naturalized foundation of 
morality and jurisprudence. Moreover, it traces the enduring 
relevance of the distinction between spiritual and temporal 
jurisdictions within his thought. The fifth and final chapter, 
instead, focuses on Jefferson’s integrative jurisprudence and 
insists that the multiple dimensions of law remained a 
fundamental feature of Jefferson’s legal persuasion, as he 
strived to substantiate the checks on power through his 
continuous engagement with the legacy of Western 
jurisprudence. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
A FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THOMAS JEFFERSON’S  
COPY OF BODIN’S LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
 
The only exact knowledge there is, said Anatole France, is the knowledge 
of the date of publication and the format of books. 
 
Walter Benjamin, Unpacking my Library 
 
Among the many books belonging to Jefferson still treasured 
at the Library of Congress is a copy of Jean Bodin’s Les Six 
Livres de la Republique edited in Paris in 1580 by Jacques du 
Puys (1). The volume in octavo is well preserved and bears the 
                                                
1 Jean BODIN, Les Six Livres de la Republique, a Paris: Chez Iacques du 
Puys, 1580, Thomas Jefferson Collection, Rare Books and Special 
Collections Division of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. A review 
of the ancient editions of the Republique is provided in Roland CRAHAY, 
Marie-Thérèse ISAAC, Marie-Thérèse LENGER, Bibliographie critique des 
éditions anciennes de Jean Bodin, Académie Royale de Belgique, Brussels, 
1992. The 1580 edition is examined on pp. 117-119. For the Republique’s 
placement in Jefferson’s catalogues see Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), 
Catalogue of the Library of Thomas Jefferson, vol. III, The Library of 
Congress, Washington D.C., 1953, p. 24; as well as James GILREATH and 
Douglas L. WILSON, (eds.), Thomas Jefferson’s Library: A Catalogue With 
Entries in His Own Order, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1989, p. 
80.  
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characteristic ownership markings that Jefferson inscribed in 
most of his books: the dotted initials t. and i., recorded 
respectively at signatures i (p. 129) and t (p. 209) of the volume 
(2). In addition to these discrete ownership markings, Jefferson’s 
copy of the Republique bears three more sets of markings, 
which are all inscribed - with only two exceptions (on pp. 87 
and 976) - in the margins of the text or in the margins of the 
lateral notes. These additional markings are made by short 
vertical dashes or long undulated vertical lines written in 
cuttlefish ink and by bookstand brackets written in pencil 
instead. The inconsistency of the markings and the difference in 
the medium employed to record them could suggest that more 
than one reader highlighted the Republique or that the same 
reader marked the volume over an extended period of time. 
Whether such reader could have been Jefferson is a question still 
open to speculation.  
Although Jefferson did not typically underline or annotate his 
books, marginal markings and notations do occasionally appear 
and while some have almost certainly been inscribed by 
previous owners, occasional borrowers, or perhaps subsequent 
readers, there are others which are commonly recognized as 
                                                
2 The page number is erroneously printed as 209, while it should be 289. For 
a detailed description of Jefferson’s ownership markings see James A. BEAR, 
Jr., Thomas Jefferson’s Book-Marks, Charlottesville, 1958, re-issued in 1993; 
Douglas L. WILSON, Jefferson’s Books, Monticello Monograph Series, 
Monticello, 1996, p. 47; and Armand London FELL, Origins of Legislative 
Sovereignty and Legislative State, vol. VI, American Tradition and 
Innovation with Contemporary Import and Foreground, Book 1, 
Foundations (to Early 19th Century), Praeger, Westport, 2004, p. 90. 
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being his own (3). No such consensus has yet been reached on 
the markings inscribed in Jefferson’s copy of the Republique. 
Therefore, scrutiny of the highlighted passages in Bodin’s 
monumental treatise on sovereignty offers the opportunity not 
only to investigate the “authorship” of these markings, but also 
to assess just how closely did Jefferson actually read Bodin’s 
masterpiece. Moreover, it provides the opportunity to situate 
Jefferson within the long arch of the Western legal tradition and 
investigate his intellectual engagment with its modern 
authorities (4). 
The first set of markings inscribed in the Republique may be 
found in book one. Here the marginal dashes are well over one 
hundred and, although they highlight several different passages 
throughout the entire ten chapters of the first book, they appear 
                                                
3 See Francis W. HIRST, Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson, Macmillan, 
New York, 1926, pp. 508-513; as well as Mark DIMUNATION, ‘The Whole of 
Recorded Knowledge’: Jefferson as Collector and Reader, in Robert C. 
BARON and Conrad EDICK WRIGHT, (eds.), The Libraries, Leadership, and 
Legacy of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, Fulcrum Publishing, Golden 
(Colorado), 2010, p. 37.  
4 The revolutions of the Western legal tradition are at the heart of Harold 
Berman’s historiography. Their fullest account is presented in Harold J. 
Harold J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal 
Tradition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 1983; and in 
ID., Law and Revolution, II. The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on 
the Western Legal Tradition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and 
London, 2003. For a correlation between Berman’s legal historiography and 
the legacy of the Historical School of Law see Gerhard DILCHER, The 
Germanists and the Historical School of Law: German Legal Science 
between Romanticism, Realism, and Rationalization, in Rechtsgeschichte, 
Legal History, vol. 24, 2016, pp. 20-72. 
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to be longer and most frequent in chapters five (on slavery), six 
(on citizenship), and eight (on sovereignty) (5).  
As noted in a recent study, «the texture of these marks does 
not [always] seem to match the quality of Jefferson’s initials in 
the signature inscriptions», the latter being rather thinner than 
the former. However, «the unobtrusive careful placement of the 
vertical lines of short dashes in the margins of Republique I» 
(placed «in lieu of underlinings, so as not to mar or clutter the 
book and its text») does bear a certain similarity to the discrete 
ownership markings inscribed by Jefferson in so many of his 
books (6).  
The second set of markings appears only on p. 290 and 
highlights the comparison between monarchy and tyranny, 
described by Bodin in the fourth chapter of the Republique’s 
second book, entitled De la Monarchie Tyrannique. 
                                                
5 Many of the topical passages in the first book of Bodin’s treatise are singled 
out by the vertical dashes, however the markings highlight more often then 
not historical exempla chosen by Bodin to describe his theoretical claims, 
rather than the abstract enunciation of the claims themselves. This is 
consistent with Jefferson’s commonplacing practice. As noted by Douglas 
Wilson, Jefferson «rarely content[ed] himself with copying out the most 
celebrated passages from a work and he often ignor[ed] what [was] most 
characteristic». See Douglas L. WILSON, Introduction, in Thomas 
JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s Literary Commonplace Book, edited by Douglas L. 
Wilson, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, pp. 13-14. It is also 
consistent with Jefferson’s general mistrust of abstractions. «All theory must 
yield to experience» he wrote to James Maury on the 16 June 1815. See The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement series, vol. 8, October 1814 to 
August 1815, edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al., Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2011, p. 544. 
6 Armand London FELL, Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and Legislative 
State, vol. VI, American Tradition and Innovation with Contemporary Import 
and Foreground, Book 1, Foundations (to Early 19th Century), cit., pp. 91-
92. 
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The third set of markings may be found, instead, in the 
seventh chapter of the third book, entitled Des Corps & College, 
Estats, & Communautez. These penciled brackets are relatively 
few and signal out about six different passages (7).  
On p. 499 of the same seventh chapter of the third book there 
is also a cross, inscribed in pencil, in correspondence to the 
passage: «Donc pour persuader ceste question, s’il est bon 
d’auoir des estats, colleges & communautés, & si la Republique 
s’en peut passer, on peut dire, à mon aduis, qu’il n’y a rien 
meilleur pour maintenir les estates populaires, & ruiner les 
tyrannies […]» (8). 
                                                
7 It is worth noting that, although pencils seem to have been commonly used 
in his time, Jefferson himself appears to have preferred writing and drawing 
in ink, at least until 1784, when his drawing habits changed. In fact, «[u]ntil 
his arrival in France in 1784, ink was Jefferson’s accustomed medium for his 
designs. There is not a single authenticated use of lead pencil by him before 
this time. Pencil notes indeed occur on a few drawings which were in his 
possession and even on one or two of his own drawings from this period, but 
in every case it is obvious that they are from the hands of other men. As 
pencil was thus apparently common among the artisans of Virginia, 
Jefferson’s failure to make use of it must have been out of choice. […] 
Although after Jefferson took up his residence in Europe he continued to 
employ ink for certain drawings, he henceforth preferred to work in pencil». 
See Fiske KIMBALL, Thomas Jefferson Architect, Riverside Press, 
Cambridge, 1916, p. 105. If Kimball’s observations could be applied also to 
the handwritten markings in Jefferson’s copy of the Republique, than it could 
be argued by analogy that the pencil markings in the third book might have 
been inscribed after the ink ones in the first. This would seem to be consistent 
with the content of the passages highlighted, the ones in the first book being 
of a more general and introductory nature than those in the third one. 
Morover, Jefferson mostly addressed the questions delt with by Bodin in the 
seventh chapter of the third book late in life, see infra chapter three, 
paragraph 3, The Form of Government of a Democratic Republic: the Ward 
Republics. 
8 Jefferson often stressed the constitutional importance of intermediate 
bodies. In 1787, for instance, he insisted that «the powers of government 
should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as 
that no one could transcend their legal limits , without being effectually 
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Leaving aside the few handwritten notations marked on the 
recto and verso of the title page and probably written by the 
hand of a librarian, there are hardly any handwritten marginal 
notations in the Republique, except for two puzzling ones: one 
on page 147 (chapter eight, book one) which has almost entirely 
faded away and is presently unreadable and one on p. 976 (book 
six, chapter five), which does not appear to have been written in 
Jefferson’s hand (9). Here the Roman numeral «CCCLVI», 
referring to year in which Damasus II was elected pope, is 
underlined in ink and the number «371» followed by a «.23» or 
possibly a «.43» and then a scribble (that may stand for «vol.») 
is written in cuttlefish ink next to it. 
Emily Millicent Sowerby, who edited the catalogue of the 
library that Thomas Jefferson sold to Congress in 1815, 
described the binding of the Republique as «[o]ld vellum» and 
noted the presence, within the book, of «some headlines and 
marginal notes», but excluded the handwriting to be Jefferson’s 
(10).  
Partially departing from Sowerby’s assessment, Joseph 
Felicijan, Jacob Peter Mayer, and Armand London Fell, who 
                                                                                                     
checked and restrained by the others». See Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on the 
State of Virginia, edited by William Peden, The University of North Carolina 
Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1954, re-issued in 1982, p. 120. The issue is 
further addressed infra, see  chapter three, paragraph 3, The Form of 
Government of a Democratic Republic: the Ward Republics. 
9 A critical survey of Jefferson’s «bewildering variety of handwriting stiles» 
may be read in Douglas L. WILSON, The Handwriting of the Literary 
Commonplace Book, in Thomas JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s Literary 
Commonplace Book, cit., pp. 191-207.  
10 Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. III, cit., p. 24. 
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also appear to have examined the volume at first hand, 
suggested that both the vertical markings and the brackets 
inscribed within the chapters of the Republique had been written 
by Jefferson himself (11).  
In a lecture delivered at Harvard in 1976 entitled Jefferson as 
Reader of Bodin: Suggestions for Further Studies, Mayer 
compared the markings in the seventh chapter of the third book 
of the Republique to «identical» bookstand brackets he found in 
Jefferson’s copy of Sydney’s Discourses on Government and to 
the square brackets used in the original rough draft of the 
Declaration of Independence (12). This resemblance between the 
bookstand and the square brackets lead Mayer to «suggest that 
the markings […] from Bodin, Sydney and the Declaration of 
Independence» had all been made by Jefferson «approximately 
during the same period» of time, which Mayer believed might 
have occurred around the middle of the 18th century, while 
                                                
11 Cfr. Joseph FELICIJAN, The Genesis of the Contractual Theory and the 
Installation of the Dukes of Carinthia, Society of St. Mohor, 
Klagenfurt,1967; Jacob Peter MAYER, Jefferson as Reader of Bodin. 
Suggestions for Further Studies, in ID., Fundamental Studies on Jean Bodin, 
Arno Press, New York, 1979, pp. 2-32; Armand London FELL, Origins of 
Legislative Sovereignty and Legislative State, vol. VI, American Tradition 
and Innovation with Contemporary Import and Foreground, Book 1, 
Foundations (to Early 19th Century), cit., pp. 11-100 Although Felicijan was 
among the first to have noticed the markings in the Republique, his essay 
seems not to have influenced neither Mayer nor Fell, who never reference it. 
Felicijan does not discuss the “authorship” of the markings, but assumed 
them to be Jefferson’s. Earlier, the markings had also been noticed by Francis 
LIEBER, in The Manual of Political Ethics, vol. 1, William Smith, London, 
1839, p. 322: «The is, in the Congress library at Washington, a copy [of Les 
Six Livres de la Republique] which belonged to Mr. Jefferson, with pencil-
marks by his hand». Mayer signals Liebler’s observation on p. 5 of his 
aforementioned essay.  
12 Jacob Peter MAYER, Jefferson as Reader of Bodin. Suggestions for Further 
Studies, cit., p. 18.  
11 
 
Jefferson was drafting the fundamental documents of the 
American Revolution and of the Virginian Commonwealth (13).  
In regard to the markings in book one of the Republique, 
Mayer was, instead, «inclined to believe» that they had been 
inscribed in «a much later period of Jefferson’s life, probably 
around 1804-5» (14). No particular evidence is offered to support 
this hypothesis, which Mayer seems to have presented simply as 
a suggestion, leaving its examination to future studies.  
In his expansive series on the Origins of Legislative 
Sovereignty and Legislative State, Fell picked up where Mayer 
had left off and provided some additional clues to support the 
claim that Jefferson «must have been familiar with Bodin’s 
importance in European political thought since his years as a 
law student» (15). Although Fell has persuasively argued that the 
fundamental revolutionary documents drafted by Jefferson in 
the mid 1770s bear significant traces of a Bodinian influence, 
the central evidence he provided as proof of Jefferson’s early 
possession of the Republique seems to be less than conclusive.  
Fell rested his case on a review of the manuscript catalogues 
that Jefferson compiled or commissioned for his library. The 
catalogues taken into consideration are three: the 1783 
manuscript catalogue, that Jefferson used until 1812; the 1789 
catalogue, in which Jefferson recorded the volumes purchased in 
                                                
13 Ibid., p. 19. 
14 Ibid., p. 27. 
15 Armand London FELL, Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and Legislative 
State, vol. VI, American Tradition and Innovation with Contemporary Import 
and Foreground, Book 1, Foundations (to Early 19th Century, p. 19. 
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Europe between 1784 and 1789; and the 1823 catalogue, that 
Jefferson commissioned «to reconstruct the order and 
classifications in his lost library catalogue or ‘fair copy’ of 
1812» (16). 
Fell begins to articulate his case by contending that Bodin’s 
Republique is listed as entry number five among the political 
works recorded in the 1783 catalogue. Its appearance «at the 
very head of Jefferson’s extremely long listing of other modern 
works […]» placed Bodin’s treatise, according to Fell, «not just 
chronologically before such 17th century theorists as Filmer, 
Locke, and Sidney, but also well prior to Machiavelli before 
them and Hooker after them, both being of the 16th century. In 
other words, Jefferson’s prominent positioning of Bodin in the 
1783 catalogue shows his especially high estimation of Bodin’s 
importance» (17).  
Fell has taken the Republique’s placement near the very 
beginning of the chapter on politics of the 1783 catalogue as 
proof of Jefferson’s «early possession» of the treatise (18). 
Douglas Wilson has, in fact, argued that the so called 1783 
catalogue was began much earlier. «The 1783 manuscript 
catalogue was not, as Sowerby believed, ‘originally written by 
Jefferson in 1783’. That it was begun earlier is evident by the 
handwriting of the original entries and other facts of time and 
                                                
16 Ibid., p. 84. 
17 Ibid., pp. 85, 86.  
18 Ibid., p. 87. 
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location. My own belief» wrote Wilson in 1984 «is that it may 
well have been started as early as the mid-1770s» (19). 
Fell contended that additional evidence of Jefferson’s early 
possession of the Republique could be gathered from further 
details. «It is well established that Jefferson intended to use his 
1783 catalogue as a guide, once he got to Paris in 1784, for 
books he already had and those he wanted to obtain. On the 
front cover […] he cited the date (‘1783, Mar. 6’), the number 
of books included at that point in his collection (‘2040 vols.’), 
and the system of check marks to the left of books he already 
possessed (‘✔this mark denotes the books I have. Those 
unmarked I mean to procure’). In the ‘chapter’ or section on 
politics [of his so called 1783 catalogue], beginning with 
political theory, Jefferson placed a check mark […] to the left of 
all the initial books […], including Bodin’s Republique» (20). 
While reaching the end of a period of intense book 
acquisition in Europe, Jefferson compiled a new catalogue, 
where he listed his acquisitions. This is the so called 1789 
catalogue. According to Fell, «Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis 
(1598) was significantly included», while «Bodin’s Republique 
[was] conspicuously absent and was therefore not a later added 
entry to the 1783 catalogue but was in it from the start […]» (21). 
                                                
19 Douglas L. WILSON, Sowerby Revisited: The Unfinished Catalogue of 
Thomas Jefferson’s Library, in The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 41, n. 
4, 1984, p. 619. 
20 Armand London FELL, Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and Legislative 
State, vol. VI, American Tradition and Innovation with Contemporary Import 
and Foreground, Book 1, Foundations (to Early 19th Century), cit., p. 87. 
21 Ibid., p. 89. 
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Finally, Fell noted that Bodin was present in the 1823 
catalogue as well. In this final, recently republished (22), 
catalogue the Republique is listed as entry number thirteen 
among the books on general theories of politics (23), and it is 
likely that this was its placement when Jefferson sold his library 
to Congress in 1815.  
Although Fell appears to have articulated a compelling case 
supporting Jefferson’s early possession of the Republique, there 
are at least two reasons to doubt his conclusion.  
First of all, it is questionable whether Bodin’s Republique 
does actually appear as entry number five in the chapter on 
politics of the 1783 catalogue. A scrutiny of the manuscript, in 
fact, allows an alternative reading. The chapter on politics 
begins on p. 135 of the manuscript (24). On the top of the page 
Jefferson clearly wrote the title: «Chap. 24. Politics» and then 
inscribed the subtitle of the first section: «general theory». All 
the entries that follow are unnumbered. The first one (in itself 
rather significant, as will be discussed further) reads: 
«Machiavelli Princeps; Agrippae oratio contra Monarchiam; 
Moecenatis oratio pro Monarchiam; Steph. Junii Bruti vindiciae 
contra tyrannos; De jure magistratuum tractatus». This entry 
                                                
22 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Thomas Jefferson’s Library: A Catalogue With 
Entries in His Own Order, cit.  
23 See Armand London FELL, Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and 
Legislative State, vol. VI, American Tradition and Innovation with 
Contemporary Import and Foreground, Book 1, Foundations (to Early 19th 
Century), cit., pp. 84-85. 
24 The manuscript is held by the Massachusetts Historical Society. Although 
a critical edition has not been published, the manuscript has been entirely 
digitized and can be seen online at the following address 
http://www.masshist.org/thomasjeffersonpapers/catalog1783/  
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refers to a single volume, probably printed in Basel in 1589, 
which is also listed as the entry number one in the chapter on 
politics of Sowerby’s critical edition of Jefferson’s later library 
catalogue (25). Contrary to expectations, Bodin’s Republique 
does not appear in the following entries on politics, but rather 
precedes them. At the top of p. 134 Jefferson recorded the final 
entries in chapter 23 of his catalogue, dedicated to books on 
«Foreign Law». On the lower half of the same page, and 
separated from the previous entries by a wide blank space, 
Jefferson listed a number of works on politics, among which 
Bodin’s Republique appears as the fifth entry. The somewhat 
odd placement of this cluster of political works, listed after the 
chapter on foreign law but prior to the chapter on politics, could 
be explained by assuming that Jefferson recorded the acquisition 
of these books once he had already filled out all the available 
space in his chapter on politics and had no more room available 
to record additional acquisitions. 
The possibility that Jefferson acquired Bodin’s Republique 
later in his life is supported by the 1789 catalogue (26). Despite 
Fell arguing otherwise, the Republique is in fact listed in this 
manuscript on p. 31, among the very first entries of the chapter 
on politics. It would thus appear that Jefferson purchased at least 
                                                
25 See Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. III, cit., pp. 1-2. See infra, as well as chapter one paragraph 1, 
Tyranny in Western Jurisprudence. 
26 Also the manuscript of this catalogue is held by the Massachusetts 
Historical Society, which has provided a digital reproduction at the following 
address http://www.masshist.org/thomasjeffersonpapers/catalog1789/ 
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one copy of Bodin’s treatise while in Europe (27). On the same 
page, Jefferson records his acquisition of Aristotle’s treatise on 
government, edited by Ellis and published in quarto (28). This is 
also the entry that immediately precedes Bodin’s Republique in 
the 1783 manuscript catalogue. Both books would therefore 
appear to have been purchased abroad and this is the second 
reason why Fell’s conclusions would seem to be at least 
partially questionable. 
However, since both entries in the 1783 and 1789 catalogue 
record only the author, the abridged title, and the format of the 
volume, but provide no further bibliographical information, it 
cannot be excluded that Jefferson owned more than one octavo 
of Bodin’s French version of the Republique. In fact, Fell is 
correct in noticing that Jefferson placed a checkmark next to 
Bodin’s name in the 1783 catalogue. So, early possession of the 
Republique cannot entirely be excluded.  
In addition, it is highly significant that Jefferson opened the 
chapter on politics in the 1783 catalogue with two influential 
16th century political treatises: the Vindiciae contra tyrannos and 
a Catholic re-edition of Théodore de Bèze’s Du droit des 
Magistrates. Their prominent placement in the catalogue 
                                                
27 It is not unreasonable to assume that Jefferson might have discussed 
Bodin’s doctrine with some of his French friends and acquaintances. In 1755 
Condorcet had, in fact, published an abridged edition of the Republique for 
his Bibliothéque de l’homme publique. See infra, chapter three paragraphs 1 
and 2, Jefferson at the «tournant rousseauiste» and The Subject of Popular 
Sovereignty: the Living Generation. 
28 It is significant that Bodin’s abridged Republique follows Aristotle’s 
Politics also in the Bibliothéque de l’homme publique. Could Jefferson, in 
keeping with Condorcet, have sensed a proximity between Bodin and 
Aristotle? 
17 
 
suggests that Jefferson esteemed 16th century French political 
literature and appreciated its fundamental importance for his 
own political education since the middle of the 1770s, as Mayer 
and Fell have both correctly assumed (29).  
Regardless of when Jefferson acquired his copy of the 
Republique, the comparative analysis of the markings in 
Jefferson’s books and manuscripts, initially conducted by Mayer 
and then carried on by Fell, tentatively suggests that Jefferson 
might have been first introduced to Bodin by some other author.  
A number of works that Jefferson read (and, in some cases, 
supposedly marked) in the early 1770s contain, in fact, more or 
less extensive references to Bodin. Mayer points out that 
«Filmer, Milton, Sydney, Locke, and Montesquieu» all 
mentioned Bodin, «and one cannot convince oneself that such a 
fantastic reader as Jefferson was, would not have gone back to a 
study of Bodin» (30).  
With the exception of Filmer, these were all authors 
recommended by Jefferson to Robert Skipwith, in a letter dated 
3 August 1771 (31). Robert Skipwith was, at the time, the 
                                                
29 One of Fell’s further contentions should be revised. In the appendix to his 
volume, Fell claims to have found vertical dashes inscribed in the margins of 
p. 15 of the Codex, in Jefferson’s octavo edition of the Corpus Iuris Civilis. 
Although markings on this page to appear, they do not appear to be vertical 
marginal dashes, but rather the traces of ink that have transpired from the 
marking inscribed on the verso of the same page, where thick continuous line 
highlights a single paragraph. 
30 Jacob Peter MAYER, Jefferson as Reader of Bodin. Suggestions for Further 
Studies, cit., p. 22. 
31 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Robert Skipwith, 3 August 1771, in The Paper 
of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, 1760-1776, edited by Julian P. Boyd et al., 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950, pp. 76-81. 
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brother-in-law of Martha Wayles Skelton, Jefferson's bride-to-
be, and he had written to Jefferson, requesting a list of 
recommended books «suited to the capacity of a common reader 
who understands but little of the classicks and who has not 
leisure for any intricate or tedious study» (32). Jefferson 
compiled with the request suggesting, in addition to the 
aforementioned authors, Davila’s Istoria delle guerre civili di 
Francia, Bayle’s Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, and 
Bolingbroke’s Philosophical Works. These treatise too discuss 
at length Bodin’s doctrine. So, it would appear that Jefferson 
was at least familiar with Bodin’s thought, if not with his 
treatise on sovereignty, by the beginning of the 1770s. 
This conclusion is supported by three further observations. 
Around 1773, Jefferson recommended to «a young friend whose 
course of reading was confided in [him]» to enhance his 
understanding of the law by reading Pierre Charron’s De la 
Sagesse (33). This treatise on morals, that Jefferson listed among 
the books on Ethics and Natural Law that he recommended to 
his young «friend», drew amply from to Bodin’s Republique and 
silently paraphrased many of its key passages. So much so, that 
                                                
32 Robert SKIPWITH, letter to Thomas Jefferson, 17 July 1771, in ibid., p. 74. 
33 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Bernard Moore, letter enclosed in the later 
letter Jefferson addressed to John Minor, 30 August 1814, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, Retirement series, vol. 7, 28 November 1813 to 30 
September 1814, edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al., Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2010, pp. 625, 627, 631. The existing copy to the letter to 
Moore is undated. The editors have assigned to it a «highly conjectural» date, 
«based on the assumption that it was written shortly before or after» 
Jefferson extended to the younger Moore credit towards the purchase of the 
books from Dabney Carr’s estate. 
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Jefferson could have gathered a first abrégé of Bodin’s doctrine 
by reading Charron (34). 
Sometime earlier, between May 1771 and December 1772, 
Jefferson drafted some notes on a case of divorce he was 
following on behalf of one of his clients, dr. James Blair (35). 
Among the authoritative passages listed in support of Blair’s 
case, Jefferson recalled several passages of the first chapter of 
the sixth book of Pufendorf’s De iure naturae et gentium. Two 
of the paragraphs recalled (nn. 22 and 24), expressly refer to the 
third chapter of the first book of Bodin’s Republique, which in 
turns deals with matrimony and repudiation (36).  
Finally, Bodin’s historiographical doctrine is largely 
discussed in Bolingbroke’s Letters on the Study and the Use of 
History - a work well known to Jefferson, ever since he read and 
                                                
34 See Anna Maria BATTISTA, Alle origini del pensiero politico libertino. 
Montaigne e Charron, Giuffrè, Milano, 1966 and especially pp. 87-100 
where Battista provides a detailed review of Charron’s engagement with 
Bodin and of the debts he contracted with the Republique. It is worth noting 
that Jefferson placed special importance on Charron. In a letter to Augustus 
B. Woodward he acknowledged that the system of classification of 
knowledge devised by Bacon, that he employed as the basic partition of his 
library catalogue, had been previously conceived by Charron. See Thomas 
JEFFERSON, letter to Augustus B. Woodward, 24 March 1824, quoted in 
Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. V, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1983, p. 167: 
«[…] L d. Bacon founded his 1 st. great division on the faculties of the mind 
which have cognisance of these sciences. It does not seem to have been 
observed by any one that the origination of this division was not with him. It 
had been proposed by Charron, more than 20. years before in his book de la 
Sagesse. B. 1. c. 14. […]». 
35 See Frank L. DEWEY, Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on Divorce, in The 
William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 29, n. 1, 1982, pp. 212-223. 
36 See ibid., pp. 219, 220, 222; Samuel PUFENDORF, De iure naturae et 
gentium libri octo, vol. II, Francofvrti et Lipsiae, ex officina Knochio-
Erlingeriana, 1759, pp. 42, 47. 
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commonplaced Lord Kame’s Historical Law Tracts, which 
amply quote Bolingbroke’s Letters in their introduction (37).  
So, although neither the provenance nor the date of 
acquisition of the Republique are precisely known, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that Jefferson became familiar with Bodin 
in the mid seventies, since the author of the Republique appears 
to have been by that time a ubiquitous presence in his reading 
(38).  
                                                
37 See Thomas JEFFERSON, The Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson. A 
Repertory of his ideas on Government, edited by Gilbert Chinard, The John 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1926, pp. 95-135. A new critical edition of the 
Legal Commonplace Book edited by David T. Konig is forthcoming and will 
be published by the Princeton University Press as part of The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson.  
38 I am unaware of any study on Bodin’s reception in the American colonies 
or specifically in Virginia. There is no surviving record of the books held in 
the collage library at William and Mary during Jefferson’s time. See John M. 
JENNINGS, The Library of the College of William and Mary, 1693-1793, The 
University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1968. Nor does Bodin appear in 
the provisional catalogue of George Wythe’s library, Jefferson’s legal 
mentor. See the catalogue  published by the Wolf Law Library at 
http://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php/Wythe's_Library. Bodin is 
also absent from the standard study on legal literature in private libraries in 
colonial Virginia. The compilation is derived from lists of books held in 
private libraries inventoried after the death of the owner. It does not include 
libraries of people who died after the Revolution, and it does not include 
libraries of people whose estate inventories do not survive and have not been 
published. Political treatises are also not included. See W. Hamilton BRISON, 
Census of Law Books in Colonial Virginia, University Press of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, 1978. However, Louis B. Wright has claimed that «[b]ooks 
on politics and statecraft found a favored place in the libraries of Virginian 
planters, as they did in New England. Although political differences that 
would later become a chasm were already developing in the two regions, 
both groups nevertheless studied some of the same political theorists. 
Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and Bodin were not uncommon». See Louis B. 
WRIGHT, The First Gentlemen of Virginia. Intellectual Qualities of the Early 
Colonial Ruling Class, The Huntington Library, San Marino (California), 
1940, p. 132. Howell A. LLOYD has recently edited a volume on The 
Reception of Bodin, Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2013. This interesting and 
complex collection of essays explains the fortune and success that Bodin’s 
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As Jefferson was not usually accustomed to inscribe marginal 
notations in his books, the few that can be found seem to be of 
particular importance. Although there are almost none in the 
Republique, it is worth noting that Jefferson recalled Bodin’s 
masterpiece in a footnote of Vattel’s Le Droit des Gens (39).  
                                                                                                     
works enjoyed in Europe. Two contributions - Glenn BURGESS, Bodin in the 
English Revolution, pp. 387-415 and Diego QUAGLIONI, The Italian Readers 
of Bodin, 17th-18th Centuries: The Italian “Readers” out of Italy - Alberico 
Gentili, pp. 371-386 - are particularly germane as they illustrate Bodin’s 
reception in England and explain how Bodin’s doctrine influenced many of 
the authors that Jefferson himself would have later studied. Sara Miglietti, 
one of the other contributors to the aforementioned volume, does mention 
that «North American copies» of Bodin’s Methodus as facilem historiarum 
cognitione «were typically bought on the antiquarian market in the nineteenth 
or twentieth centuries». See Sara MIGLIETTI, Reading from the Margins: 
Some Insights in the Early Reception of Bodin’s Methodus, in The Reception 
of Bodin, edited by Howell A. Lloyd, cit., p. 199. However, she also notes 
that «the 1572 copy [of Bodin’s Methodus] which is now held by the Library 
Company of Philadelphia probably [reached] the New World along with its 
owner, James Logan (1674-1751)», ibid., p. 205. J. S. Maloy is the only 
author I know of who attempts to retrace the fortune and circulation that 
Bodin enjoyed in the colonies. According to him the «Puritans who 
emigrated to America came from an intellectual world in which Bodin 
figured as one of the most familiar authorities on politics. […] New 
Englanders used Bodin as, among other things, a source of lessons from the 
history of political thought and practice». See Jason S. MALOY, The Colonial 
American Origins of Modern Democracy Thought, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 95. Apart from this work, I should also mention 
the oftentimes quoted volume written by Armand London Fell, that has 
attempted to retrace the influence of Bodin over the Founding Fathers. 
39 See Emmerich de VATTEL, Le droit des gens, ou principes de la loi 
naturelle, appliqués à la conduite & aux affaires des Nations & des 
Souverains, a Amsterdam: Chez E. Van Harrevelt, 1775, p. 141, Thomas 
Jefferson Collection, Rare Books and Special Collections Division of the 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Sowerby noted that Jefferson entered 
this volume in his so called «undated manuscript catalogue», compiled, 
around 1789, when approaching the end of his diplomatic mission to France. 
See Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. II, The Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., 1953, pp. 71-
72. It is worth noting that on pages 98 and 99 of the Tome Second (bound 
together with the first) there are two paragraphs highlighted by vertical 
dashes inscribed in pencil. The two passages refer to the right of conquest. In 
the second tome there are also a few cuttlefish ink markings. 
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In chapter twenty-three of the first book of his treatise, Vattel 
highlighted the main principles of maritime law by paraphrasing 
the doctrines of Grotius, Selden, and Bodin. More precisely, the 
Swiss author affirmed that, according to Bodin, «[…] la 
domination du prince s’étend jusqu’à trente lieues des côtes 
[…]» and referred his readers to «De la République, Liv. I. chap. 
X.» (p. 141). Jefferson completed the footnote by adding «pa. 
246.» (40). This, of course, is the page number in which the 
principle recalled by Vattel is mentioned in Jefferson’s copy of 
the Republique: «[…] les droits de la mer n' appartiennent 
qu'au Prince souuerain, qui peut imposer charges iusques à xxx. 
lieuës loing de sa terre […]» (41).  
Not only is this passage recalled in the notation added by 
Jefferson to Vattel’s footnote, it is also highlighted by the 
vertical dashes that single out so many of the passages in the 
first book of Jefferson’s copy of the Republique.  
Whether the correspondence between Jefferson’s addition to 
Vattel’s footnote and the vertical dashes may be only a happy 
coincidence or whether it may be regarded as tentative evidence 
of Jefferson’s “authorship” of the markings inscribed in the first 
book of the Republique, the issues addressed by Vattel and 
Bodin in the passages just mentioned surely arose Jefferson’s 
interest by 1793, when it became his responsibility as Secretary 
                                                
40 Sowerby identified the notation as being Jefferson’s, see Emily Millicent 
SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas Jefferson, vol. II, cit., 
p. 72.  
41 Jean BODIN, Les Six Livres de la Republique, cit., livre I, chapitre 10, De 
vrayes marques de Souueraineté, p. 246. 
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of State to determine how far «the territorial protection of the 
Unites States» extended into the sea (42).  
It was in this year, in fact, that Jefferson wrote to a number of 
European ambassadors in the Unites States, claiming that the 
country’s maritime jurisdiction extended up to «three 
geographical miles» from the nation’s shores (43). This was the 
first time any country ever proclaimed the three mile limit for its 
maritime jurisdiction (44). 
The source of such measurement is, in all likelihood, 
recorded by Jefferson himself, in a second autograph footnote he 
added to his copy of Vattel. On page 142, shortly after recalling 
Bodin’s opinion on the matter, Vattel argued that the breadth of 
territorial sea could no longer be calculated according to 
Bodin’s measurements, as «[a]ujourd’hui» it only comprised 
«[…] l’espace de mer, qui est à la portée du cannon […]» (45). 
It is to this observation that Jefferson added his footnote: «C’est 
a dire» he remarked, quoting from paragraph 122 of von 
Martens’s Droit des gens moderne, «à trois lieues du rivage».  
                                                
42 Thomas Jefferson, letter to certain Foreign Ministers in the Unites States, 
Germantown 8 November 1793, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 27, 
1 September to 31 December 1793, edited by John Catanzariti et al., 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997 p. 328. Jefferson discussed in 
greater detail his understanding of the different views entertained by 
«Governments and jurisconsults» on the matter in a letter addressed, on the 
same date, to the French ambassador Edmond Charles Genet, see ibid., pp. 
330-331.  
43 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to certain Foreign Minister in the Unites States, 
Germantown 8 November 1793, cit., p. 329. 
44 See ibid., p. 330. 
45 Emmerich de VATTEL, Le droit des gens, ou principes de la loi naturelle, 
appliqués à la conduite & aux affaires des Nations & des Souverains, cit., p. 
142. 
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Trois lieues du rivage, «three geographical miles», precisely 
the breadth of American territorial sea that Jefferson claimed in 
his letter to the European ambassadors.  
The correspondence between the autograph notes in Vattel, 
the markings in the Republique, and the observations in his own 
letter to the European ambassadors, all suggest that Jefferson 
had a direct and specific knowledge of Bodin at least by 1793 
and further suggests that it might have been him who inscribed 
the vertical dashes in the first book of the Republique.  
As brief as they may be, the autograph notations in the 
inferior margins of Vattel offer some insight into Jefferson’s 
understanding of sovereignty. Moreover, they suggest that 
Jefferson might have adopted Bodin’s notion of sovereign 
prerogatives. And this, in turn, could help explain why Jefferson 
felt the need to complete Vattel’s reference to Bodin by adding 
the precise page number in which maritime jurisdiction was 
listed among the defining features of sovereignty in chapter ten 
of the Republique. 
Such notation is a unique example of the awareness with 
which Jefferson addressed questions of public law. The issue at 
hand was not simply determining (more or less arbitrarily) the 
breadth of maritime jurisdiction. As important as it might have 
been, the measurement was in itself susceptible to change, so 
much so that Jefferson openly acknowledged it in his letter (46). 
                                                
46 See Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to certain Foreign Minister in the Unites 
States, Germantown 8 November 1793, cit., p. 328: «The President of the 
United States thinking that before it shall be finally decided to what distance 
from our sea shores the territorial protection of the United States shall be 
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However, the implications of his proclamation were much 
subtler: by claiming control over a portion of the sea, the United 
States was reaffirming its independence and claiming one of the 
fundamental prerogatives of sovereignty.  
So, despite determining the breadth of maritime jurisdiction 
according to the indications of Vattel and von Martens, 
Jefferson appears to have been actually following the principles 
laid down by Bodin in the heavily marked tenth chapter of the 
Republique’s first book. Throughout this chapter, Bodin 
illustrated an analytical conception of sovereignty, carefully 
examining those exclusive powers, or regalia, whose unitary 
exercise secured absolute independence and supremacy. 
Sovereignty, thus, was presented less as an abstract 
proclamation and more as the concrete exercise of specific 
prerogative powers (47). 
This is the conception that Jefferson seems to have recalled 
by annotating his copy of Vattel. A conception that allowed him 
to secure the newly proclaimed independence of the United 
States by exercising the prerogatives that distinguished 
sovereignty from all other kinds of subordinate power.  
Without the aforementioned notation such a conclusion might 
have been only conjectured, for Bodin - as far as I know - is 
                                                                                                     
exercised, it will be proper to enter into friendly conferences and 
explanations with the powers chiefly interested in the navigation of the seas 
on our coasts, and relying that convenient occasions may be taken for these 
hereafter, finds it necessary in the mean time, to fix provisionally on some 
distance for the present government of these questions». 
47 See Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, Introduzione, in Jean BODIN, I sei libri 
dello Stato, vol. I, edited by Margherita Isnardi Parente, Utet, Torino, 1964, 
p. 53. 
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never mentioned in any of Jefferson’s letters. But, thanks to 
Jefferson’s autograph notation, we are offered the chance to read 
his writing through the transparency of his own legal 
understanding and may conclude that he viewed sovereignty 
through the lens of Bodin’s doctrine. 
If indeed the markings in the first book of the Republique 
could be legitimately considered Jefferson’s, as the tentative 
evidence gathered so far would seem to suggest, the volume 
would than acquire a special significance for anyone interested 
in Jefferson’s legal education, as it could offer a unique glimpse 
into Jefferson’s scrutiny of early modern continental legal and 
political scholarship. 
Along with the other early volumes belonging to his 
collection and with the rich Legal Commonplace Book he 
compiled as a young man (48), the marked copy of the 
Republique could belong to the cluster of sources that shaped his 
legal mind. After all, the passages highlighted appear consistent 
with Jefferson’s understanding of law as a comparative and 
historical endeavor and might have contributed to its 
consolidation. 
But the Republique was not the only early modern treatise of 
continental legal and political doctrine in Jefferson’s library. 
Along with it, the stacks at Monticello shelved the Vindiciae 
contra tyrannos (49), a few works edited by Théodore de Bèze 
                                                
48 See Douglas L. WILSON, Thomas Jefferson’s Early Notebooks, in The 
William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 42, n. 4, 1985, pp. 433-452. 
49 See Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. III, cit., pp. 1-2. 
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(50) and Francois Hotman (51), Louis Le Roy’s edition of 
Aristotle’s Politics and Plato’s Republic (52), the later Essais of 
Montaigne (53), an English translation of Charron’s De la 
sagesse (54), the Istoria delle guerre civili di Francia by Enrico 
                                                
50 See ibid., vol. II, p. 99. The catalog lists a French translation of the Psalms, 
edited by Clément Marot and de Bèze. The catalog also lists two translations 
of the New Testament by de Bèze. See ibid., vol. II, pp. 92 and 100. 
However, there is no entry in the catalogue recording Du droit des 
Magistrates, i.e. the main political treatise written by de Bèze and published 
in 1574. This absence is somewhat surprising. Nevertheless, Jefferson owned 
a copy of another treatise, written precisely to counter de Bèze and his 
doctrine. The treatise in question is Johan Baptist Fickler's De iure 
magistratuum (1578). Fickler clarifies his intent to refute the doctrine of de 
Bèze in the subtitle of his work: «Contra libellum cuiusdam Calvino, sub 
eadem inscriptione […]». This short treatise is bound in the same volume 
that collects together a latin translation of Machiavelli's Il principe, Agrippa’s 
oration Contra Monarchiam, Gaius Maecenas’ oration Pro Monarchia, and 
the Vindiciae contra tyrannos. Machiavelli, Agrippa and Mecenate are 
heavily annotated, although apparently not in Jefferson’s hand. A few 
autograph notations by Jefferson occur on the title pages of the Vindiciae and 
of Fickler’s treatise. See infra, as well as Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), 
Catalogue of the Library of Thomas Jefferson, vol. III, cit., pp. 1-2.  
51 Also Hotman’s main political treatise (Francogallia) is missing from 
Jefferson’s catalogue. Nevertheless, there is one entry recording his De jure 
connubiorum. See ibid., vol. II, p. 405. It is also worth noting that Jefferson 
might have learned about Hotman’s doctrine by reading Thomas Craig, who  
authored a treatise on feudal law and was strongly influenced by Hotman. 
See John G. A. POCOCK, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 79-92. Hotman’s doctrine 
is also amply discussed by Algernon Sidney in his Discourses on 
Government, which Jefferson described as «[…] a rich treasure of republican 
principles, supported by copious & cogent arguments, and adorned with the 
finest flowers of science […]» and regarded as «[…] probably the best 
elementary book of the principles of government, as founded in natural right 
which has ever been published in any language […]». Thomas JEFFERSON,  
letter to Mason Locke Weems, 13 December 1804, quoted in Emily Millicent 
SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas Jefferson, vol. III, cit., 
p. 13. 
52 See in Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. III, cit., p. 20. 
53 See Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. II, cit., pp. 46-46.  
54 See ibid., vol. II, cit., p. 156. 
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Caterino Davila (55), Denis Godfrey’s edition of Philippe de 
Commynes’ Memoirs (56) and Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire 
historique et critique (57), along with his Pensées sur la Comete 
de 1680 (58), his Critique générale de l’histoire du Calvinisme 
de Maimbourg (59), and an English translation of his 
Commentaire philosophique sur ces mots de Jésus-Christ (60). 
The presence of these works proves in itself the soundness of 
Mayer’s intuition and demonstrates how Jefferson’s interest in 
Bodin was part of his larger interest for 16th and 17th century 
scholarship. The legal, political, and religious controversies of 
the time reverberated, after all, in his own age, as sovereignty 
and freedom of conscience, subjecthood and citizenship were 
still some of the most vexing issues challenging the founders. 
Mayer’s intuition is even further supported by a few 
autograph notations, inscribed by Jefferson in an «early hand», 
on the title page of his own copy of the Vindiciae (61). Here, just 
below the title and the author's pseudonym, Jefferson inscribed 
«by Hubert Languet» and added «see 1st Hollis's memoirs. 129» 
(62).  
                                                
55 See Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. I, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1952, p. 88. 
56 See ibid., vol. I., cit., p. 87. 
57 See ibid., vol. I, cit., p. 66. 
58 See ibid., vol. II, cit., pp. 19-20. 
59 See ibid., vol. II, cit., p. 134. 
60 See ibid., vol. II, cit., p. 22. 
61 According to Sowerby the autograph notations are written by Jefferson see 
ibid. vol. III, cit., p. 2. Just how early this hand might be is hard to tell as the 
reference inscribed by Jefferson refers to a work published in 1780. See 
immediately below, note 62. 
62 Jefferson owned the 1589 Latin edition of the Vindiciae, which was 
published in octavo, along with the Latin translation of Machiavelli’s 
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These concise notations refer to page 129 of the first volume 
of Francis Blackburne’s Memoirs of Thomas Hollis and recalls a 
passage in which the author retraced the history surrounding the 
publication of the Vindiciae and attributed its authorship to 
Huber Languet (63).  
In doing so, the Memoirs expressly followed Pierre Bayle’s 
analysis. For his part, Bayle wrote in his Dictionnarie an 
extensive and detailed dissertation on the Vindiciae, with the 
intent to disprove any attribution of the text which did not 
recognize the authorship of Languet (64). By doing so, Bayle 
mentioned and discussed the work of the main antagonists of 
absolutism, offering to his readers - and among these especially 
to Jefferson - a wealth of information on Hotman, Bèze, Du 
Plessis Mornai, Languet, Fickler, Grotius, and even Milton.  
                                                                                                     
Principe edited by Sylvester Telius, Johan Baptist Fickler's De iure 
magistratuum, Agrippa’s oration Contra Monarchiam, and Gaius  Maecenas’ 
oration Pro  Monarchia under the title Nicolai Machiavelli Princeps. Ex 
Sylvestri Telii Fulginatis traductione diligenter emendata. Adiecta sunt 
eiusdem Argumenti aliorum quorundam contra Machiavellum Scripta de 
potestate & officio Principium contra Tyrannos, [n.p.], 1589, Thomas 
Jefferson Collection, Rare Books and Special Collections Division of the 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.  
63 On Jefferson’s copy of Francis BLACKBURNE, Memoirs of Thomas Hollis, 
London, 1780 see Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library 
of Thomas Jefferson, vol. I, cit., p. 166. As noted by Sowerby, «Jefferson’s 
copy was sent to him by Thomas Brand Hollis, the friend and heir of Thomas 
Hollis [in] 1878», ibid. On p. 129 of the Memoirs one may read: «There have 
been many debates concerning the real author of the Vindiciae, &c. which 
Mr. Bayle has endeavoured to adjust in a dissertation at the end of his 
dictionary, and seemingly with sufficient success, to put it out of doubt that 
the book was the work of the excellant Hubert Languet […]».  
64 See Pierre BAYLE., Dissertation concernant le livre d’Etienne Junius 
Brutus, imprimé l’an 1579, in ID. Dictionnarie politique et critique, vol. IV, 
Jean Luois Brandmuller, Basel, 1741, pp. 569-577, Special Collection, 
Società Letteraria di Verona.  
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It is hard to believe that Jefferson may have been interested 
in the authorship of the Vindiciae without at the same time 
admitting that he must have felt a strong interest in the doctrine 
of the Huguenot jurists of the 16th century. And, if indeed he 
happened to be drawn towards these authors and their doctrines, 
could he really have comprehended them without constantly 
comparing their tenets to the rival opinions of Bodin and the 
Politiques?  
So, assuming that Mayer was right and Jefferson closely read 
Bodin (as seems now to have been confirmed also by Armand 
London Fell’s research), it is most likely that his reading of the 
Republique was particularly attentive to the nuances and 
peculiarities of the work, that placed it whitin the doctrinal 
debate of the time.  
All these early modern works, though occasioned by a crisis 
of unprecedented order, as was the one that shook France and 
Europe in the late 16th century, addressed beyond any contingent 
concern, the nature of power and, even more so, of its 
constitutional limitations, and they did so by departing from or 
recalling, with unprecedented commitment, the principles of 
Roman law as reinterpreted by late medieval jurisprudence (65).  
                                                
65 See Diego QUAGLIONI, Dal costituzionalismo medievale al 
costituzionalismo moderno, in Annali del seminario giuridico dell’Università 
di Palermo, vol. 52, 2008, p. 57: «Tutte queste opere, benché occasionate da 
una crisi d’ordine senza precedenti, com’è quella che scuote la Francia e 
l’Europa di fine Cinquecento, ponevano in termini non contingenti la 
questione della natura del potere e più ancora quella dei “freni” del potere, 
cioè dei suoi limiti “costituzionali”, e lo facevano richiamandosi, ora per 
discostarsene ora per aderirvi ancor più radicalmente che in passato, alla 
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Read in this light, the several highlighted passages, in 
Jefferson’s copy of the Republique, on the natural law 
limitations that constrain the power of the prince acquire a 
remarkable importance and could indicate how deeply Bodin’s 
insistence on the natural law limitations constraining absolute 
power impressed Jefferson and led him to claim «as an axiom of 
eternal truth in politics, that whatever power in any government 
is independent, is absolute also […]. Independence can be 
trusted nowhere but with the people in mass. They are 
inherently independent of all but moral law» (66). 
In his earlier masterpiece, the Methodus ad facile historiarum 
cognitionem, Bodin insisted that a true lawyer should engage in 
a global study of legal and political institutions and of the 
principles and foundations that sustain them (67). Only by 
systematically mapping the permutations of law and comparing 
the causes that determined certain institutional arrangements in 
one country and fostered different ones in another could it be 
possible to review laws and comprehend the rationales behind 
them (68). No such review could be passed by someone who 
ignored the different manners of people or the historical laws 
according to which empires were erected and shattered. 
                                                                                                     
tradizione romanistica e alle sue rielaborazioni tardo-medievali, dotate ormai 
di un’autorità esemplare». 
66 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Spencer Roane, 6 September 1819, in Thomas 
Jefferson, Writings, edited by Merrill D. Peterson, New York, The Library of 
America, 1984, p. 1426. 
67 See Cesare VASOLI, Il metodo ne La République, in ID., Armonia e 
giustizia. Studi sulle idee filosofiche di Jean Bodin, edited by Enzo Baldini, 
Olschki, Firenze, 2008, p. 86.  
68 See ibid., p. 87. 
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The «storico-giurista», as Cesare Vasoli called him, must  
investigate the humanae actiones (quae) semper erroribus 
implicantur, and the customs, the manners of life, the different 
kinds of civilizations, the ethical and moral norms, the political 
institutions, the ever-changing beliefs and the multiple religions, 
in all the breadth of their variations though time and space and 
must do so, without allowing that such a transient and 
contingent variety of historical instances deflect him from his 
steady comprehension of the universal order in which all such 
events are ultimately encompassed (69).  
It is within such order that Bodin attempted to inscribe his 
doctrine on sovereignty. Whether such an attempt may be called 
successful is a question still debated by historians. But, 
regardless of the answer, it is an attempt that decisively 
influenced generations to come and introduced a distinctly 
historical and comparative bend into legal studies, that justified 
the need for an encyclopedic understanding of life.  
It seems to me that Jefferson shared a similar conviction. The 
very existence of his extensive library, the largest private 
collection gathered in America at the time, is proof of an 
education acquired through a seamless dialogue with the many 
voices of a centuries-old tradition (70). Moreover, the order he 
impressed to his library though its catalogue and its many 
partitions, under which he classified no less than «the whole of 
                                                
69 See ibid. 
70 See Robert C. BARON and Conrad EDICK WRIGHT, (eds.), The Libraries, 
Leadership, and Legacy of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, cit. 
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recorded knowledge» (71), reflected Jefferson’s historical and 
comparative understanding of law and politics. The same interes 
is mirrored by the several markings in the Republique, as they 
highlight an erudite inquiry in the historical sources of the 
Western legal tradition, of which Bodin’s work on the nature of 
sovereignty and its fundamental limitations proved to be one of 
the most decisive turning points. 
However, Jeffersonian scholarship seems to have been less 
concerned by similar doctrinal preoccupations and more intent 
on refining an impressive sociological sensitivity and enhancing 
its powers of psychological introspection. Earlier Jeffersonian 
scholarship has indeed sought to ascertain the ideological 
origins of American constitutionalism, but the interpretations 
suggested over the past fifty years have become somewhat 
conventional. Generally, they have tended to narrow down the 
sources Jefferson relied upon, in order to select a canon of 
politically consistent texts, and declare Jefferson’s affiliation to 
their creed (72). It would seem that these interpretations have 
told us more of Jefferson’s supposed political alignment, than of 
his intellectual and spiritual education. Nevertheless, such 
interpretations have certainly been able to demonstrate the 
decisive influence of a few authors on Jefferson’s doctrine (say, 
for instance, John Locke or James Harrington). Nontheless, they 
                                                
71 James GILREATH and Douglas L. WILSON, Introduction, in Thomas 
JEFFERSON, Thomas Jefferson’s Library: A Catalogue With Entries in His 
Own Order, cit., p. 2. 
72 A comprehensive review may be read in Perter S. ONUF, Making Sense of 
Jefferson, in ID., The Mind of Thomas Jefferson, University of Virginia Press, 
Charlottesville and London, 2007, pp.19-49. 
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have not been able to provide a thorough examination of the 
authorities gathered in Jefferson’s library and a deeper 
understanding of their significance as a whole.  
To this end, my concern in the following pages has not been 
to present a comprehensive account of Jefferson’s personality or 
of his thought. He himself never provided neither. It has rather 
been to read Jefferson’s doctrine in light of the tradition within 
which he consciously wrote and the scholarship that has most 
sharply interpreted it. I have attempted, in other words, to follow 
Jefferson in his effort to construe Western jurisprudence and 
construct a new scientific language out of the legal and political 
lexicon of the sources he studied throughout his life and 
gathered in his library (73). Hence, my work will revolve around 
the coming of age of a jurist and the invention of a new legal 
science. And its focus will be equally on Jefferson and on the 
books that he read and gathered in his great library. 
Although Jefferson’s papers comprise a wide range of 
political reflections, none articulate systematically his 
constitutional thought. Therefore, interpreters have read his 
doctrine according to political assumptions not always 
consistent with his jurisprudence. However, Jefferson was 
mindful of his own legacy and summarized it in a number of 
works, his epitaph being the main. In writing it, Jefferson did 
                                                
73 On Wester jurisprudence and American law see Harold J. BERMAN, The 
Historical Backgroung of American Law, in Talks on American Law: A 
Series of Broadcasts to Foreign Audiences by Members of the Harvard Law 
School Faculty, edited by Harold J. Berman, Vintage Books, New York, 
1961, pp. 3-17.  
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not only articulate his major accomplishments, he also digested 
the principles of his constitutionalism. In fact, by memorializing 
himself as «Author of the Declaration of Independence and of 
the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, and Father of the 
University of Virginia» (74), Jefferson signaled out his 
contribution to the three main fields of inquiry of modern 
political scholarship: what is sovereignty? In what relation does 
it stand to the freedom the individual’s conscience? And what 
body of knowledge prepares the individual’s conscience to 
handle the exercise of sovereign power?  
As this appears to have been the ultimate partition that 
Jefferson gave to his legacy, I will attempt to follow it by 
subdividing my dissertation into two parts, dealing respectively 
with his thoughts on sovereignty and religion, while collectively 
illustrating his engagement with the Western legal tradition in 
which he was educated as both a lawyer and a statesman. 
                                                
74 Quoted in Richard B. BERNSTEIN, Thomas Jefferson, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2003, p. IX. 
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Part One 
 
 
 
SOVEREIGNTY
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1 
 
 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE OF  
JEFFERSON’S DOCTRINE ON TYRANNY 
 
 
1. Tyranny in Western Jurisprudence  
In keeping with the Western legal tradition, Thomas Jefferson 
(1743-1826) held sovereignty to be the lawful expression of 
supreme power (1). This ultimately medieval persuasion in the 
supremacy of law over politics led him to regard power as 
«arbitrary» whenever history could prove that its acquisition or 
its exercise had been achieved through a series of «usurpations» 
or «abuses» (2). In both cases, in fact, power degenerated into 
«tyranny», for having either been acquired through an act of 
force devoid of right, or for having been exercised in spite of its 
                                                
1 See Hannah ARENDT, On Revolution, The Viking Press, New York, 1963, 
re-published by Penguin, London, 1990, p. 181: «The men of the American 
Revolution […] understood by power the very opposite of a pre-political 
natural violence. To them, power came into being when and where people 
would get together and bind themselves through promises, covenants, and 
mutual pledges; only such power, which rested on reciprocity and mutuality, 
was real power and legitimate, whereas the so-called power of kings or 
princes or aristocrats, because it did not spring from mutuality but, at best, 
rested only on consent, was spurious and usurped». 
2 Thomas JEFFERSON, Original Rough Draught of the Declaration of 
Independence, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 424. 
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constitutional limitations (3). To be regarded as «just» power 
needed, instead, a proper foundation: sovereignty could not 
emanate but from a title capable of constituting, at once, its 
lawful source and its limiting principle (4).  
This distinction between arbitrary and legitimate power 
allowed Jefferson to digest American political experience 
according to the scientific legacy of European jurisprudence and 
justify American independence by qualifying British rule as 
tyrannical. Such indictment could hardly have been pronounced 
had the notion of tyranny not retained, however indirectly, in the 
last quarter of the 18th century, some trace of the technical 
meaning it had acquired at the height of the ius commune, when 
tyranny came to be understood as the subversion of iurisdictio, 
i.e. as the radical perversion of that sacred rule of nature 
established by God to adjudicate questions of power and order 
human society accordingly (5). 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 423. 
5 Written in the imminence of one of the darkest apparitions of perverted 
power, the classical English study on tyranny is Ephraim EMERTON, 
Humanism and Tyranny. Studies in the Italian Trecento, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1925, reprinted by Peter Smith, Gloucester, 1964. A more 
recent and succinct account of medieval doctrines on tyranny and resistance 
may be found in Anthony BLACK, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 148-152. The literature 
on medieval conceptions of iurisdictio is as vast as well known. The standard 
references are: Francesco CALASSO, «Jurisdictio» nel diritto commune 
classico, in Studi in onore di Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz nel XLV anno del suo 
insegnamento, vol. 4, Jovene, Napoli, 1953, pp. 423-443, also published in 
Annali di storia del diritto, vol. 9, 1965, pp. 89-110; Walter ULLMANN, Law 
and Jurisdiction in the Middle Ages, edited by George Garnett, Variorum 
Reprints, London, 1988; Pietro COSTA, Iurisdictio. Semantica del potere 
politico nella giuspubblicistica medievale (1100-1433), Giuffrè, Milano, 
1969; Harold J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western 
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It had taken the greatest of all medieval jurists, Bartolus a 
Saxoferrato (1314-1357), to transpose in the sharp language of 
the law the theological and political notion of tyranny (6). His 
effort to classify the perverted forms of acquisition and exercise 
of power led him to revise the µεταβολαί τών πολιτειών 
according to the Scholastic reading of Aristotle and compose the 
first comprehensive treatise on the tyrannical degeneration of 
government, entitled De tyranno (7). Its lasting influence over 
                                                                                                     
Legal Tradition, cit., pp. 289-292; Diego QUAGLIONI, «Dominium», 
«iurisdictio», «imperium». Gli elementi non-moderni della modernità 
giuridica, in Gli inizi del diritto pubblico, Die Anfänge des öffentlichen 
Rechts, vol. 3, Verso la costruzione del diritto pubblico tra medioevo e 
modernità, Auf dem Wege zur Etablierung des öffentlichen Rechts zwischen 
Mittelalter und Moderne, edited by Gerhard Dilcher and Diego Quaglioni, Il 
Mulino, Bologna, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2011, pp. 663-677. The 
greatest medieval account of the anti-tyrannical purpose of universal 
jurisdictions was given by DANTE ALIGHIERI in Monarchia, edited by Diego 
Quaglioni, in Opere, vol. 2, published under the direction of Marco 
Santagata, Mondadori, Milano, 2014, pp. 809-1415. Conversely, BARTOLUS 
A SAXOFERRATO observed that «cum Imperium fuit prostratum insurrexerunt 
dirae tyrannides», Super constitutione extravaganti Ad reprimendum, glo. «In 
cuius tranquillitate», n. 7, in ID., Consilia, Quaestiones, et Tractatus, vol. 10, 
Venetiis, 1596, fol. 95rA, as quoted in Francesco CALASSO, Gli ordinamenti 
giuridici del rinascimento medievale, Giuffrè, Milano, 1965, p. 263. 
6 The most recent biographical entry written on Bartolus is Diego 
QUAGLIONI, Bartolus a Saxoferrato, in Encyclopedia of Diplomacy, edited by 
Gordon Martel, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, forthcomming. Classical 
accounts of his life and thought may be read in Cecil Nathan Sidney WOOLF, 
Bartolus of Sassoferrato: His Position in the History of Medieval Political 
Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1913; and Francesco 
CALASSO, Bartolo da Sassoferrato, in Dizionario biografico degli italiani, 
vol. 6, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Roma, 1964, pp. 640-669. The 
political and theological origins of the juristic conception of tyranny have 
been retraced in Diego QUAGLIONI, «Quant tyranie sormonte, la justice est 
perdue». Alle origini del paradigma giuridico del tiranno, in Tiranni e 
tirannidi nel Trecento italiano, edited by Andrea Zorzi, Viella, Roma, 2013, 
pp. 37-56. 
7 The critical edition is published in Diego QUAGLIONI, Politica e diritto nel 
trecento italiano. Il “De tyranno” di Bartolo da Sassoferrato (1314-1357). 
Con l’edizione critica dei trattati “De Guelphis et Gebellinis”, “De regimine 
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the Western legal tradition provided generations of lawyers with 
a technical definition of tyranny, which fulfilled, according to 
Diego Quaglioni, «una funzione eminentemente costituzionale» 
(8). 
Bartolus began classifying the deviated forms of government 
by defining tyranny as the quintessentially unlawful political 
regime: «tyrannus civitatis est qui in civitate non iure 
principatur» (9). His silent paraphrase of St. Gregory the Great’s 
definition of a tyrant, «tyrannus dicitur qui […] non iure 
principatur» (10), led him to acknowledge that there were as 
many forms of tyranny, as were the means of perverting power.  
«Sicut autem non iure principari multis modis contingit, ita 
multe sunt tyrannorum species» (11). So, Bartolus distinguished 
tyranny in two species, depending on whether the unlawful 
                                                                                                     
civitatis” e “De tyranno”, Olschki, Firenze, 1983, pp. 171-213. An English 
translation of the De tyranno may be read in Eric COCHRANE and Julius 
KIRSHNER, (eds.), University of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization, 
vol. 5, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986, pp. 7-30. The medieval 
reception of Aristotelian political thought is summarized in, once again, 
Anthony BLACK, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, cit., pp. 136-146. 
8 Diego QUAGLIONI, Tyrannis, in Il lessico della “Politica” di Johannes 
Althusius. L’arte della simbiosi santa, giusta, vantaggiosa e felice, edited by 
Francesco Ingravalle and Corrado Malandrino, Olschki, Firenze, 2005, p. 
325. 
9 BARTOLUS A SAXOFERRATO, Tractatus de tyranno, in Diego QUAGLIONI, 
Politica e diritto nel trecento italiano., cit., p. 184. In previous paragraphs 
Bartolus acknowledged that tyranny could only occur where there was actual 
jurisdiction, such as in the empire, in the kingdom, in the city or in the 
household and even in the conscience, if plans and arrangements for 
tyrannical action were actually under way. However, from the fifth paragraph 
onward, his treatise was mostly dedicated to the tyrannical degeneration of 
city government, which he considered to be an instance of exemplary 
political importance. 
10 Ibid., p. 177. 
11 Ibid., p. 184. 
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pursuit of power had been achieved through a series of 
undisguised or rather concealed acts of usurpation or abuse. He 
called the first overt or manifest, the second veiled or concealed. 
«Nam quidam est tyrannus apertus et manifestus, quidam est 
tyrannus velatus et tacitus» (12).  
Manifest subversion could either be ex defectu tituli or ex 
parte exercitii. The distinction was drawn on the basis of a well-
known categorization outlined by St. Thomas Aquinas 
according to earlier canon law sources (13). Bartolus followed it 
by distinguishing tyrants which had come to power by usurping 
their office, from tyrants who abused the power legitimately 
entrusted to them. The ones brandished a power to which they 
were not entitled: «tyrannus manifestus ex defectu tituli [est] ille 
qui in civitate sine iusto titulo manifeste principatur» (14). The 
others stretched the power entrusted to them beyond its limits, 
by pursuing partisan interests rather than the common good: 
                                                
12 Ibid., pp. 184-185. English translations of the aforementioned passages are 
provided in Eric COCHRANE and Julius KIRSHNER, (eds.), University of 
Chicago Readings in Western Civilization, vol. 5, cit., p. 15. 
13 See Robert Warrand CARLYLE and Alexander James CARLYLE, A History 
of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, vol. 6, Political Theory from 1300 
to 1600, William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1936, p. 81. A 
much more detailed analysis of the sources from which Bartolus drew this 
distinction is in Diego QUAGLIONI, Politica e diritto nel trecento italiano, 
cit., pp. 44-45: «La stessa distinzione […] è di diretta derivazione dal 
commento di Innocenzo IV alle decretali Nihil est quod Ecclesiae e Cum ex 
iniuncto (c. 44, X, i, 6 e c. 2, X, v, 32) […]. Gli stessi canoni Neque enim e 
Principatus (c. 9, C. XIV, q. v e c. 25, C. I, q. i), che riproducono due luoghi 
del De bono coniugali di Agostino e dell’Epistola XIII di Leone Magno e che 
costituiscono senza dubbio alcuno la fonte prima e più importante della 
distinzione bartoliana, sono espressamente allegati in più luoghi del De 
tyranno giusto come canones, come autorità normative e non semplicemente 
come fonti dottrinali».  
14 BARTOLUS A SAXOFERRATO, Tractatus de tyranno, in Diego QUAGLIONI, 
Politica e diritto nel trecento italiano, cit., p. 185. 
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«tyrannus est ex parte exercitii, qui opera tyrannica facit, hoc 
est, opera eius non tendunt ad bonum commune, sed proprium 
ipsius tyranni» (15).  
Concealed forms of tyranny, on the other hand, could either 
be propter defectum tituli or propter titulum. Both equally 
masked the subversion of legitimate authority under their 
apparent compliance with fundamental laws (16). Magistrates 
turned into tyrants propter defectum tituli whenever they 
remained in office beyond the term for which tenure had been 
granted them, exercising a power they were no longer entitled 
to. «Primum [velamen est], quod quis facit sibi concedi 
iurisdictionem ad tempus, et finito tempore refirmari […]» (17). 
Whereas tyrants propter titulum arose whenever subordinate 
magistrates arbitrarily exercised a power far greater than the one 
properly conferred to them by their office. «Secundum velamen 
est, quod quidam tyranni faciunt sibi fieri aliquem titulum, cui 
nulla quasi iurisdictio inest […] Certe ex isto titulo tyrannus non 
est. Sed ex hoc quandoque in tantam venit potentiam, quod 
officia civitatis ordinat prout vult, et officiales ei obediunt ut 
                                                
15 Ibid., p. 196. English translations are provided in Eric COCHRANE and 
Julius KIRSHNER, (eds.), University of Chicago Readings in Western 
Civilization, vol. 5, cit., pp. 15, 22. 
16 As noted by Francesco CALASSO in Gli ordinamenti giuridici del 
rinascimento medievale, cit., p. 263: «[…] c’è invece un’altra sorta di 
tirannide, quella che [Bartolo] chiama ‘velata et tacita’, che viene esercitata 
sotto la maschera del rispetto delle forme costituzionali». 
17 BARTOLUS A SAXOFERRATO, Tractatus de tyranno, in Diego QUAGLIONI, 
Politica e diritto nel trecento italiano, cit., p. 208.  
43 
 
domino: tunc dico, quod si opera tyrannica facit vel fieri facit, 
vere tyrannus est» (18). 
By classifying these four aberrations of legitimate authority 
Bartolus fixed the legal contours of each deviation of power. He 
unified the multiple forms in which tyranny historically 
presented itself into a «rigorous paradigm» of perverted 
government. And concluded that not only were tyrannical acts 
inherently void, but tyranny itself could be legitimately 
redressed by deposing the illegitimate ruler (19).  
Quaglioni has written extensively on this paradigm and has 
summarized the complex history of its later receptions, through 
the succeeding revolutions and convulsions of the Western legal 
tradition, in an entry on Johannes Althusius (1563-1638) and his 
early 17th century re-visitation of the tyrannical perversio 
                                                
18 Ibid., p. 209. English translations are provided in Eric COCHRANE and 
Julius KIRSHNER, (eds.), University of Chicago Readings in Western 
Civilization, vol. 5, cit., pp. 27, 28. 
19 Diego QUAGLIONI and Vittor Ivo COMPARATO, Italy, in European Political 
Thought, 1450-1700. Religion, Law and Philosophy, edited by Howell A. 
Lloyd, Glenn Burgess, and Simon Hodson, Yale University Press, New 
Haven and London, 2007, p. 67. Effects and remedies to tyranny are 
analytically discussed in paragraphs VII, IX, XI, and XII of the treatise 
authored by Bartolus. Whereas Bartolus regarded tyrannical acts to be 
inherently void, just as contracts stipulated by the tyrannus ex defectu tituli or 
prosecutions brought against political expatriates, he did not challenge the 
validity of contracts stipulated by the tyrannus ex parte exercitii that did not 
imping on the common good or prosecution of citizen that would have been 
equally carried out under a non-tyrannical rule. In regards to the deposition of 
the tyrant, Batolus held it to be one of the chief responsibilities of each 
superior jurisdiction and ultimately entrusted it to the Emperor and the Pope. 
See BARTOLUS A SAXOFERRATO, Tractatus de tyranno, in Diego QUAGLIONI, 
Politica e diritto nel trecento italiano, cit., pp. 188-196, 202-204, 205-207, 
211-213. 
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ordinis (20). From this vantage point it appears clear that, once 
tyranny entered into the language of the law, it remained part of 
the lexicon through which political obliquities were rationalized 
and rectified, for as long as human enterprises and political 
agency were believed in need to comply with some notion of 
transcendental justice (21). Once this need began to be 
questioned, either by those who followed Machiavelli (1469-
1527) in acknowledging that political agency was compelled to 
a greater degree by the harsher laws of history than by the 
abstract principles of religion and morality (22), or by those who 
exasperated Bodin (1529/30-1596) in emphasizing power’s 
capacity to establish and maintain itself regardless of consent or 
                                                
20 Diego QUAGLIONI, Tyrannis, in Il lessico della “Politica” di Johannes 
Althusius, cit., pp. 325-337. 
21 The ethical need shared by law and politics to comply with some notion of 
transcendental justice is one of the defining features of the ius commune. See 
generally Bruno PARADISI, Il pensiero politico dei giuristi medievali, in 
Storia delle idee politiche, economiche e sociali, vol. 2, Ebraismo e 
Cristianesimo. Il Medioevo, book 2, edited by Luigi Firpo, Utet, Torino, 
1983, pp. 211-366 and especially, p. 212: «Ogni costruzione teorica [dello ius 
commune] sulla natura e sui poteri degli organismi politici non si fondava 
così sulla constatazione delle loro possibilità effettuali, ma in primo luogo su 
una giustificazione etico giuridica che soddisfacesse la giustizia, premessa 
fondamentale di ogni azione e modo d’essere concernente le relazioni 
umane». 
22 On history’s normativity see Diego QUAGLIONI, Machiavelli e la lingua 
della giurisprudenza, in Il pensiero politico, vol. 32, n. 1, 1999, pp. 171-185, 
now collected in ID., Machiavelli e la lingua della giurisprudenza. Una 
letteratura della crisi, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2011, pp. 57-75. See also Corrado 
VIVANTI, Niccolò Machiavelli. I tempi della politica. Donzelli, Roma, 2008, 
pp. 111-116. Whereas, on the persistent relevance of justice in Machiavelli’s 
political doctrine see Erica BENNER, Machiavelli’s Ethics, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2009, pp. 290-324; as well as Diego 
QUAGLIONI, Machiavelli, the Prince and the Idea of Justice, in Italian 
Culture, vol. 32, n. 2, 2014, pp. 110-121.   
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compliance with higher laws of nature and God (23), the notion 
of tyranny began to lose its edge. But, even at this later juncture, 
tyranny was still far from becoming «un tόpos erudito o una 
questione obsoleta» (24).  
Bodin himself had never formally dismissed the institution of 
tyranny, nor had he ever supported tyrannical rule (25). His 
absolute monarch was in no way a tyrant. «Quite the contrary: 
as God’s representative, he was supposed to rule by just laws» 
                                                
23 Chief among early misreaders of the Republique was James I, who 
stiffened Bodin’s doctrine and turned it into an authoritarian ideology by 
disregarding the several checks that Bodin had firmly maintained in place to 
limit sovereignty from transgressing its natural boundaries. See Harold J. 
BERMAN, Law and Revolution, II. The Impact of the Protestant Reformations 
on the Western Legal Tradition, cit., pp. 234-238; Glenn BURGESS, British 
Political Thought, 1500-1600, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2009, pp. 142-
152; and more generally Diego QUAGLIONI, La sovranità, Laterza, Bari, 
2004, p. 44 Insights may be also gathered from Kenneth PENNINGTON, The 
Prince and the Law, 1200-1600. Sovereignty and Rights in the Wester Legal 
Tradition, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993, p. 202. The 
varying receptions of Bodin’s thought have been explored in Howell A. 
LLOYD, (ed.), The Reception of Bodin, cit. 
24 Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, Jean Bodin su tirannide e signoria nella 
«République», in La «République» di Jean Bodin. Atti del convegno di 
Perugia, 14-15 novembre 1980, Firenze, Olschki, 1981, pp. 61-77, now 
collected in ID., Rinascimento politico in Europa, edited by Diego Quaglioni 
e Paolo Carta, Cedam, Padova, 2008, pp. 131-149: 139. A conventional 
reading of tyranny, that places little to no relevance on its juristic character, 
but significantly emphasizes its renewed relevance for modern political 
discourse across the Atlantic, may be found in John H. M. SALMON, Tyranny, 
Theory of, in Europe, 1450 to 1789: Encyclopedia of the Early Modern 
World, vol. 6, Tasso to Zwingli; Index, edited by Jonathan Dewald, Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, New York, 2004, pp. 84-87. 
25 See Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, Jean Bodin su tirannide e signoria nella 
«République», cit. On Bodin’s understanding of the limits binding absolute 
sovereignty see generally Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, Introduzione, in 
Jean BODIN, I sei libri dello stato, vol. 1, Utet, Torino, 1964, pp. 11-100; and 
Diego QUAGLIONI, I limiti della sovranità. Il pensiero di Jean Bodin nella 
cultura politica e giuridica della modernità, Cedam, Padova, 1992. 
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(26). Should he, instead, overstep the limits of his power and 
transgress God’s explicit commandments, his rule would indeed 
become tyrannical, «but his subjects [would still be] required 
[…] to obey him», for the prince’s exclusive accountability to 
God was the defining feature of Bodin’s notion of absolute 
sovereignty (27).  However, his detailed enumeration of the 
tyrant’s distinguishing features is, quite remarkably, one of the 
several passages highlighted in Jefferson’s own copy of Les Six 
Livres de la Republique (28). And, although the institute of 
                                                
26 Harold J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution, II. The Impact of the Protestant 
Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition, cit., p. 236. 
27 Ibid., p. 237. See also Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, Introduzione, cit., p. 
28-29; and more generally Diego QUAGLIONI, Il pensiero politico 
dell’assolutismo, in Il pensiero politido. Idee teorie dottrine, vol. 2, Età 
moderna, edited by Alberto Andreatta and Artemio Enzo Baldini, Utet, 
Torino, 1999, pp. 99-125. 
28 See Jean BODIN, Les Six Livres de la Republique, cit., livre II, chapitre 4, 
De la Monarchie Tyrannique, p. 290: «l’un s’efforce de maintenir les 
subiects en paix & vnion: l’autre y met tousiours diuision, pour les ruiner les 
vns par les autres, & s’engraisser de confiscations: l’un prend plaisir d’estre 
veu quelquesfois, & oui de ses subiects: l’autre se cache tousiours d’eux, 
comme de ses ennemis.  l’un fait estat de l’amour de son peuple: l’autre de la 
peur. l’un ne craint iamais que pour ses subiects: l’autre ne redoute rien plus 
que ceux-là. l’un ne charge les fiens que le moins qu’il peut, & pour la 
necessité publique: l’autre hume le sang, ronge les os, succe la mouelle des 
subiects pour les affoiblir. l’un cherche les plus gents de bien pour employer 
aux charges publiques: l’autre n’y employe que les larrons & plus meschants, 
pour s’en seruir comme d’esponges. l’un donne les estats & offices pour 
obuier aux concussions & foule du people: l’autre les vend le plus cher qu’il 
peut pour leur donner moyen d’affoiblir le peuple par  larcins, & puis couper 
la gorge aux larrons, pour estre reputé bon iusticier. l’un mesure ses moeurs, 
& façons au pied des loix: l’autre faict seruir les loix à ses moeurs. l’un est 
aimé & adore de tous ses subiects: l’autre les hait tous, & est hai de tous. l’un 
n’a recours en guerre qu’à ses subiects: l’autre ne fait guerre qu’à ceux-là. 
l’un n’à garde y garnison que des siens: l’autre que d’estrangers. l’un 
s’esiouist d’un repos assure, & tranquilité haute: l’autre languit en perpetuelle 
crainte. l’un attend la vie tres heureuse: l’autre ne peut euiter le supplice 
eternel. l’un est honnoré en sa vie, & desire apres sa mort: l’autre est diffamé 
en sa vie & deschiré apres sa mort. Il n’est pas besoin de verifier cecy par 
beaucoup d’examples, qui son en veue d’un chacun. Car nous trouuons és 
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tyranny did lose much of its technical sharpness once Bodin had 
so firmly denied that sovereignty rested upon consent (29), this 
very doctrine was challenged by contemporary Huguenot jurists, 
who recovered the medieval notion of tyranny in their effort to 
oppose the progressive centralization of power and compulsion 
of religious beliefs that led to the outbreak of the 16th century 
Wars of Religion (30).  
Not only was Jefferson quite familiar with this literature, but 
he placed the Vindiciae contra tyrannos, the most vigorous 
Huguenot inquiry into the nature of power and the forms of its 
tyrannical degeneration (31), as the very first entry in the chapter 
                                                                                                     
histoires, la tyrannie auoir esté si detestable,qu’il n’estoit pas iusques aux 
escholiers & aux femmes […]». Here the page ends, and so does the marginal 
marking, the phrase continues thusly on the next page: «qui n’ayent voulu 
gaigner le prix d’honneur à tuer les tyrans […]». 
29 See Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, Jean Bodin su tirannide e signoria nella 
«République», cit., p. 145. On tyranny’s inherent subversion of the 
consensual foundation of legitimate power in Bartolus, see Diego 
QUAGLIONI, Tyrannis, cit., pp. 236-237. 
30 See Saffo TESTONI BINETTI, Il pensiero politico ugonotto. Dallo studio 
della storia all’idea di contratto (1572-1579), Centro editoriale toscano, 
Firenze, 2002; and Michael WALTZER, The Revolution of the Saints. A Study 
in the Origin of Radical Politics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and 
London, 1982, pp. 68-92. The compulsion of religious beliefs as a new and 
typically modern ground upon which to resist against any tyrannical 
degeneration of power is highlighted in Alessandro FONTANA, Du droit de 
resistance au devoir d’insurrection, in Le Droit de résistance, XIIe-XXe 
siècle, edited by Jean-Claude Zancarini, ENS Éditions, Fontanay Saint-
Cloud, 1999, pp. 15-33. A classic overview of Huguenot resistance theories, 
published only one year before Ephraim Emerton’s study on tyranny in the 
Italian Trecento, is Harold J. LASKI, Historical Introduction, in A Defence of 
Liberty Against Tyrants, a Translation of the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos by 
Junius Brutus, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1924, pp. 1-60. 
31 The Vindiciae contra tyrannos was first published in 1579, under the 
pseudonym of Stephanus Junius Brutus. Although the title page reported 
Edinburgh as the place of publication, the true publisher, Thomas Guérin, 
was based in Basel. See STEPHANUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae Contra 
Tyrannos, sive De Principis in Populum et Populi in Principe legitima 
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on politics of his 1783 library catalogue, which arranged the 
books of his collection both by subject and importance (32). This 
prominent placement would appear to suggest Jefferson’s high 
esteem for the treatise that, in the second half of the 16th century, 
offered, as its contribution to the ongoing debate on sovereignty, 
a passionate plea in favor of prosecuting and deposing rulers 
who had unlawfully acquired or exercised their power.   
To this end, not only did the Vindiciae expressly maintain the 
distinction between the tyrannus absque titulo and the tyrannus 
exercitio (33), but it built its case against tyranny by charging the 
                                                                                                     
potestate, Edimburgi, 1579. Two years later, the treatise, which had 
originally appeared in Latin, was published in French, see ETIENNE JUNIUS 
BRUTUS, De la puissance legitime du prince sur le peuple et du peuple sur le 
prince. Traits trtes-utile et digne de lecture en ce temps, secret en Latin par 
Estienne Junius Brutus, et nouvellement traduit en François, 1581. An 
extensively commented re-issue of the French 1581 edition is provided in 
ETIENNE JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae contra tyrannos. Tradution française du 
1581, introduced and commented by Arlette Jouanna, André Turnon, Henri 
Weber, et al., Droz, Genève, 1979. The most recent English translation and 
commentary of the text is given in STEPHANUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae 
Contra Tyrannos: or, Concerning the Legitimate power of a Prince over the 
People, and of the People over the Prince, edited and translated by George 
Garnett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, re-issued in 2003. 
32 In his later, and now lost, 1814 catalogue Jefferson supposedly listed the 
Vindiciae as entry number 8 in his chaper on Politics. See James GILREATH 
and Douglas L. WILSON, (eds.), Thomas Jefferson’s Library: A Catalogue 
with Entries in his own Order, cit., p. 80. Jefferson’s complex system of 
classification in analyzed ibid., pp. 2-3. 
33 See STEPHANUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, [n.p.], 1589, 
quaestio III, Qui sint tyranni, p. 167, Thomas Jefferson Collection, Rare 
Books and Special Collections Division of the Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.: «Eum itaque tyrannum, vtpote regi plane contrarium esse, 
sequitur qui aut vi malisque artibus imperium invasit, aut vltro sponteque 
delatum regnum contra ius & fas regit, conraque leges & pacta, quibus sese 
sacrosante devinxit pervicaciter administrat. Quod etiam utrumque in unum  
eundemque hominem cadere potest. Ille vulgo dicitur Tyrannus absque 
titutlo, hic Tyrannus exercitio».  For an English translation see STEPHANUS 
JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos: or, Concerning the Legitimate 
power of a Prince over the People, and of the People over the Prince, cit., p. 
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tyrant, and especially the tyrant ex parte exercitii, for sedition. 
By arguing that all rulers received their power from the people 
and where thus no more than its chief magistrates (34), the 
Vindiciae maintained that, whenever a prince disregarded the 
word he had given to his people or perverted the laws of the 
commonwealth, he betrayed his subjects, violated the majesty of 
the body politic, and turned himself into a rebel (35). Guilty of 
lèse-majesté (36), not only resistance against his rule was 
legitimate, but so was also his deposition (37).  
                                                                                                     
140. The notion of tyrannus absque titulo appears here to have subsumed 
within itself all cases of illegitimate acquisition of power, be they manifest or 
concealed. 
34 See STEPHANUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, cit., quaestio 
III, Adversus Tyrannos exercitio quantum iure concedatur, p. 187: «Deinde 
probauimus, reges omnes regiam dignitatem a populo accipere; populum 
universum rege potiorem & superiorem esse; regem regni, imperatorem 
imperii supremum tantum ministum & actorem esse: populum vero, vere 
dominum existere». For an English translation see STEPHANUS JUNIUS 
BRUTUS, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos: or, Concerning the Legitimate power 
of a Prince over the People, and of the People over the Prince, cit., p. 156. 
35 See STEPHANUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, cit., quaestio 
III, Adversus Tyrannos exercitio quantum iure concedatur, p. 185: «At certe 
si rempublicam consulto evertat, si iura proterue peruertat, si nullam fidei 
datae, nullam conventionum, nullam iustitae, nullam pietatis curam habeat: si 
suorum ipse sit hostis, si denique eas artes, quas enumerauimus, aut omnes, 
aut precipuas ineat: tum sane tyrannus […] id est Dei hominumque hostis, 
iudicari poterit». And ibid. quaestio III, Adversus Tyrannos exercitio 
quantum iure concedatur, p. 187: «Sequitur ergo, tyrannum in populum, 
tanquam feudi dominum, feloniam committere, regni imperiique sacram 
Maiestatem laedere, rebellem esse […]». For an English translation see 
STEPHANUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos: or, Concerning the 
Legitimate power of a Prince over the People, and of the People over the 
Prince, cit., pp. 154-155, 156.  
36 See generally Mario SBRICCOLI, Crimen laesae maiestatis. Il problema del 
reato politico alle soglie della scienza penalistica moderna, Giuffrè, Milano, 
1974. 
37 See STEPHANUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, cit., quaestio 
III, Adversus Tyrannos exercitio quantum iure concedatur, p. 187: «Itaque, 
ait Bartolus, poterit is deponi a superiore […]. Superior vero, universus 
populous est, quive eum repraesentant». For an English translation see 
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The claim, first advanced by Bartolus in his treatise on 
tyranny and recalled in his glosses to the constitution Quoniam 
nuper of Henry VII (38), became, through the mediation of the 
Vindiciae and its recollection of both texts, the ground upon 
which English and American revolutionaries maintained the 
rightfulness of deposing tyrannical rulers. 
Whereas deposing tyrants had been the ultimate responsibility 
of the Empire and the Church for as long as Western societies 
had recognized the existence of the two universal jurisdictions 
ordained by God to guide men in spiritual and temporal affairs 
(39), once these jurisdictions had been compromised in their 
universality, either by the insurgence of national polities or by 
                                                                                                     
STEPHANUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos: or, Concerning the 
Legitimate power of a Prince over the People, and of the People over the 
Prince, cit., pp. 156. 
38 For Bartolus’s qualification of tyrants ex parte exercitii as «ipso iure […] 
rebelles» see BARTOLUS A SAXOFERRATO, Tractatus de tyranno, in Diego 
QUAGLIONI, Politica e diritto nel trecento italiano, cit., pp. 204. On his 
glosses to the extravagentes of Henry VII see Diego QUAGLIONI, «Rebellare 
idem est quam resistere». Obéissance et résistance dans les gloses de Bartolo 
à la constitution «Quoniam nuper» d’Henri VII, in Le Droit de résistance 
XIIe-XXe siècle, edited by Jean-Claude Zancarini, cit., pp. 35-46, and 
especially p. 38. For a general analysis of Henry VII’s constitutions, and the 
reaction they provoked among jurists see Kenneth PENNINGTON, Henry VII 
and Robert of Naples, in Jürgen MIETHKE, Das Publikum politischer Theorie 
in 14. Jarhundert, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 1992, pp. 81-92; now 
expanded in ID., The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600. Sovereignty and Rights 
in the Western Legal Tradition, cit., pp. 165-201, and especially pp. 196-201. 
The most recent contribution on the matter is Christian ZENDRI, La 
legislazione pisana di Enrico VII: Problemi filologici e interpretativi, in 
Enrico VII, Dante e Pisa a 700 anni dalla morte dell’imperatore e dalla 
Monarchia (1313-2013), edited by Giuseppe Petralia and Marco Santagata, 
Longo, Ravenna, 2016, pp. 337-357.  
39 See BARTOLUS A SAXOFERRATO, Tractatus de tyranno, in Diego 
QUAGLIONI, Politica e diritto nel trecento italiano, cit., p. 202: «[A]d 
superiorem pertinent populum de servitude eripere» wrote Bartolus, 
concerning himself primarily with the imperial jurisdiction. «Item ad 
superiorem spectat tyrannos deponere» he added immediately after.  
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the schism that had fractured Christianity after the Reformation, 
neither could enforce any longer the correction of political 
obliquities. And so the deposition of tyrants fell on other 
shoulders. Those of the people, or rather of their representatives, 
claimed the Vindiciae, as it contended that no magistracy, not 
even the king, was superior to the collective body of the people 
acting through the agency of the officers representing it (40).  
It was these magistrates, observed John Milton (1608-1674) 
seventy years later in a treatise written to justify the deposition 
and execution of king Charles I, who were called to enforce the 
king’s subjection to the law, originally «enacted as a rule» by 
«Theodosius the yonger», then included in Justinian’s Codex as 
the lex Digna Vox (C. 1, 14, 4), and later quoted at the outset of 
the Vindiciae as both a recollection of medieval 
constitutionalism and the clearest proclamation «that a Prince is 
bound to the Laws; that on the authority of Law the authority of 
a Prince depends, and to the Laws ought submit» (41). «Digna 
                                                
40 See Michael WALZER, The Revolution of the Saints. A Study in the Origins 
of Radical Politics, cit., pp. 84-85.  
41 John MILTON, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, in The Complete 
Works of John Milton, vol. 6, Vernacular Regicide and Republican Writings, 
edited by Neil H. Keeble and Nicholas McDowell, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2013, p. 158. On the legal authority of the principle that Milton 
claimed to have been enacted as a rule see the contrary argument provided in 
Ennio CORTESE, Il problema della sovranità nel pensiero giuridico 
medievale, Bulzoni, Roma, 1966, re-issued in 1982, p. 141-142: «Teodosio 
aveva designato questa sua legge con l’appellativo di ‘oraculum praesentis 
edicti’. Azzone commenta: ‘[…] et bene dicit oraculo, quia per legem istam 
orat futurum imperatorem quod ita faciat, cum ei imperare non possit […]’. 
Data, infatti, l’incontrovertibile regola che il principe non possa ritenersi 
vincolato in senso tecnico dalle norme dei suoi predecessori, non essendo 
soggetto alla loro autorità, questi possono indirizzargli tutt’al più un invito, 
una semplice suasio a mantenere un certo comportamento. Posto, cioè, che 
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vox [est] maiestate regnantis legibus alligatum se principem 
profiteri: adeo de auctoritate iuris nostra pendet auctoritas; et re 
vera maius imperio est submittere legibus: et oraculo praesentis 
edicti quod nobis licere non patimur [aliis] indicamus» (42). 
As influential as the Vindiciae became during the English 
Revolution (43), the lex Digna vox had already established itself 
as one of the main sources of English constitutionalism by the 
second half of the 13th century, when Bracton (c. 1210 - c. 1268) 
had incorporated its text in his De Legibus et Consuetudinibius 
Angliae among the authoritative foundations of his doctrine on 
kingship (44). So, when English readers of the Vindiciae paused 
over its opening citation of the lex Digna vox, they must have 
                                                                                                     
‘par in parem non habet imperium’, la Digna vox non è nei suoi confronti 
imperativa, tanto che se egli dicesse ‘ego sum legibus obligatus, mentiretur’ 
». 
42 STEPHANUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, cit., epigraph 
quotation.  For an English translation see STEPHANUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, 
Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos: or, Concerning the Legitimate power of a Prince 
over the People, and of the People over the Prince, cit., p. 6. On the 
constitutional importance of the lex Digna Vox throughout the Western legal 
tradition see Diego QUAGLIONI, Sovereignty Versus Tyranny in Medieval and 
Early Modern Political Thought, in In the Footsteps of Herodotus. Towards 
European Political Thought, edited by Janet Coleman and Paschalis M. 
Kitromilides, Olschki, Firenze, 2012, pp. 65-75. 
43 The pioneering study on the influence exercised by 16th century French 
jurisprudence over English political thought is John H. M. SALMON, The 
French Religious Wars in English Political Thought, The Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1959. A more recent, yet not as broad, account is given in Stefania 
TUTINO, Huguenots, Jesuits and Tyrants: Notes on the Vindiciae Contra 
Tyrannos in Early modern England, in Journal of Early Modern History, vol. 
11, n. 3, 2007, pp. 175-196. 
44 See the dated but still insightful Fritz SCHULTZ, Bracton on Kingship, in 
The English Historical Review, vol. 60, n. 237, 1945, pp. 136-176, which 
remains indespensable to retrace the civil law sources on which Bracton 
relied. Of equal importance is the highly persuasive critical review of 
previous Bractionian scholarship provided in Brian TIERNEY, Bracton on 
Government, in Speculum, vol. 38, n. 2, 1963, pp. 295-317. 
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been immediately reminded of the foundational treatise of 
English jurisprudence and its use of the text «placed at the 
origin» of medieval and modern discussions on limited 
sovereignty across Europe (45).  
This association would seem to have been even more likely 
given that Bracton reverted to the authority of the lex Digna vox 
to draw the same distinction between the prince and the tyrant 
that three centuries later would have been ultimately re-affirmed 
on the same textual grounds by the Vindiciae. «Dicitur enim rex 
a bene regendo et non a regnando, quia rex est dum bene regit, 
tyrannus dum populum sibi creditum violenta opprimit 
dominatione» claimed Bracton, as he paraphrased the proverbial 
notions of rex and tyrannus he found in the great medieval 
treatises on kingship and adapted them to the English polity (46). 
«Temperet igitur potentiam suam per legem […]» he then 
added, going on to append the fundamental authorities on which 
he laid his claim, «quia hoc sanxit lex humana, quod leges suum 
ligent latorem. Et alibi in eadem: Digna vox maiestate regnantis 
                                                
45 Diego QUAGLIONI, Sovereignty Versus Tyranny in Medieval and Early 
Modern Political Thought, cit., p. 67. And more extensively, ID., Dal 
costituzionalismo medievale al costituzionalismo moderno, cit., pp. 55-67. 
46 Henry BRACTON, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, On the Laws 
and Customs of England, vol. 2, edited by George E. Woodbine and 
translated with revisions and notes by Samuel E. Thorne, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 1968, p. 305. The sources from whence Bracton drew his 
notions of king and tyrant are reviewed in Fritz SCHULTZ, Bracton on 
Kingship, cit., pp. 140, 151-153. On the medieval specula principum see 
Diego QUAGLIONI, Il modello del principe cristiano. Gli «specula 
principum» fra Medio Evo e prima Età Moderna, in Modelli nella storia del 
pensiero politico, edited by Vittor Ivo Comparato, Olschki, Firenze, 1987, 
pp. 103-122; and more generally Angela DE BENEDICTIS and Annamaria 
PISAPIA, (eds.), Specula principum, Vittorio Klostermann, Krankfurt am 
Main, 1999. 
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est, legibus silicet alligatum se principem profiteri. Item, nihil 
tam proprium est imperii, quam legibus vivere. Et maius 
imperio est, legibus submittere principatum» (47).  
Ennio Cortese has argued that the incorporation of the lex 
Digna vox into English medieval jurisprudence gave way to 
«taluni atteggiamenti legalitari particolarmente marcati del 
pensiero inglese successivo» (48). Bracton’s reliance on its 
authority, in fact, shaped English political discourse in so much 
as the central tenet of his doctrine, «Ipse autem rex non debet 
esse sub homine sed sub deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem» 
(49), became, along with the aforementioned passages of his 
treaty, the ground on which royal absolutism was challenged 
throughout the 17th century, first and foremost by sir Edward 
Coke (50), who was quite familiar with each of these passages 
having underlined them in his copy of Bracton (51); and then 
                                                
47 Fritz SCHULTZ, Bracton on Kingship, cit., pp. 140-141. I have preferred to 
quote this second passage from the edition given by Schultz in his 
aforementioned article. Though fragmentary, it seems quite clearer than the 
one provided by Woodbine, which can be read in Henry BRACTON, De 
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, On the Laws and Customs of England, 
cit., pp. 305-306. 
48 Ennio CORTESE, La norma giuridica. Spunti teorici nel diritto comune 
classico, vol. 1, Giuffrè, Milano, 1962, re-issued in 1995, p. 154.  
49 Henry BRACTON, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, On the Laws 
and Customs of England, cit., p. 33. 
50 See Harold J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution II. The Impact of the 
Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition, cit., pp. 238-245, 
464-465. 
51 Coke’s copy of Bracton’s De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae is part of 
the special collection held by the Edward Bennett Williams Law Library of 
the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C. In it Coke has 
inscribed extensive marginal notations as well as highlighted numerous 
passages. The text has been digitized and may by referenced at 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/761480. For the 
purposes of this discussion it is worth noting that Coke underlined the 
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secondly by the renewed doctrine on tyranny, much indebted to 
the legacy of the ius commune and the authority of the Vindiciae 
(52), that eventually unfolded in the works of John Milton, 
Algernon Sidney, and John Locke: three of Jefferson’s main 
sources (53).  
Each of them was intent on drawing the medieval persuasion 
in the supremacy of law over politics to its ultimate conclusions 
                                                                                                     
passage in which Bracton paraphrased the lex Digna vox. See Henry 
BRACTON, De legibus et consuetidinibus Angliae, Londini: Apud Richardum 
Tottellum, 1569, book 3, Ad quod rex creatus sit in ordinaria iurisdictione, 
fol. 107 v, Special Collection, Edward Bennett Williams Law Library, 
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.: «Dicitur enim rex a 
bene regendo, & non a regnando, quia rex est dum bene regit, Tyrannus dum 
populum sibi creditum violenta opprimit dominatione. Temperet igitur 
potentiam suam per legem, quae fraenum est potentiae quod secundum leges 
vivat, quod hoc sanxit lex humana, quod leges suum ligent latorem, & alibi in 
eadem, digna vox maiestate regnantis est legibus alligatum se principem 
proficiscere .i.profiteri. Item nihil tam proprium est imperij, quam legibus 
vivere, & maius imperio est legibus submittere principatum, & merito debet 
retribuere legi, quia lex tribuit ei, facit enim lex quod ipse sit rex». The 
passages are underlined as they appear in Coke’s copy of Bracton. 
52 This indebtedness of English political thought to the ius commune should 
not come as a surprise. As much as its doctrine on tyranny was developed out 
of continental literature, so was the English understanding of regality and of 
the corporate personhood of the king «derived from arguments which the 
glossators and post-glossators had advanced long before». This seems to me 
the most vital lessen of Ernest H. KANTOROWICZ, The King’s Two Bodies. A 
Study in Medieval Political Theology, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1957, re-issued in 2016, p. 408. The influence of the Civil Law over later 
English constitutionalism and Stuart political thought has recently been 
reviewed in Daniel LEE, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional 
Thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 273-315. 
53 See generally Kevin J. HAYES, The Road to Monticello: The Life and Mind 
of Thomas Jefferson, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008, pp. 204, 
179. For a summary of Milton’s influence on Jefferson see Douglas L. 
WILSON, Register of Authors, in Thomas JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s Literary 
Commonplace Book, edited by Dougals L. Wilson, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1989, pp. 174-175. On the influence of Sidney and Locke 
see David N. MAYER, The Consitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson, 
University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville and London, 1994, pp. 20-21, 
297-298. 
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(54). And this meant intensifying claims and practices current in 
the earlier days of the ius commune, by articulating a broader 
and far more radical right to resist tyranny (55). 
Of the three, Milton’s doctrine was the most complex. Not 
only did he recall Bracton’s distinction between king and tyrant 
(56), but he also maintained the distinction between tyranny by 
                                                
54 The first to suggest that modern political doctrines on power exaspereted 
the tenets of medieval jurisprudence, by drawing them to their ultimate 
conclusions was Margherita Isnardi Parente, see. ID., Introduzione, cit., p. 43. 
Since then, the idea has been developed further by Diego QUAGLIONI, see ID., 
Presentazione dell’edizione italiana, in Harold J. BERMAN, Diritto e 
rivoluzione II. L’impatto delle riforme protestanti sulla tradizione giuridica 
occidentale, Italian edition edited by Diego Quaglioni, Il mulino, Bologna, 
2010, pp. IX-XXIII, and especially p. XIII: «[…] non si tratta di riaffermare la 
profondità e la persistenza delle radici “medievali” nell’esperienza giuridica 
“moderna”, ma più ancora di ricordare che quest’ultima scaturisce da un 
complesso di tematiche medievali portate alle estreme conseguenze». 
55 See Alessandro FONTANA, Du droit de resistance au devoir d’insurrection, 
cit., pp. 25-26. 
56 See John MILTON, A Defence of the People pf England, in Complete Prose 
Works of John Milton, vol. IV, 1650-1651, part 1, edited by Don M. Wolfe, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, p. 492: «Thus in book I chapter 8 
our famous jurist of old, Bracton, writes: ‘Where passion rules, there is 
neither king nor law’, and in book III chapter 9: ‘A king remains a king while 
he governs well, but becomes a tyrant when by a rule of violence he crushes 
those entrusted to him’ In the same chapter he adds ‘The king should exercise 
the power of the law as God’s agent and servant; the power to do wrong is of 
the Devil’s servant’». The Complete Prose Works of John Milton provide 
only an English translation of the text originally written in Latin by Milton. A 
critical edition of the original text appears to be forthcoming and should be 
published as part of Oxford’s new series dedicated to The Complete Works of 
John Milton. For an illustration on Milton’s doctrine on sovereignty see 
Daniel LEE, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought, 
cit., pp. 299-300.  In these pages, Lee also insists on the influence exercised 
by Huguenot jurists over Milton’s understanding of the king as «a 
“usufructuary” rather than as a dominus», ibid., p. 299. This contention will 
become central in Jefferson’s own constitutional thought, as will be discussed 
infra, see chapter three, paragraph 2, The Subject of Popular Sovereignty: the 
Living Generation. 
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usurpation and tyranny by abuse (57), bequeathed most directly 
to him by the French 16th century jurisprudence and in particular 
by the Vindiciae (58).  
Beyond retaining these traditional distinctions, Milton 
subsumed them in the broader notion of «custom», that he 
derived from Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592).  Just as 
Montaigne, Milton saw in custom the consolidation of those 
collective beliefs and institutions passed down by history and 
society and instinctively, perhaps even unconsciously, adopted 
                                                
57 See John MILTON, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, cit., p. 161: «We 
may from hence with more ease, and force of argument determin what a 
Tyrant is, and what the people may doe against him. A Tyrant whether by 
wrong or by right coming to the Crown, is he who regarding neither Law nor 
the common good, reigns onely for himself and his faction: Thus St. Basil 
among others defined him». Although Milton maintains the distinction 
between the ruler who comes to power legitimately and the one who does so 
wrongfully, he believes that the true measure of tyranny lies in the exercise 
of power itself, rather than in the means of its acquisition. So tyranny is for 
Milton predominantly ex parte exercitii. This seems in keeping with 
Erasmus, who articulated a similar stance in his Institutio principis christiani. 
See Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, L’educazione del principe cristiano di 
Erasmo da Rotterdam, in ERASMO DA ROTTERDAM, L’educazione del 
principe cristiano, edited by Margherita Isnardi Parente, Morano, Napoli, 
1977, pp. 9-46, now collected in ID., Rinascimento Politico in Europa, cit., 
pp. 23-55: 37-38: «Il concetto di tirannide si estende, per Erasmo, 
all’assolutismo di tradizione giuridica romanistica. Ogni sovrano che 
pretenda di essere fonte assoluta della legge è di per sé tirannico e pagano. 
Ciò perché, va premesso, il concetto di tirannide in Erasmo non ha aspetto 
specificamente giuridico: è un concetto di ordine etico. Erasmo non accetta 
affatto la distinzione con la quale Bartolo di Sassoferrato, concludendo in 
maniera sistematica un lungo travaglio del pensiero medievale, aveva 
conciliato e insieme contrapposto i due concetti rappresentanti i due aspetti 
fondamentali della tirannide, quello del tyrannus ex defectu tituli e quello del 
tirannus ex parte exercitii. […] Per Erasmo, il tiranno è sempre e solo ex 
parte exercitii: il titolo che si accampa è indifferente, è il modo di reggere lo 
stato e di amministrare il potere che caratterizza il principe come buon 
reggitore politico o come tiranno». 
58 On the influence the Vindiciae exercised over Milton see Elizabeth SAUER, 
Milton, Toleration, and Nationhood, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2014, p. 34. 
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by men (59), who in so doing subjected themselves to a kind of 
tyranny over mind and actions that would ultimately be at the 
heart of Immanuel Kant’s Was ist Aufklärung? and of Thomas 
Jefferson’s profession of «eternal hostility against every form of 
tyranny over the mind» and body «of men»  (60).  
This led Milton to acknowledge the existence of a «double 
tyrannie, of Custom from without, and blind affections within» 
(61). Men were entitled to challenge both and could enjoy 
political freedom without only if they ceased to be «slaves 
within» (62). This was the condition on which rested their 
capacity to enforce the rule of law over their rulers. For only 
«the liberty and right of free born men, to be governe’d as seems 
to them best» entitled the people to either chose or reject their 
rulers «as oft as they shall judge it for the best» (63).  
Sidney (1623-1683) reached similar conclusions retaining 
much of the same jurisprudential authorities. «This indeed is the 
                                                
59 This understanding of custom in Montaign’s thought is indebted to Anna 
Maria BATTISTA, Nuove riflessioni su «Montaigne Politico», in Studi politici 
in onore di Luigi Firpo, edited by Silvia Rota Ghibaudi and Franco Barcia, 
vol. 1, Ricerche sui secoli XIV-XVI, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1990, p. 807.  
60 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Benjamin Rush, 23 September 1800, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 32, 1 June 1800 to 16 February 1801, 
edited by Barbara B. Oberg et al., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2005, p. 166. On the notion of tyranny over mind and actions in Montaigne 
and its later development in Kant see Anna Maria BATTISTA, Nuove 
riflessioni su «Montaigne Politico», cit., p. 828. 
61 John MILTON, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, cit., p. 151. 
62 Ibid.  This notion of slavery from within does not seem to be too distant 
from Etienne de la Boetie’s notion of voluntary servitude. On Milton’s 
indebtedness to Etienne de La Boetie, and his Montaignan notion of custom, 
see Merritt Y. HUGHES, Introduction, in Complete Prose Works of John 
Milton, vol. III, 1648-1649, edited by Merritt Y. Hughes, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1962, pp. 109. 
63 Ibid., p. 159. 
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doctrine of Bracton» he wrote in  the third part of his Discourses 
Concerning Government, not long before referring himself to 
the lex Digna vox (64), «who having said that the power of the 
king is the power of the law, because the law makes him king, 
adds ‘That if he do injustice, he ceases to be king, degenerates 
into a tyrant, and becomes the viceregent of the Devil’» (65).  
Tyranny for Sidney was of three kinds. «The first» occurred 
when «one or more men [took] upon them the power and name 
of a magistracy, to which they [had] not [been] justly called» 
(66). «These [were] by other authors called tyranni sine titulo, 
and that name [was] given to all those who obtain[ed] the 
supreme power by illegal and unjust means. The laws which 
they overthr[ew] [could] give them no protection; and every 
man [was] a soldier against him who [had become] a public 
enemy» (67).  
«The second» kind of tyranny occurred «when one or more 
being justly called, continue[d] in their magistracy longer than 
the laws by which they [had been] called [did] prescribe» (68). 
This second instance on which Sidney paused was none other 
than the tyranny propter defectum tituli outlined by Bartolus in 
the twelfth paragraph of his De tyranno. Though the text was 
not itself referenced by Sidney, it is not unlikely he might have 
been familiar with its doctrine, having perhaps discovered it 
                                                
64 Algernon SIDNEY, Discourses Concerning Government, edited by Thomas 
G. West, Liberty Found, Indianapolis, 1996, p. 446 
65 Ibid., p. 399.  
66 Ibid., p. 220. 
67 Ibid., p. 221. 
68 Ibid., p. 220. 
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during his extensive travels through Italy (69). Unfortunately 
though, no study has yet focused on Sidney’s indebtedness to 
the legacy of the ius commune beyond his clear indebtedness to 
early modern continental jurisprudence (70). 
Finally, the third kind of tyranny mentioned by Sidney 
occurred «when he or they who [had been] rightly called, [did] 
assume a power, tho within the time prescribed, that the law 
[did] not give; or turn[ed] that which the law [did] give, to an 
end different and contrary to that which [was] intended by it» 
(71). His last partition included the two remaining types of 
tyranny classified by Bartolus: the tyranny propter titulum and 
the tyranny ex parte exercitii.  
Though far from Milton’s complex combination of inner and 
outer forms of tyranny and Sidney’s close adherence to the 
traditional partition of tyrannical regimes consolidated by 
Bartolus, John Locke (1632-1704) offered a no less influential 
meditation of the perversion of power.  
After having devoted his entire First Treatise of Government 
to prove that true sovereignty could emanate exclusively from a 
legitimate title (72), he concluded his Second Treatise by 
examining the illegitimate acquisition of power and its abusive 
exercise (73). He discussed the first in his chapter on 
                                                
69 Jonathan SCOTT, Algernon Sidney and the English Republic, 1623-1677, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 151-163. 
70 See ibid., p. 19. 
71 Algernon SIDNEY, Discourses Concerning Government, cit., p. 220. 
72 John LOCKE, Two Treatise of Government, edited by Peter Laslett, 
Cambridgne University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 141-262. 
73 Ibid., pp. 387-405. 
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«Usurpation» and restricted his treatment of «Tyranny» to the 
second (74). 
It would be a mistake, however, to infer from such partition 
that Locke ignored the jurisprudential tradition and contented 
himself with a belated Aristotelian understanding of tyranny as 
abuse of power and disregard for the common good (75). His 
choice to consider the illegitimate acquisition of power as an 
aberration of authority distinct from tyranny appears to have 
been a means to emphasize the egregiousness of the violation 
perpetrated by the usurper. «Whoever gets into the exercise of 
any part of the Power, by other ways, than what the laws of the 
Community have prescribed, hath no Right to be obeyed […]; 
since he is not the Person the Law have appointed, and 
consequently not the Person the People have consented to» (76).  
It was precisely this lack of title that Locke stigmatized in his 
                                                
74 Ibid., pp. 397, 398. 
75 In the introduction to her translation of the Institutio principis christiani, 
Margherita Isnardi Parente noted: «La distinzione del buono dal cattivo 
reggitore, del principe dal tiranno […] è desunta […] dalla Politica 
aristotelica […]. Essa è fondata infatti, costantemente, sul motivo della 
publica utilitas, del bene e dell’interesse di tutti, del κοινόν συµφέρον […]. 
Ora, tale motivo è desunto […] dalla Politica aristotelica, in base a una 
costante tradizione di pensiero che la tarda Scolastica ha convalidata con la 
conoscenza diretta e il commento di Aristotele e il primo Rinascimento ha 
per suo conto originalmente continuata […] Nel III libro della Politica di 
Aristotele […] la distinzione assume un carattere più largamente e 
concretamente sociale: il criterio di distinzione fra buono e cattivo governo è 
il riferimento all’utilità comune […]».  See Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, 
L’educazione del principe cristiano di Erasmo da Rotterdam, cit., p. 31.  
76 John LOCKE, Two Treatise of Government, cit., p. 398. 
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brief yet brilliant chapter on usurpation, to the point of denying 
the «Usurper» could ever «[…] have Right on his side» (77).  
                                                
77 Ibid., p. 397. «Nor can such an Usurper, or any deriving from him, ever 
have a Title» he went on «till the People are both at liberty to consent, and 
have actually consented to allow, and confirm in him, the Power he hath till 
then Usurped», ibid., p. 398. This closing statement is among the most 
remarkable in the chapter and would require a more extensive discussion. 
Suffice it to note that Locke here resolves in the affirmative the vexing 
question of whether belated consent might rectify an originally illegitimate 
acquisition of power. The traditional answer given by the masters of the ius 
commune, and chiefly by Bartolus, had been in the negative. (See Margherita 
ISNARDI PARENTE, Jean Bodin su tirannide e signoria nella «République», 
cit., pp. 141-142: «Sono […] largamente reperibili nella casistica giuridica 
della tirannide, nel corso del pensiero medievale, proseguitisi nel 
Rinascimento e negli ulteriori repertori, le affermazioni di non prescrittibilità 
del potere sovrano: la tirannide, usurpazione di sovranità, non può cadere in 
prescrizione. Si ricordi che la prescrizione esige la ‘bona fides’, che rende 
possibile la legittimazione del possesso per usucapione; ma la ‘bona fides’ è, 
per definizione, esclusa dalla tirannide»). Howerver, in this very passage, 
Locke recalls one of the most distinctive traits of Bartolus’ doctrine on 
tyranny. The consent given by the people to a ruler must be free from any 
kind or physical or moral compulsion or it otherwise constitutes an 
illegitimate extortion invalidating the title claimed by the ruler. See Diego 
QUAGLIONI, Tyrannis, cit., pp. 236-237: «Al centro dell’indagine bartoliana, 
tendente a delineare una compiuta casistica della tirannide, sta il problema 
del consenso, assimilato, nel linguaggio del diritto commune, al priblema dei 
vizi della volontà del negozio giuridico. Tra questi è non solo la violenza 
fisica, ma anche la violenza morale (iustus metus), cioè la minaccia attuale di 
un male ingiusto e notevole, posta in essere al fine di costringere qualcuno a 
concludere un negozio e dunque rilevante per inficiare la volontà negoziale. 
Perciò il giurista ricerca I modi della violenza fisica e morale (‘qualiter 
violentia vel metus inferatur in populum’) e richiama in modo esplicito 
l’actio quod metus causa, cioè il rimedio concesso dal magistrato una volta 
accertata concretamente la presenza della minaccia di un male notevole 
moralmente o giuridicamente illecito, come elemento perturbatore del 
processo formativo della volontà. Insomma, nello schema bartoliano è 
provata – e come tale è perseguibile – la tirannide per difetto di tiolo ogni 
qual volta la civitas trasferisca la giurisdizione nel dominus, sia pure con un 
formale atto di elezione, ma in presenza di uno stato di opporessione, poiché 
il potere pubblico deve essere trasferito con un atto di libera manifestazione 
della volontà, e dove questa volontà sia viziata da un timore fondato, quella 
trasmissione ha il palese carattere dell’illegittimità (‘iurisdictio debet 
transferri voluntarie est si per metum fiat ipso iure non valet’)». As is the 
case for Sidney, I am unaware of any study tracing the influence of the ius 
commune over the political thought of John Locke. But passages such as the 
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There is a remarkable echo in these words. Whether or not 
Locke and his contemporaries were aware of it is hard to say. 
Nonetheless, by reading these texts, it might not be 
unreasonable to assume that the memory of tyranny’s 
longstanding tradition, which had found in Dante’s «usurpatio 
enim iuris non facit ius» the sharpest indictment of what 
Bartolus would classify a generation later as the tyrannus ex 
defectu titutli, had not been entirely forgotten in the days of the 
English Revolution (78).  
No doubt this medieval doctrine on tyranny stands, more 
generally, as the root of the administrative law institutes of 
incompetence and abuse of power (79). But within the Anglo-
American political tradition it seems to have acquired a special 
relevance amid the 17th and 18th centuries, when it became – 
                                                                                                     
ones discussed above seem to indicate a keen interest on the part of both for 
earlier continental jurisprudence.  
78 DANTE ALIGHIERI in Monarchia, cit., pp. 456-458 Locke’s echo of the 
ius commune can be traced even further. The final chapter of the Second 
Treatise offers, in fact, one last reminiscence of Bartolus and his legacy, as 
mediated most likely by the Vindiciae. Like Bartolus and the Vindiciae, 
Locke held that being «Rebellion […] an Opposition not to Persons but 
Authority, which is founded only in the Constitutions and Laws of the 
Government; those whoever they be, who by force break through, and by 
force justify their violation of them, are truly and properly Rebels. For when 
Men by entering into Society and Civil Government, have excluded force, 
and introduced Laws for the preservation of Property, Peace, and Unity 
among themselves; those who set up force again in opposition to the Laws, 
do Rebellare, that is, bring back again the state of War, and are properly 
Rebels: Which they who are in Power (by the pretence they have to 
Authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and the Flattery 
of those about them) being likeliest to do; the properest way to prevent the 
evil, is to shew them the danger and injustice of it, who are under the greatest 
temptation to run into it». See, John LOCKE, Two Treatise of Government, 
cit., p. 415. 
79 See Francesco CALASSO, Gli ordinamenti giuridici del rinascimento 
medievale, cit., p. 263. 
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through its indirect reception, mediated by such works as the 
Vindiciae – the ultimate foundation on which a new paradigm of 
power was constituted, in an effort to redress the abuses and 
usurpations that had led to the outbreak of the English and 
American Revolutions. It had been, in other words, «la patologia 
del potere a sollecitare» the Anglo-American legal thought «alla 
riaffermazione di un principio universale di legittimità e 
giustizia» (80).  And so, it happened that modern 
constitutionalism was conceived as an expressly anti-tyrannical 
doctrine.  
 
2. Jefferson’s doctrine on tyranny  
Thomas Jefferson held most of these doctrines at arms’ reach. 
Since early on, he had begun collecting a wide selection of 
sources on tyranny in his library.  Not only because these were 
the elementary treatises of any legal education, but because the 
perversion of power rapidly became the primary concern of his 
early political career and the main issue of his revolutionary 
writings (81). Yet, scholarly appreciation of his engagement with 
the doctrine ultimately championed by Bartolus has mostly been 
                                                
80 Diego QUAGLIONI, «Dominium», «iurisdictio», «imperium». Gli elementi 
non-moderni della modernità giuridica, cit., p. 675. 
81 Annette GORDON-REED and Peter S. ONUF, «Most Blessed of Patriarchs”. 
Thomas Jefferson and the Empire of the Imagination, Liveright, New York, 
2016, p. xv: «[…] hostility to tyranny was at the heart ot his politics and plan 
for the United States», however, as the authors go on to note, «that sentiment 
had no real currency» on his plantation, ruled as it was by the corrupt and 
corrupting institute of slavery. 
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cursory. As a result, the limited review of his sources has 
blurred out perception of his own notion of tyranny.  
Even at first sight, Jefferson’s revolutionary papers appear to 
have been written in the language of Western jurisprudence, at a 
time when tyranny was still very much part of that language and 
questions concerning the acquisition or exercise of power were 
treated as legal controversies. It is that language that shaped 
Jefferson’s political discourse and informed his understanding 
of power. And it is to that same language that Western politics 
owes, more than its legalistic tone, the conceptual framework 
needed to conceive the nature and effects of political obligations 
(82). 
Jefferson did not conceive power in the abstract. It had been 
the imperial crisis with Britain which had led him to retrace the 
«true ground» on which colonial settlements had been first 
established and then urged him to pit the origin of American 
jurisdictions against the foundations of English parliamentary 
and royal prerogatives (83). And it was this historical 
investigation of colonial past that Jefferson progressively shaped 
into a broader doctrine on sovereignty and its degeneration into 
tyranny. 
                                                
82 The idea that Western political discourse owes its conceptual lexicon to the 
language of jurisprudence has been put forth in Diego QUAGLIONI, 
Machiavelli e la lingua della giurisprudenza, cit., p. 59: «A quella lingua e al 
suo vocabolario la politica stessa deve, più che un “colorito giuridico”, quasi 
tutto il suo patrimonio concettuale. In tal senso, sul terreno del diritto 
pubblico, la lingua della giurisprudenza non è altro che la lingua del potere». 
83 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft of Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (MS Text of A Summary View of the Rights of British 
America), cit., p. 125. 
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Jefferson’s earliest restatement of tyranny came in his first 
piece of revolutionary writing, published in 1774 under the title 
A Summery View of the Rights of British America (84). He had 
not himself overseen the publication of the text, which had been 
drafted as a set of instructions to the Virginia delegates in the 
First Continental Congress. His political allies had seen to it, 
rightly convinced, by the forcefulness of Jefferson’s arguments, 
that the text would have easily won public approbation, 
strengthening the colonists’ stance against the British Parliament 
and its asserted right of legislation over the colonies (85).  
In the text Jefferson levied two main charges against British 
rule.  
He began by claiming that Parliament had usurped a power it 
was not entitled to and denied that any right could be established 
through such encroachment (86). According to Jefferson, the 
colonists had «acquired» the right to govern themselves by 
expatriating and establishing new societies in the territories they 
                                                
84 Ibid., pp. 121-137. 
85 See Stephen A. CONRAD, Putting Rights Talk in its Place: The Summary 
View Revisited, in Jeffersonian Legacies, edited by Peter S. Onuf, University 
Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1993, pp. 256-261; as well as David N. 
MAYER, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson, University of 
Virginia Press, Charlottesville and London, 1994, pp. 28-37. For an overview 
of the various scholarly readings of the Summary View see Kristofer RAY, 
Thomas Jefferson and A Summary View of the Rights of British North 
America, in A Companion to Thomas Jefferson, edited by Francis D. 
Cogliano, Wiley-Blakwell, Chichester, 2012, pp. 32-43. 
86 The idea that «force cannot give right» (see Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft of 
Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the Continental Congress (MS Text 
of A Summary View of the Rights of British America), cit., p. 134) runs 
through all of Jefferson’s thought. For a preliminary discussion see Maurizio 
VALSANIA, Nature’s Man. Thomas Jefferson’s Philosophical Anthropology, 
University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville and London, 2013, pp. 77-78. 
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conquered «at the hazard of their lives and loss of their 
fortunes» (87). These new jurisdictions were in themselves 
independent, as each possessed within itself «the sovereign 
powers of legislation» (88). On the contrary, Parliament’s 
«exertion of power» over the colonies appeared to be baseless, 
as no title justified the subjection of British Americans to the 
legislation of a body to whom they had relinquished allegiance 
by removing themselves from its purview (89). «Single acts of 
tyranny» could have been ascribed «to the accidental opinion of 
a day; but a series of oppression, begun at a distinguished 
period, and pursued unalterably thro’ every change of ministers» 
proved «too plainly» a «deliberate, systematical plan of 
reducing» the colonies «to slavery» (90). Hence, Jefferson 
qualified Parliament’s acts of colonial legislation as tyrannical 
for they constituted the exercise of a «usurped power», which, in 
the jurisprudential language Jefferson reverted to in his 
revolutionary papers, meant Parliament was not entitled to 
«exercise [any] authority» over the colonies and all its acts of 
colonial legislation were inherently «void» (91). 
There can be no doubt that by usurpation Jefferson meant the 
illegitimate acquisition of power traditionally known as tyranny 
ex defectu tituli. His language could not have been more 
                                                
87 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft of Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (MS Text of A Summary View of the Rights of British 
America), cit., p. 123. 
88 Ibid., p. 132.  
89 Ibid., p. 123.  
90 Ibid., p. 125. 
91 Ibid.  
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explicit, nor could he have argued more stringently that by 
usurping a power it was not entitled to Parliament had acted 
tyrannically. A part from being consistent with the language of 
his most immediate sources (Locke, Sidney, Milton, and the 
Vindiciae), Jefferson’s use of tyranny highlighted one of the 
fundamental tenets of his constitutionalism:  power may not 
establish itself. In order for it to be legitimate, power must 
emanate from a lawful title. It must, in other words, have been 
constituted. In the absence of a proper constitution, power can 
claim no title and is thus tyrannical.   
Jefferson was adamant: any de facto acquisition of power was 
not only illegitimate, it was against nature itself. A power 
devoid of title, was a power that pretended to be the source of its 
own strength and legitimacy, a creature of its own creation (92). 
                                                
92 This notion stands in sharp contrast to a quite opposive view of 
constitutionalism according to which legal sistems are originally established 
de facto and as such do not tolerate any review of their foundations. This 
doctrine has been discussed most clearly in Santi ROMANO, L’instaurazione 
di fatto di un ordinamento costituzionale e sua legittimazione, in Archivio 
giuridico, vol. 68, 1901, re-published in ID., Scritti minori, vol. 1, Diritto 
costituzionale, edited by Guido Zanobini, Giuffrè, Milano, 1990, pp. 131-
201; as well as in ID. Rivoluzione e diritto, in ID., Frammenti di un dizionario 
giuridico, Giuffrè, Milano, 1947, re-published in 1983, pp. 220-233. The 
relationship between the revolution, understood as the de facto establishment 
of a new regime, and the law has also been drawn the attention of Antonio 
MARONGIU, see his Diritto e potere nell’inghilterra del seicento, in Diritto e 
potere nella storia europea. Atti in onore di Bruno Paradisi, Olschki, 
Firenze, 1982, p. 564: «Chi ha studiato i rapporti tra le rivoluzioni e il diritto 
trova – o può trovare, se lo voglia – che la rivoluzione rechi in sé un 
momento necessario e sufficiente di giuridicità e la coesistenza, nel tempo 
che precede la instaurazione di un nuovo ordine, di un diritto statuale e di un 
diritto non statuale, oppure ritenere che essa attui un potere di fatto, che poi 
essa medesima non validerà o ratificherà, rendendolo definitivo e 
giuridicamente valido: rivoluzione, quindi, attuazione di un potere di fatto 
tendente a diventare una nuova giuridicità. La rivoluzione è ed è stata sempre 
creazione di diritto. Ma va considerata rivoluzione anche la reazione, o la 
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This had been Parliament’s exorbitant claim, against which 
Jefferson levied his second charge.  Being one «free and 
independent legislature», Parliament could not take it upon itself 
«to suspend the powers» of colonial legislatures, which were 
equally free and independent assemblies, without pretending to 
become «the creator and creature of it’s [sic] own power» and 
thus «exhibiting a phenomenon, unknown in nature» and 
inadmissible in law (93).  
Locke and Sidney had confronted similar claims advanced by 
Filmer (1588-1653), who had forbidden to «examine titles» and 
maintained that power must have been obeyed «whether 
                                                                                                     
restaurazione, che tende a negare la giuridicità della rivoluzione vera e 
propria, come ciò che era avvenuto in Inghilterra, tutti lo sanno, nel 1660». 
Of opposite opinion was Victor Hugo, who seems not to have forgotten either 
Locke or the legacy of Bartolus. See, Victor HUGO, Les Misérables, edited by 
Maurice Allem, Gallimard, Paris, 1951, p. 854: «Pour les vieux partis qui se 
rattachent à l’hérédité par la grâce de Dieu, les révolutions étant sorties du 
droit de révolte, on a droit de révolte contre elles. Erreur. Car dans les 
révolutions, le révolte, ce n’est pas le people, c’est le roi. Révolution est 
précisément le contraire de révolte. Toute révolution, étant un 
accomplissement normal, contient en elle sa légitimité, que de faux 
révolutionnaires déshonorent quelquefois, mais qui persiste, même souillée, 
qui survit, même ensanglantée. Les révolutions sortent, non d’un accident, 
mais de la nécessité. Une révolution est un retour du factice au réel. Elle est 
parce qu’il faut qu’elle soit». In deposing the old regime, Jefferson himself 
claimed similarly the need «to re-establish such antient principles as are 
friendly to the rights of the people». See Thomas JEFFERSON, First Draft of 
the Virginia Constitution, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 
339. The significance of «re-establish» can only be appreciated if the 
tyrannical rule of George III is understood, in keeping with the legacy of 
Bartolus and the Vindiciae, as a rebellion against the ancient rights of the 
people guarded by Western Jurisprudence: «[…] quod si existentes in tali 
tyrannide […]  ipso iure sunt rebelles et dignitatem perdunt». See BARTOLUS 
A SAXOFERRATO, Tractatus de tyranno, cit., pp. 203-204. 
93 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft of Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (MS Text of A Summary View of the Rights of British 
America), cit., p. 126.  
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acquired by usurpation or otherwise» (94). They both rejected 
such propositions, reclaiming instead the cornerstone principle 
of the rule of law, ingrained in Western jurisprudence ever since 
Dante had claimed: «Nullus princeps se ipsum potest 
auctorizare» (95), and Bartolus had paraphrased the maxim, 
adding: «[…] debet quis ab alio rex constitui, non ipse sua 
auctoritate sibi regnum assumere: tunc enim non esset rex sed 
tyrannus […]» (96).  
Jefferson himself drew the principle to its ultimate 
conclusion. Just as power could not rightfully establish itself, 
nor could it rightfully limit itself. There was no room in his 
constitutionalism for what would later be called 
Selbstverpflichtung (97). He expressly dismissed any kind of 
                                                
94 Algernon SIDNEY, Discourses Concerning Government, cit., p. 220. 
95 DANTE ALIGHIERI, in Monarchia, cit., p. 404 
96 BARTOLUS A SAXOFERRATO, Tractatus de regimine civitatis, in Diego 
QUAGLIONI, Politica e diritto nel trecento italiano, cit., p. 159. The passage 
is part of Bartolus’ commentary on Deuteronomy 17, 14-20. On the political 
and normative relevance of this passage in Western jurisprudence and 
political thought see Diego QUAGLIONI, «Religio sola est, in qua libertas 
domicilium conlocavit». Coscienza e potere nella prima età moderna, in 
Religious Obedience and Political Resistance in the Early Modern Wrold. 
Jewish, Christian and Islamic Philosophers Addressing the Bible, edited by 
Luisa Simonutti, Brepols, Turnhout, 2014, pp. 33-51. The relevance of this 
same scriptural passage in English political thought has been reviewed in 
Eric NELSON, The Hebrew Republic. Jewish Sources and the Transformation 
of European Political Thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and 
London, 2010. 
97 On Selbstverpflichtung and Georg Jellinek’s Staatslehre see Diego 
QUAGLIONI, Sovranità e autolimitazione. (Rileggendo la «Dottrina generale 
del diritto dello Stato» di G. Jellinek), in Crisi e metamorfosi della sovranità, 
edited by Maurizio Basciu, Giuffrè, Milano, 1996, pp. 271-282. See, more 
recently, Sara LAGI, The Formation of a Liberal Thinker: Georg Jellinek and 
his early Writings (1872-1878), in Res Publica, vol. 19, n. 1, 2016, pp. 59-76; 
and ID., Georg Jellinek, a Liberal Political Thinker against Despotic Rule 
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self-obligation: «to ourselves, in strict language, we can owe no 
duties, obligation requiring […] two parties», he famously wrote 
to Thomas Law in 1814 (98). Jefferson might have drawn the 
strict language of this dismissal from the language of Roman 
Law as it had been rephrased by Bodin, according to who’s 
reading of the Digest: «Nulla obligatio consistere potest, quae a 
voluntate promittentis statum capit». This crucial passage, 
highlighted in Jefferson’s copy of the Republique, led Bodin to 
claim unequivocally that no authority could bind itself: «[…] car 
on peut bien receuoir loy d’autruy, mais il est impossible par 
nature de se donner loy, non plus que commander a soy-mesme 
chose qui depende de sa volonté, comme dit la loy, Nulla 
obbligatio consistere potest, quae a voluntate promittentis 
statum capit: qui est une raison necessaire, qui monstre 
euidemment que le Roy ne peut estre subiect à ses loix.. Et tout 
ainsi que le Pape ne se lie iamais les mains, comme disent les 
canonistes: aussi le Prince souuerain ne se peut lier les mains, 
quand ores il voudroit» (99).  
                                                                                                     
(1885-1898), in The Hungarian Historical Review, vol. 5, n. 1, 2016, pp. 
103-120. 
98 Thomas JEFFERSTON, letter to Thomas Law, 13 June 1814, in The Papers 
of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol. 7, 28 November to 30 
September, edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al., Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2010, p. 413. On the legal impossibility of a self-obligation see 
Diego QUAGLIONI, Costituzione e costituzionalismo nella tradizione 
giuridica occidentale, in La Costituzione Francese, La Constitution 
Française. Atti del convegno biennale dell’Associazione di Diritto pubblico 
comparato ed europeo, Bari, Università degli Studi, 22-23 maggio 2008, 
edited by Marina Calamo Specchia, Giappichelli, Torino, 2009, p. 15. 
99 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la Republique, cit., livre 1, chapitre 8, De la 
souveraineté, p. 132. The dotted underlining corresponds to the marginal 
markings in Jefferson’s copy of the Republique. For a commentary see Diego 
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This same logic had informed Jefferson’s earlier criticism of 
the newly adopted Constitution of Virginia. Because the Charter 
had been enacted by the ordinary legislature, it did not possess 
the capacity to bind future legislatures for the strictly Bodinian 
reason that it did not «pretend» to any «higher authority than the 
other ordinances» enacted in «the same session», nor was it 
«transcendent above the powers of those who they knew would 
have [maintained] equal power with themselves» (100). 
Now, against Parliament’s inordinate acts of usurpation some 
remedy was needed and Jefferson sought it in the «mediatory 
power» entrusted to the king (101). Drawing from the long 
standing tradition which had envisioned the king as chief 
magistrate of the people (102), «appointed by the laws, and 
circumscribed with definite powers, to assist in the working of 
the great machine of government» (103), and reminding «his 
majesty» that he could not «put down all law under his feet» or 
«erect a power superior to that which» had «erected» him to the 
throne (104), Jefferson called the king to fulfill his office: «[hold] 
                                                                                                     
QUAGLIONI, «Omnes sunt cives civiliter». Cittadinanza e sovranità fra storia 
e diritto, in Dallo status di cittadino ai diritti di cittadinanza, edited by 
Fulvio Cortese, Gianni Santucci, and Anna Simonati, Università degli Studi 
di Trento, Trento, 2014, pp. 9-10. 
100 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, cit., p. 122. 
101 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft of Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (MS Text of A Summary View of the Rights of British 
America), cit., p. 129. 
102 See Diego QUAGLIONI, Il modello del principe cristiano. Gli “Specula 
principum” fra Medioevo e perima età moderna, cit, pp. 103-122. 
103 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft of Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (MS Text of A Summary View of the Rights of British 
America), cit., p. 121. 
104 Ibid., p. 134. 
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the balance» of the empire, preserve its harmony, «resume the 
exercise of his negative power», and prevent «any one 
legislature» from passing acts which might have «infringe[d] on 
the rights and liberties of another» (105).  
Had the king reconciled the competing interests within the 
empire, rather than side with those of one particular body 
against all the others, Jefferson would have had no cause to levy 
an additional charge of tyranny against the monarch. But the 
petition voiced in the Summary View was answered by the 
repeated injuries of a monarch who disregarded balance within 
his empire and conspired to subject American societies to the 
«foreign jurisdiction» of Parliament (106).  
The new charge against the king was brought by Jefferson’s 
preamble to the Constitution he had drafted for the 
Commonwealth of Virginia in 1776, after the Second 
Continental Congress had urged all former colonies to revise 
their fundamental laws (107). Virginia ended up adopting a 
                                                
105 Ibid., pp. 135, 134. The idea according to which sovereignty ultimately 
consists in the mediation of conflicting interests is typically Bodinian. It 
would thus be tempting to ascribe these Jeffersonian ruminations on the 
mediatory power of the king to his reading of Bodin and the Republique. It 
must not be forgotten, however, the Jefferson seems to have acquired his 
copy of the Republique during his diplomatic mission to France. Although it 
is possible that Jefferson had access to Bodin prior to his European tour 
(copies of Bodin’s French, Latin, and English editions of the Republique 
where held at the Loganian Libray in Philadelphia, as evidenced by the 
existing catalogues of the Library Company of Philadelphia), there seems to 
be no hard evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
106 Thomas JEFFERSON, First Draft of the Virginia Constitution, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 338. 
107 See Pauline MAIER, American Scripture. Making the Declaration of 
Independence, Knopf, New York, 1997, re-issued by Vintage Books, New 
York, 1998, p. 37: «Finally, on May 10, 19776, the Continental Congress 
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different text, but it did incorporate Jefferson’s preamble in its 
Constitution. This would be sufficient to make the text worthy 
of consideration, but what rendered it still more significant was 
Jefferson’s own reliance on its text as a blueprint for the 
Declaration of Independence he drafted only a few weeks later 
(108).  
The preamble not only allowed Jefferson to indict the king’s 
endeavors «to pervert» government «into a detestable & 
insupportable tyranny» (109), it allowed him also to qualify the 
king as a tyrant ex parte exercitii, who had put «his negative on 
[colonial] laws the most wholesome & necessary for the public 
good» (110), but had not exercised the same power to prevent 
parliamentary encroachments over colonial autonomy.  And so 
did all the other charges levied in the following paragraphs 
reinforce Jeferson’s qualification of the king as a tyrant who had 
not fulfilled his office, but had rather abused his power, and 
disregarded the rights of his subjects (111). 
                                                                                                     
recomended to ‘the respective assemblies and conventions of the United 
Colonies, where no government sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs 
has been hitherto established’, that they ‘adopt such government as shall, in 
the opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to the 
happiness and safety of their constituents in particular and America in 
general’». See also Robert G. PARKINSON, The Declaration of Independence, 
in A Companion to Thomas Jefferson, edited by Francis D. Cogliano, cit., p. 
47. 
108 See Pauline MAIER, American Scripture. Making the Declaration of 
Independence, cit., p. 105. 
109 Thomas JEFFERSON, First Draft of the Virginia Constitution, cit., p. 337. 
110 Ibid., p. 338. 
111The escalating conflict between the colonies and Parliament prompted 
several British Americans to invoke the monarch’s protection and urge him 
to exercise his negative against Parliament to prevent the enactment of laws 
detrimental to colonial autonomy. Although such prerogative power had not 
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Looked through the lens of his revolutionary writings, 
American political experience provided Jefferson with two 
different examples of tyrannical practices: Parliament’s 
usurpation of colonial self-government and the King’s abusive 
disregard of colonial rights. Both these instances were distinct 
manifestations of an overall perversion of power that threatened 
                                                                                                     
been exercised by any monarch since the English Revolution and Parliament 
had actually claimed prerogative powers for itself, British Americans insisted 
in their claim and firmly rejected the principle of parliamentary supremacy, 
along with all its implications.  In a recent monograph, Eric Nelson has 
strongly insisted that, through such claim, British Americans advocated a 
return to the constitutional settlement preceding the English Revolution, 
when Parliament enjoyed no supremacy – especially over the colonies – and 
was countered in its action by the exercise of royal prerogatives. See Eric 
NELSON, The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2015. Thus, in Nelson’s view, the very 
people who would eventually become the leaders of the American 
Revolution articulated a neo-Stuart defense of prerogative power and came to 
reject kingship only after their king had actually refused to avail himself of 
such powers. As compelling as this interpretation is (for not only does it 
challenge the prevailing interpretation of the American Revolution, but in 
doing so it opens new research perspectives), it does not appear to be entirely 
consistent, as Nelson himself acknowledges,  with the constitutional rationale 
given by Jefferson for the American Revolution (see ibid., pp. 58-60)  
Although it’s true that Jefferson expressly invoked the royal negative against 
parliamentary usurpation, and thus advocated in favor of a constitutional 
arrangement in which prerogative powers could be exercised as a limit 
against the illegitimate pretense of one legislator to suppress the autonomy of 
another, it would be a misinterpretation of his thought (as Nelson admits) to 
contend that Jefferson defended prerogative power per se. What Jefferson’s 
did appreciate was the constitutional purpose that prerogative powers could 
fulfill when exercised as a remedial power against tyrannical acts of 
usurpation. Therefore, it was only within the broader framework provided by 
the doctrine on tyranny that Jefferson justified the existence of prerogative 
powers, given that such powers were themselves limited by that very doctrine 
– a point Jefferson clearly articulated in the Summary View, where he 
expressly insisted that neither the power enjoyed by Parliament, nor the one 
enjoyed by the king, were devoid of titles and of limits, granted they both 
could degenerate into tyranny, as they both eventually did. Just how borad 
was such constitutional appreciation of tyranny amongst British Americans is 
a question still in need to be addressed by interpreters of the American 
Revolution. 
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the foundations of colonial societies by subjecting them to a 
«jurisdiction foreign to [their] constitutions» and exposing them 
to the injuries perpetrated by «sacrificing the rights of one part 
of the empire to the inordinate desire of another» (112).  
Jefferson was thus confronted with the problem of proving his 
multiple charges (113). And what evidence could he submit «to 
the tribunal of the world» if not historical (114)? As Alessandro 
Fontana has remarked, «[s]i la question de la résistance se situe, 
au Moyen Âge, sur le plan de la loi, si à l’époque des guerres de 
religion elle se situe sur le plan de la conscience, du XVIIe siècle 
à 1798 elle va se situer sur le plan de l’histoire: résistance au 
monarque qui enfreint la loi d’abord, résistance au prince qui 
viole la conscience ensuite, résistance enfin au roi dont les 
ancêtres son censés avoir usurpé le pouvoir par la conquête» 
(115).  
It had been the colonists who had expatriated, relinquished 
their allegiance to the mother country, conquered for 
themselves, and themselves alone, the Atlantic shores of North 
America, and then, once «settlements [had] been thus effected in 
                                                
112 Thomas JEFFERSON, Original Rough Draught of the Declaration of 
Independence, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 425; ID., 
Draft of Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the Continental Congress 
(MS Text of A Summary View of the Rights of British America), cit., p. 134. 
113 Not only was this a characteristically juristic problem, but it had also 
been, evers since Bartolus, one of the traditional problem confronting anyone 
who challenged the tyrannical nature of power. See BARTOLUS A 
SAXOFERRATO, Tractatus de tyranno, cit., pp. 185-187, 207, 213. 
114 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Henry Lee, 8 May 1825, in Thomas 
Jefferson, Writings, edited by Merrill D. Peterson, The Library of America, 
New York, 1984, p. 1501. 
115 Alessandro FONTANA, Du droit de resistance au devoir d’insurrection, 
cit., p. 25. 
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the wilds of America», chosen «to continue their union» with 
the empire «by submitting themselves to the same common 
sovereign, who was thereby made the central link connecting the 
several parts of the empire thus newly multiplied» (116). No 
submission to Parliament had, instead, ever been granted (117). 
And it was the colonists expectation that the king would enforce 
their legislative independence against any parliamentary 
usurpation (118).  When the monarch betrayed such duty, he 
altered the conditions on which the colonists had agreed to 
submit to his empire and became thus liable for deposition (119). 
This historical line of reasoning ran through all of Jefferson’s 
revolutionary writings and culminated in his draft of the 
Declaration of Independence. It underpinned the detailed list of 
charges levied against king and parliament alike. And moreover 
it offered him the chance to expound systematically, and in a 
single historical narrative, his doctrine on tyranny, which – 
                                                
116 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft of Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (MS Text of A Summary View of the Rights of British 
America), cit., p. 122-123. 
117 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Original Rough Draught of the Declaration of 
Independence, cit., p. 426: «[…] in constitutiong our several forms of 
government, we had adopted one common king […] but that submission to 
their parliament was no part  of our constitution, nor ever in idea, if history 
may be credited […]». 
118 As David Myer has contended, the Summary View «provided not only the 
justification for American independence, but also the rational for the federal 
union that the new American nation ultimately would adopt as the form of its 
constitution». See David N. MAYER, The Constitutional Though of Thomas 
Jefferson, cit., p. 29. 
119 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Third Draft of the Virginia Constitution, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 357: «[…] by which several acts 
of misrule the said George Guelf has forfaited the kingly office and has 
rendered it necessay for the preservation of the people that he should be 
immediatly deposed from the same, and divested of all it’s [sic] priviledges, 
powers, & prerogatives […]». 
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according to Pauline Maier – constituted his distinguishing 
contribution to the cause of independence (120).  
The text of Jefferson’s original rough draft went even further 
than his earlier revolutionary writings in qualifying British rule 
as manifestly tyrannical and chastising the «many acts of 
tyranny without a mask» perpetrated by George III (121). The 
wording of this most technical qualification was altered in the 
following draft of the Declaration, but its substance remained 
unchanged, as the text attacked the «foundation so broad & so 
undisguised» of British tyranny (122). But, rather significantly, 
this same qualification was expunged from the paragraph as 
adopted by Congress. Jefferson’s technical language was 
glossed over in favor of a more synthetic, but less articulate 
wording (123).  The drafting history of the Declaration proves, 
                                                
120 See Pauline MAIER, American Scripture. Making the Declaration of 
Independence, cit., p. 123. 
121 Thomas JEFFERSON, Original Rough Draught of the Declaration of 
Independence, cit., p. 426: «a prince [Jefferson is reverting to the romanistic 
notion of princeps] whose character is thus marked by every act which may 
define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a people who mean to be free. Future 
ages will scarce believe that the hardiness of one man, adventured within the 
short compass of 12 years only, on so many acts of tyranny without a mask, 
over a people fostered & fixed in principles of liberty». 
122 Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress, 7 
June – 1 August 1776, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 318: 
«a prince who’s character is thus marked by every act which may define a 
tyrant is unfit to be the ruler of a free people. […] future ages will scarcely 
believe that the hardiness of one man adventured, within the short compass of 
twelve years only, to lau a foundation so broad &so undisguised for tyranny 
over a people fostered & fixed in principles of freedom».  
123 See The Declaration of Independence as Adopted by Congress, 11 June – 
4 July 1776, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 431, where the 
aformentioned passage is reduced to: «A Prince, whose character is thus 
marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a 
free people». 
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however, Jefferson’s technical understanding of tyranny and his 
clear perception of its dogmatic and historical articulations. 
Whereas this allows us to claim that the legacy of Bartolus 
mediated by the Vindiciae  and adopted by 17th century English 
political thought was still alive in Jefferson’s recollection of 
Western jurisprudence on tyranny, it is undoubtedly true that the 
notion of tyranny had lost much of its technical sharpness since 
the earlier days of the ius commune. And this is equally proven 
by the drafting history of the Declaration. Not only because the 
express qualification of tyranny as «undisguised», i.e. manifest, 
was absent from the final text of the Declaration, but because of 
another highly significant alteration in the text. 
In the second paragraph of his rough draft, Jefferson had 
distinguished «just powers» of government, which derived from 
a proper title: «the consent of the governed» (124), from 
«arbitrary powers», resulting instead from «abuses and 
usurpations», which led inescapably to «absolute tyranny» (125).  
 
«We hold these truths to be sacred & undeniable; that all men are 
created equal & independent, that from that equal creation they derive 
cerain rights inherent & inalinable, among which are the preservation 
of life, & liberty, & the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these 
rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any for of 
government shall become destructive to these ends, it is the right of 
the people to alter or abolish it, & to institute new government, laying 
it’s [sic] foundation on such principles & organizing it’s [sic] power in 
                                                
124 Thomas JEFFERSON, Original Rough Draught of the Declaration of 
Independence, cit., p. 423. 
125 Ibid., p. 424. 
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such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety & 
happiness. […] But when a long train of abuses &usurpations, begun 
at a distinguished period, & pursuing invariably the same object, 
evinces a design to subject them to arbitrary power, it is their right, it 
is their duty, to throw off such government & to provide new guards 
for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these 
colonies; & such is now the necessity which constrains them to 
expunge their former sistems of government. The history of his 
present majesty, is a history of unremitting injuries & usurpations, 
among which no one fact stands single or solitary to contradict the 
uniform tenor of the rest, all of which have in direct object the 
establishment of an absolute tyranny ofer these states». 
 
The symmetry of this juxtaposition was somewhat altered 
once John Adams revised Jefferson’s rough draft, for in the 
copy he made of the draft Declaration the word «arbitrary» was 
substitute for «absolute» (126). Furthermore, Benjamin Franklin 
appears to have suggested an additional revision and proposed 
to replace «power» with «Despotism» (127). Thus, in the end 
                                                
126 Ibid., p. 428. 
127 Ibid., p. 428. A tentative comment on this sequence of alterations is 
provided in Julian P. BOYD, The Declaration of Independence. The Evolution 
of the text, revised edition edited by Gerard W. Gawalt, The Library of 
Congress in association with the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation 
Inc., University Press of New England, Hanover and London, 1999, pp. 27-
28: «At first glance it appears as if the words ‘to arbitrary power’ were 
cancelled by two parallel lines with two continuous strokes of the pen and as 
if ‘Despotism’ was written above this cancellation at the same time as ‘under 
absolute’. Strangely, however, Adams did not copy the phrase as ‘under 
absolute Despotism’ but as ‘under absolute power’. This, as Mr. Becker 
observes, ‘is neither the original nor the corrected reading, but a combination 
of both. Adams may of course have made a mistake in copying (he made a 
number of slight errors in copying); or it may be that at this time Franklin 
wrote in under absolute in place of to arbitrary and that not until later, after 
Adams had made his copy, was power crossed out and Despotism written in. 
In the original manuscropt, Despotism appears to have been written with a 
different pen, o with heavier ink, than under Absolute, as if written at a 
different time’. I think Mr. Becker is quite right in suggesting that ‘under 
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Jefferson’s clear contrast between «just» » and «arbitrary» 
powers was lost, and, more significantly, it appeared that «a 
long train of abuses and usurpations» had reduced the colonies 
under an «absolute Despotism» as well as an «absolute tyranny» 
(128).  
 
«We hold these truths to be self evident: that all men are created 
equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain inherent and 
inalinable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
                                                                                                     
absolute’ and ‘Despotism’ were written at different times and the latter after 
Adams had taken his copy. Both Adams’ copy and the differences in shading 
in the words point to this conclusion. But I would go much further than Mr. 
Becker, though without some trepidation. I would suggest that ‘under 
absolute’ and ‘Despotism’ were written at different times – and by different 
persons, the former by Jefferson before Adams took his copy and the latter 
by Franklin after Adams had sone so. The three words ‘under absolute 
Despotism’ have always been attributed to Franklin because of Jefferson’s 
marginal notation opposite them ‘Dr. Franklin’s handwriting’, with an 
identifying mark berfore each phrase connecting them with another. It seems 
clear, however, that Jefferson’s marginal notations were written many years 
after 1776, as the feebleness of the handwriting indicates; it is apparent also 
that Jefferson failed in these marginalia to give Franklin credit for all of the 
changes that were made by him in the Rough Draft. Could he have been 
mistaken in this instance likewise in giving Franklin credit for too much? It 
appears plausible in light of the Adams copy and almost conclusive in light 
of the differences in writing  that ‘under absolute’ and ‘Despotism’ were not 
only written at different times but by different persons: the ‘s’ in ‘absolute’ 
appears makedly different from those in ‘Despotism’; the ‘u’certainly has a 
Jeffersonian appearance; the ‘i’ in the two words are different of appear to 
be; there is, as Mr. Beker points out, the striking difference in the shading of 
the words; the word ‘absolute’ bears a very strong resemblance to the same 
word in the third line from the bottom of the same page; and finally, the 
strokes of the pen by which the phrase ‘to arbitrary power’ is cancelled our 
were not continuous, as will be seen when the lines are examined under a 
powerful magnifying glass. […]». See also Carl L. BECKER, The Declaration 
of Independence. A study in the History of Political Ideas, Alfred A. Kopf, 
New York, 1953, pp.154-155; and infra, chapter 2, note 66. 
128 See, The Declaration of Independence as Amended by the Committee and 
by Congress, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 430; as well 
as Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes of Proceedings in the Continental Congress, in 
ibid., pp. 315-316.  
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happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted 
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive 
to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, & to 
institute new government, laying it’s [sic] foundation on such 
principles, & organizing it’s [sic] power in such form, as to them shall 
seem most likely to effect their safety & happiness. […] But when a 
long train of abuses & usurpations […], evinces a design to reduce 
them under absolute Despotism it is their right, it is their duty to throw 
off such government, & to provide new guards for their future 
security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies; & 
such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter […] their 
former government. The history of the present king of Great Britain is 
a history of repeated […] injuries & usurpations […] all having in 
direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny overe these 
states».  
 
Was there no distinction between the two qualifications of 
tyranny and despotism? Apparently not, at least not in the minds 
of Franklin and the other delegates to the Second Continental 
Congress. Nor is there any evidence suggesting that Jefferson 
himself opposed such amendment. However, the final wording 
appears less precise and more ambiguous than the original, 
given that tyranny and despotism had been traditionally distinct 
notions (129), the one referring to an unlawful regime, the other 
to a highly centralized government that did not acknowledge 
any distinction between public and private property (130). Using 
the two notions as synonyms testified to a certain loss of 
                                                
129 See the remarks in Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, Introduzione, cit., pp. 
89-90. 
130 Ibid. 
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technicality in the understanding of tyranny, that coexisted with 
Jefferson’s staunch re-affirmation of its essential traits. 
Distinguishing absolutism from despotism and tyranny had 
been a challenge throughout the 16th and 17th centuries and even 
John Adams himself had confronted the problem in one of his 
marginal notations to William Ellis’ English translation of 
Aristotle’s Politics (131). «Despotism, absolute Monarchy, and 
limited Monarchy as explained by modern Writers are three 
distinct species of Government. But they don’t appear in this 
place to have been clearly comprehended by Aristotle. Absolute 
Monarchy is used here for Despotism and a king governing by 
Laws is said to be but a Republik» (132). Regardles, these subtle 
distinctions seem to have been ultimately superseded by the 
final wording of the Declaration, in which absolute power was 
taken to be inherently arbitrary, and the juxtaposition of tyranny 
to despotism seemed to have become a distinction without a 
difference.  
Jefferson often complained about the final text of the 
Declaration (133). It is generally assumed he did not disapprove 
the alterations proposed by Adams and Franklin, regarding them 
                                                
131 See Rosanna FAVALE, Tirannide e dispotismo nel dibattito politico tra 
cinque e siecento. IX giornata Luigi Firpo, Torino 27-28 settembre 2002, in 
Bruniana & Campanelliana, vol. 8, n. 2, 2002, pp. 533-535. 
132 This autograph notation is inscribed by John Adams in ARISTOTELE, A 
Treatise on Government, translated by William Ellis, London, 1776, book III, 
chapter xvi, p. 171. The text has been digitized and is abailable online at 
https://archive.org/stream/treatiseongovern00aris#page/170/mode/2up 
133 Pauline MAIER, American Scripture. Making the Declaration of 
Independence, cit., pp. 143-153. 
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as «merely verbal» (134). However, he also offered his own 
precise definition of despotism, in line with the notations 
inscribed by Adams in his copy of Aristotle, but at odds with 
Franklin’s amendment. «The concentrating [of all the powers of 
government, legislative, executive, and judiciary] in the same 
hands is precisely the definition of despotic government» (135).  
So, there remains an appreciable difference between Jefferson’s 
original wording of the Declaration – as well as his later 
thought – and the following versions of the text, at least in 
regards to tyranny. But even the text as adopted by Congress 
remained, despite these internal inconsistencies, a decisive 
indictment of British tyrannical rule. 
Pauline Maier has persuasively argued that, by proving the 
tyrannical nature of British rule, the Declaration served to 
justify the revolution (136). The Declaration also proved, at least 
in Jefferson’s intentions, that American independence had been 
established de iure and not simply de facto (137). It denied that 
power had the capacity of establishing itself and rejected the 
                                                
134 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to James Madison, 30 August 1823, in The 
Republic of Letters, The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison, 1776-1826, vol. 3, 1804-1826, edited by James Morton 
Smith, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1995, p. 1875. 
135 Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, cit., p. 120. 
136 See Pauline MAIER, American Scripture. Making the Declaration of 
Independence, cit., p. 115. 
137 Exactly opposite is the view of David Mayer and Thomas Grey. See 
David N. MAYER, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson, cit., p. 
41: «Yet, as Thomas Grey has noted, the case for independence ‘could not be 
made in legal terms ‘but rather had to be based upon extralegal 
considerations of utility and political philosophy». See also, Thomas C. 
GREY, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American 
Revolution Theory, in Stanford Law Review, vol. 30, 1978, pp. 843-893. 
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proposition that would eventually reduce, two centureis later, 
public law to the mere sanction of power and give way to an 
alternative interpretation of the notion of revolution as 
«l’instaurazione di fatto di un ordinamento» (138). American 
societies constituted proper jurisdictions because they derived 
their power from lawful titles that had been established, in 
pursuance of a higher law, as the earliest colonial settlements 
were being effectuated, through expatriation, conquest, and later 
citizenship.  
This insistent need to retrace the titles from which power 
emanated was at the origin of Jefferson’s constitutionalism. His 
understanding of power depended, in other words, on his 
apreciation of its deviation from its proper foundations. Thus 
Jefferson conceived constitutionalism not simply as a check on 
tyranny, but as its dialectical opposite. To the point that he could 
not conceive the one, if not in direct relation to the other.  
In a constitutional democracy, a «succesful majority» could 
not forget that, «though its will [was] to prevail, that will, to be 
rightful, [had to be] reasonable», i.e. consistent with the recta 
ratio, the higher law of Western jurisprudence (139). And an 
«equal law» binding all factions of society had to guard the 
«equal rights» of «the minority» from all possible 
                                                
138 Santi ROMANO, L’instaurazione di fatto di un ordinamento costituzionale 
e sua legittimazione, cit., pp. 131-201. For an even more explicit 
interpretation of the revolution as a de facto foundation of a legal system see 
ID. Rivoluzione e diritto, cit., pp. 220-233 
139 Thomsa JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address, in The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. 33, edited by Barbara B. Oberg et al., Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2006, p. 149. 
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encroachments of the majority (140). Because even a government 
representing the will of the majority could degenerate into 
tyranny, if the majority did not comply with the fundamental 
laws establishing society. A lesson contemporary 
constitutionalism seems, if not to have forgotten, at least to have 
given for granted, as it has increasingly lost interest in the 
relationship between sovereignty and its negative. To the point 
that none of its current institutes seems any longer capable of 
conceptualizing the radical perversion of power and providing 
effective remedies against the degeneration of sovereignty into 
its aberration (141).  
Tyranny remained at the heart of Jefferson’s constitutionalism 
even after the revolution.  And it was through the language of 
tyranny that Jefferson expressed his anguished perplexion over 
slavery. Writing to James Holmes in 1820 Jefferson claimed 
that, in regards to slavery, Americans had «the wolf by the ears» 
                                                
140 Ibid.   
141 Incitendally, it is worth noting that one of Italy’s foremost constitutional 
scholars has recently reverted to the notion of tyranny in an effort to qualify 
the abuses perpetrated by the Italian Parliament, which has approved a 
comprehensive revision of the existing Constitution, despit the Constitutional 
Court had previously declared the partial unconstitutionality of the law by 
which its members had been elected to office. In this context, Gustavo 
Zagrebelsky recalled the distinction between tyranny «ex defectu tituli» and 
tyranny «quoad exercitio», acknowledging that the negative paradigm of 
power belonged to both the medieval doctrine and the wisdom «dei padri del 
costituzionalismo moderno» and insisting that such distinction «è perenne e 
vale anche nel nostro caso». See Gustavo ZAGREBELSKY, La sentenza n. 1 del 
2014 e i suoi commentatori, in Giurisprudenza costituzionale, vol. 54, n. 3, 
2014, p. 2987. The constitutional reform was eventually rejected by a 
referendum. 
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and could neither «hold him nor safely let him go» (142). This 
forceful metaphor belonged to a long literary tradition on 
tyranny. It had at first been attributed the Roman emperor 
Tiberius by Suetonius (143), then collected by Erasmus in his 
Adagia (144), and finally recalled in the final pages of, quite 
remarkably, the Vindiciae contra tyrannos (145).   
«Tyrannus enim quam violenter invadit tyrannidem, violenter 
retinere quodammodo cogitur. Quia lupum, ut dicebat Tyberius, 
auribus tenere sibi videtur, quem neque absque vi retinere, 
neque absque periculo dimittere potest» (146). 
This would seem to suggest that the language of Western 
jurisprudence on tyranny, originally conceived by the civilis 
sapientia in the 14th century, was still very much the language of 
Jefferson’s 18th century constitutionalism; while English 17th 
century political writers and French 16th century jurists its most 
                                                
142 See Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to James Holmes, 12 April, 1820, in 
Thomas Jefferson, Writings, cit., p. 1434. 
143 See SVETONIUS, De XII Caesaribus, in ID., Opera omnia, Londini: e 
Typographeo Mariae Matthews, 1718, Thomas Jefferson Collection, Rare 
Books and Special Collections Division of the Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C., p. 257: «Cunctandi causa erat, metus undique 
imminentium discriminum: us saepe lupum se auribus tenere diceret». 
Tiberius would later become the paragon of tyranny for Thomas More. See 
Vittorio GABRIELI, Introduzione, in Tommaso Moro, Storia di Re Riccardo 
III, edited by Vittorio Gabrieli, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, Roma, 2005, 
pp. XXXVI. 
144 See Desiderius ERASMUS, Adagiorum epitome, Ex novissima Chiliadum 
ceu, ipsorum fontium recognitione excerpta, & multis in locis jam longè 
accuratius, quàm antè emendata. Cum triplici Indice, Authorum, Locorum & 
Proverbiorum locupletissimo, Amstelodami: apud Joannem Janssonium, 
1663, p. 422, Thomas Jefferson Collection, Rare Books and Special 
Collections Division of the Library of Congress. 
145 See STEPHANUS JUNIUS BRUTUS, Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, cit., 
quaestio IV, pp. 222-223. 
146 Ibid. 
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immediate sources. Whereas no evidence proves Jefferson’s 
direct knowledge of Bartolus or his texts, the legal and political 
sources in which he was read did indeed mediate and reinterpret 
the legacy of the ius commune (147). Milton, Sidney, and Locke 
relied on Huguenots resistance theorists, as much as the 
Vindiciae relied on Bartolus. Through their works and their 
participation in the revolutions that constituted the Western legal 
tradition, the doctrine of tyranny was handed down to later 
generations. Jefferson and his fellow revolutionaries received it 
and assumed it as the negative paradigm against which they 
shaped, by contraposition, a renewed unuderstanding of 
sovereignty as the constitutional expression of supreme power.  
Despite common assumptions generally understand 18th 
century constitutionalism as having supported the establishment 
of new forms of government by refuting earlier doctrines on 
power, the founding moments of American constitutionalism did 
not radically break with the past. Accordingly, the revolution led 
                                                
147 On the fundamental continuity of the Western legal tradition, not despite, 
but by virtue of its characteristic revolutions see Diego QUAGLIONI, 
Costituzione e costituzionalismo nella tradizione giuridica occidentale, cit., 
p. 7: «Un simile collegamento fra passato e presente[…] potrebbe apparire 
appunto paradossale a chi, scrutando nell’ideario giuridico medievale e 
impacciato dal carico ideologico della modernità, fosse incapaee di 
riconoscere nella tradizione giuridica occidentale una fondamentale trama 
unitaria, non al di là delle cesure, ma proprio in ragione di quelle 
“rivoluzioni” che ne costituiscono il tratto più caratteristico (almeno nella 
visione che di quella tradizione ci ha dato Harold J. Berman in Law and 
Revolution, come capacità tipica dell’occidente di rielaborare in 
continuazione una dimensione scientifica del diritto: ‘the sense of an ongoing 
historical continuity between past and future’, “senso” dello sviluppo 
organico degli istituti giuridici lungo generazioni e secoli, con ciascuna 
generazione che costruisce coscientemente sull’opera di quelle che l’hanno 
preceduta». 
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by Jefferson can be read, in keeping with a school of thought 
that goes from Hannah Arendt to Harold J. Berman, as a 
«gigantic attemp[t] to repair» the spoiled foundations of the 
Western legal tradition and «renew the broken thread» of its 
moral and scientific heritage (148). Rather than constituting an 
entirely new body politic floating on the surface of history, 
Jefferson seems to have taken «a tiger’s leap into the past» to 
ground the constitution of a new political regime into revived 
interpretations of forgotten or neglected practices of power and 
of its limitations (149). As a result, «la stessa letteratura 
costituzionale moderna», so indebted to Jefferson’s writings, «si 
muove, senza sapero», the words are those of a young Gaetano 
Salvemini, written in an essay originally published in 1901, «su 
un terreno i cui confini furono fissati fin dal secolo XIV dalla 
mente veramente geniale di Bartolo da Sassoferrato» (150). 
                                                
148 Hannah ARENDT, What is Authority?, in ID., Between Past and Future. 
Eight Exercises in Political Thought, Viking Press, New York, 1961, re-
issued by Penguin, New York, 2006, p. 140. 
149 Walter BENJAMIN, Thesis on the Philosophy of History, in ID., 
Illuminations. Essays and Reflections, edited and with an introduction by 
Hannah Arendt, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego, 1968, re-issued by 
Schocken Books, New York, 2007, p. 261 
150 Gaetano SALVEMINI, La teoria di Bartolo da Sassoferrato sulle 
costituzioni politiche, in ID., Studi Storici, Tipografia galileiana, Firenze, 
1901, re-printed in ID., La dignità cavalleresca nel comune di Firenze e altri 
scritti, edited by Ernesto Sestan, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1972, p. 350. 
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2 
 
 
 
THE TITLES OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 
1. Expatriation 
Almost two centuries before Jefferson claimed expatriation 
had allowed American settlers to relinquish their mother country 
and establish self-governing colonies, the duke of Parma and 
Piacenza had issued a decree in which he prohibited his subjects 
from residing abroad for over a semester and compelled those 
who had left his dominions to return within two months, 
threatening otherwise to seize their lands and possessions (1).  
Soon after its adoption, the decree became increasingly 
controversial and sparked a complex debate amongst jurists, 
many of whom rendered consilia, some defending the decree’s 
lawfulness, others rejecting it.  
Among the latter, Giacomo Antonio Marta (1559-1628) was 
surely the most prominent scholar and practitioner (2). The first 
                                                
1 See Gino GORLA, “Ius libertatis” e diritto “naturale” di libertà di espatrio, 
in un celebre caso discusso in Italia tra i secoli XVI e XVII (per un raffronto 
con i “diritti dell’uomo” dal 1789 a oggi), in Scritti in onore di Massimo 
Severo Giannini, vol. II, edited by Paolo Pistone, Giuffrè, Milano, 1988, pp. 
225-250. The following considerations draw amply from this study. 
2 See Federico ROGGERO, Giacomo Antonio Marta, in Dizionario biografico 
degli italiani, vol. 71, Istituto dell’enciclopedia italiana, Roma, 2008, pp. 24-
29; and Paul F. GRANDLER, Giacomo Antonio Marta: Antipapal Lawyer and 
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consilium he rendered on the issue, along with the far more 
compelling second one, prompted by his rejection of Giacomo 
Menochio’s defence and published as the consilium primum in 
his repertoire of advisory opinions, was among the most 
eloquent examples of early modern jurisprudence on iura 
naturalia seen through the prism of expatriation and freedom of 
establishment (3). 
Gino Gorla has dedicated a captivating essay to the analysis 
of Marta’s doctrine. Building on previous studies, he has 
contended that expatriation was held by modern European 
jurists as one of the iura naturalia limiting the legislative 
authority of the prince. These iura were «determinate 
principles» of natural law, «res decisae et determinatae naturali 
lege vel moribus gentium» as Baldus (1327-1400) had called 
them (4), restraining an otherwise plena and absoluta potestas 
(5).  
                                                                                                     
English Spy, 1609-1618, in The Catholic Historical Review, vol. 93, n. 4, 
2007, pp. 784-814. 
3 See Giacomo Antonio MARTA, Consilia doctoris Martae svmmi practici : 
in qvibvs omnes cavsae, qvae svis temporibus in controuersiam vocatae 
fuerunt, iudicio grauissimo definiuntur, et noua respondendi, & allegandi de 
iure methodus exhibetur, Avgvstae Tavrinorvm: Apud HH. Io. Dominici 
Tarini, 1628, pp. 1-4, Special Collection, Robbins Collection in Religious 
and Civil Law, UC Berkeley School of Law, Berkeley, (CA). 
4 BALDUS DE UBALDIS, Consilia, I, Cons. 328 quoted in Gino GORLA, “Ius 
libertatis” e diritto “naturale” di libertà di espatrio, in un celebre caso 
discusso in Italia tra i secoli XVI e XVII (per un raffronto con i “diritti 
dell’uomo” dal 1789 a oggi), cit., p. 229. 
5 See Gino GORLA, «Iura Naturalia Sunt Immutabilia»: Limits to the Powers 
of the ‘Pinceps’ (as Sovereign) in Legal Literature and Case Law between 
the 16th and 18th Centuries, in Italian Studies in Law, vol. I, edited by 
Alessandro Pizzorusso, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, 
London, 1992, p. 56. The original Italian unabridged version of this article is 
published as Gino GORLA, «Iura naturalia sunt immutabilia»: I limiti al 
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According to Gorla, Marta’s consilium highlighted the opinio 
communis settled at the time, in light of which any legislative 
enactment violating natural rights was considered to be 
inherently flawed and could be successfully challenged for 
having infringed upon the principle of higher law iura naturalia 
sunt immutabilia (6). 
Marta condemned the duke of Parma and Piacenza for his 
attempt to curtail his subject’s right to expatriate and claimed, 
moreover, that suppressing freedom of movement and 
preventing citizens from travelling around the world, in search 
of knowledge and success, constituted an offense against 
humanity itself: «inhumanum est igitur interdicere subditis 
hominibus facultatem peregrinandi per orbem, et facultatem 
ediscendi apud diversas nationes; atque propriam fortunam 
inveniendi: libertas voluntatis et electionis tollenda non est» (7).  
Reflecting on this sweeping and imposing assertion of 
freedom, Gorla wondered whether its influence extended to later 
                                                                                                     
potere del “Principe” nella dottrina e nalla giurisprudenza forense tra I 
secoli XVI e XVIII, in Diritto e potere nella storia europea. Atti in onore di 
Bruno Paradisi, vol. 2, Olschki, Firenze, 1982, pp. 629-684. 
6 See Gino GORLA, “Ius libertatis” e diritto “naturale” di libertà di espatrio, 
in un celebre caso discusso in Italia tra i secoli XVI e XVII (per un raffronto 
con i “diritti dell’uomo” dal 1789 a oggi), cit., p. 230. Marta re-affirmed the 
prince’s duty to comply with the iura naturalia in Giacomo Antonio MARTA, 
Consilia doctoris Martae, cit., p. 2: «[…] Princeps non potest facere legem 
contra ius naturale & gentium […] quia potestas Principis subest iuri naturali 
& gentium, ideo non potest legem condere illa iura derogando». 
7 Giacomo Antonio MARTA, Consilia doctoris Martae, cit., p. 2. So, it was 
«opera e merito di Marta» if the right to expatriate became part of that ius 
libertatis inherent in the human condition and regulated by the ius commune. 
See Gino GORLA, “Ius libertatis” e diritto “naturale” di libertà di espatrio, 
in un celebre caso discusso in Italia tra i secoli XVI e XVII (per un raffronto 
con i “diritti dell’uomo” dal 1789 a oggi), cit., p. 245. 
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generations as well. Had the drafters of the Declarations and 
Constitutions adopted during the French Revolution been 
familiar with Marta’s writings and mindful that he had 
construed freedom of movement as the paradigm of man’s ius 
libertatis? And were the 18th century constitutional codifications 
of expatriation indebted in any meaningful way to the earlier 
jurisprudence and case law on iura naturalia? 
Gorla answered these questions in the negative: the 
jurisprudence and case law on the natural right to freely 
expatriate, cross borders and settle abroad had fallen into 
oblivion, following the broader demise of the jurisprudence and 
case law on iura naturalia. Neither the 17th and the 18th century 
natural law scholars, nor the authors of the several 
Constitutions, Charters, and Declarations adopted from the 
French Revolution onwards had these earlier currents of thought 
in mind (8).  
But what about the drafters of the Declarations, Bills, and 
Constitutions adopted amidst the American Revolution? Could 
it be that American jurists preserved the memory of what later 
European jurists would instead forget? After all, the importance 
immigrations had assumed in the constitutional history of 
colonial settlements was very much present to 18th century 
Americans, who took a keen interest in the institute of 
                                                
8 See Gino GORLA, “Ius libertatis” e diritto “naturale” di libertà di espatrio, 
in un celebre caso discusso in Italia tra i secoli XVI e XVII (per un raffronto 
con i “diritti dell’uomo” dal 1789 a oggi), cit., pp. 247-250. «Sicché» he 
carried on «non si è potuto vedere cosa vi fosse veramente di “antico” 
nell’Antico regime rispetto al “Nuovo” […], né spiegare il passaggio 
dall’uno all’altro». See ibid., p. 248. 
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expatriation and the determination of its legal effects (9). To the 
point that Thomas Jefferson argued it constituted the foundation 
                                                
9 See John P. REID, Constitutional History of the American Revolution, vol. 
1, The Authority of Rights, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2003, 
pp. 114-123. Whereas Reid did address the authority of migration in colonial 
legal discourse and did acknowledge that migration had not been traditionally 
given «any weight by the constitutional historians of the American 
Revolution» (ibid., pp. 115-116), who had not recognized it to be a legal 
argument, he also stressed that, taken in itself, the «migration principle was 
not an important authority for colonial rights» (ibid., p. 115). Though this 
might have been true for the discussion at large, it is surly was not the case 
for Jefferson. Moreover, Reid did recognize that migration had been treated 
as a legal institute by both British and Irish political literature. Yet, as the 
brief mention of Marta’s consilium suggests, expatriation belonged to a much 
broader legal discourse and was generally recognized throughout Europe as 
one of the iura naturalia since at least early modernity. Reid’s qualification 
of the legal authority of migration is equally problematic. Dispite recognizing 
that the «natural right of migration was neither an American original nor a 
radical doctrine but one that long had been a staple in the legal literature of 
Europe» (ibid., p. 119), Reid oddly claimed that being a natural rather the 
positive right migration «may not have existed at common law», apparently 
forgetting that sir Edward Coke had claimd, in the landmark Calvin’s case, 
that natural rights were part and parcel of the English common law. Coke had 
gone even further and had claimed such rights could never be «altered or 
changed», since it was «certainly true that jura naturalia sunt immutabilia». 
See Calvin’s case, English Reports, vol. 77, King’s Bench Division, 6, 
Containing Coke, Parts 5 to 13, Stevens & Sons, London, 1907, pp. 391, 
392-393.  In this respect, it seems appropriate to recall once more of Gino 
Gorla’s penetrating remarks: «[…] it is interesting to notice that [here], Coke 
reveals one of his habits, well known to English and American lawyers of the 
18th and 19th century, and even today […]; i.e. he borrows from civil law 
principles, concepts, maxims, without indicating the source, but using instead 
words or concepts proper of common  law. For instance, in Bohnam’s case he 
translates into terms of ‘common reason’ (as declared by common law 
courts) and of common rights, or rights based upon such common reason, 
what for English civilians and Bracton (who influenced so much Coke) were 
the ius naturale vel gentium and the iura naturalia immutablia. In Calvin’s 
case, decided the same year […], Coke mentions a ius natural divine and 
eternal». See Gino GORLA, «Iura Naturalia Sunt Immutabilia»: Limits to the 
Powers of the ‘Pinceps’ (as Sovereign) in Legal Literature and Case Law 
between the 16th and 18th Centuries, cit., p. 65; the original Italian version 
may be read in ID., «Iura naturalia sunt immutabilia». I limiti al potere del 
«principe» nella dottrina e nella giurisprudenza forense fra i secoli xvi e 
xviii, cit., pp. 653-654. 
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of America’s claim to independence (10). Would it then be 
unreasonable to wonder whether Jefferson himself had in mind 
European authorities when claiming that the American legal 
systems had been founded upon «the rights of men; of 
expatriated men»? (11)  
It is well known that Jefferson never authored a 
comprehensive treatise on constitutional law. Driven by the 
urgency of putting words to action, he committed most of his 
thoughts to letters and occasional writings and seems not to have 
felt the desire of fixing once and for all the shape of his doctrine, 
preferring – not unlike a judge – to articulate his views case by 
case, according to the relevant circumstances presented by 
history. Undoubtedly, this rhapsodic quality of his 
constitutionalism has frustrated many scholars, who have 
lamented, to a greater or lesser degree, its fragmentation. But, 
perhaps no other author as Jefferson has been able to reveal, 
through the «petit écrits du temps» and the «correspondances 
particulier», the beliefs and principles underlying and sustaining 
the construction, not only of a new legal system, but of the 
renewed understanding of law necessary for its constitution (12).  
                                                
10 See David N. MAYER, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson, 
cit., pp. 29-30, 338-339. 
11 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Judge John Tayler, 17 June 1812, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol. 5, 1 May 1812 to 10 
March 1813, edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al., Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2009, p. 135. 
12 Alexis DE TOCQUEVILLE, letter to Louis de Kergolay, 16 May 1858, quoted 
in Gino GORLA, Commento a Tocqueville. “L’idea dei diritti”, Giuffrè, 
Milano, 1948, p. 26: «[…] je n’ai jusqu’à present trouvé qu’un seul moyen: 
c’est en quelque sorte de vivre à chaque moment de la révolution avec les 
contemporains en listant non ce qu’on dit d’eux, ou qu’eux-mêmes ont dit 
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Jefferson began reflecting on expatriation ever since his 
earliest writings and consistently reverted to its notion 
throughout his career (13). His opinions on the subject made 
their first organic appearance in the Summary View. Right from 
the opening paragraphs, it is clear that Jefferson’s argument in 
favor of colonial self-government hinged on his notion of 
expatriation. According to which, colonial settlers emigrated 
from England to Northern America at their own risk and 
expense, having received hardly any aid from their distant 
homeland, not being considered agents of the empire, but rather 
free men seeking to establish commonwealths of their own in 
pursuance of natural law.  
Before «they emigrated to America», the words are 
Jefferson’s, «our ancestors […] were free inhabitants of the 
British dominions in Europe, and possessed a right which nature 
has given all men, of departing from the country in which 
chance, not choice, has placed them, of going in quest of new 
habitations, and of there establishing new societies, under such 
laws and regulations as to them shall seem most likely to 
                                                                                                     
d’eux depuis, mais ce qu’ils disaient eux-mêmes alors, ed, autant que 
possible, ce qu’ils pensaient réellement. Les petits écrits du temps, le 
correspondances particulières, etc., ont, pour atteindre ce but, plus 
d’efficacité encore que les debates des assemblées». 
13 As David T. Konig has recently noted, Jefferson’s earliest 
«announcement» of the freedom of movement may be found in the legal brief 
written to defend Samuel Howell, an enslaved Virginian who sued his master 
and sought Jefferson’s assistance in 1770.  According to Jefferson’s claim: 
«Under the law of nature, all men are born free, [and] everyone comes into 
the world with a right to his own person which includes the liberty of moving 
[…]». See David T. KONIG, Jefferson and the Law, in A Companinon to 
Thomas Jefferson, edited by Francis D. Cogliano, cit., p. 355. 
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promote public happiness» (14). 
Like his understanding of power, Jefferson’s understanding of 
expatriation was in no way abstract. Precisely because he 
believed it to be a right, naturally inherent in the human 
condition, he believed it to be actionable, and was eager to recall 
the specific instances in which it had been concretely put into 
action and exercised throughout history (15). The Saxons had 
expatriated from Germany to England several centuries prior to 
the British emigration to North America and the precedent they 
had set was amply discussed by Jefferson in the opening 
paragraphs of his Summary View (16).   
This precedent, along with the larger history of the Saxon 
people, was of particular relevance for Jefferson (17). It traced 
the origins of English history to its Germanic roots and revealed 
that, much as Montesquieu had argued, «si l’on veut lire 
l’admirable ouvrage de Tacite sur les moeurs des Germains, on 
                                                
14 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (Manuscript Text of A Summary View of the Rights of 
British America), cit., p. 121. 
15 Dumas Malone, the author of the classic and still most comprehensive 
biography written on Jefferson, insisted that Jefferson «craved historical as 
well as philosophical authority» and «could not be content without finding 
precedent for the freedom he was so sure was right». See Dumas MALONE, 
Jefferson and His Time, vol. 1, Jefferson the Virginian, Little, Brown, and 
Company, Boston, 1948, p. 185. 
16 A concise overview is provided in Brian STEELE, Thomas Jefferson and 
American Nationhood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 
34-35; as weel as in Ari HELO, Thomas Jefferson’s Ethics and the Politics of 
Human Progress. The Morality of a Slaveholder, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2014, pp. 124-125. 
17 See Trevor COULBOURN, The Lamp of Experience, Whig History and the 
Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution, University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1965, re-published by Liberty Fund, 
Indianapolis, 1998. 
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verra que c’est d’eux que les Anglois ont tire l’idée de leur 
gouvernement politique. Ce beau système a été trouvé dans les 
bois» (18).  Rather than being the achievement of a particular 
national history, the rights and liberties enjoyed by Englishmen 
and English expatriates belonged to the shared European 
heritage of the Germanic people. Their indomitable 
temperament and characteristic form of government by general 
assembly had been described with admiration by Tacitus and his 
Germania had became throughout the 17th and 18th centuries one 
of the main sources of English and later French critics of 
absolutism (19). Like Montesquieu, Algernon Sidney had amply 
referred to Tacitus and openly acknowledged that English had 
drawn their «original and government» from the «Germanic 
nations». He further acknowledged that the Saxons coming into 
England had «retain’d to themselves the same rights» enjoyed 
on the continent and «had no kings but such as were set up by 
themselves», whose power they could abrogate «when they 
                                                
18 Charles-Louis de Secondat de MONTESQUIEU, De l’esprit des loix, livre XI, 
chapitre 6, De la Constitution d’Angleterre, in Œuvres de Montesquieu, 
nouvelle édition, revue, corrigée & considérablement augmentée par 
l’auteur, tome premier, a Londres: Chez Nourse, 1767, p. 221, Thomas 
Jefferson Collection, Rare Books and Special Collections Division of the 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.  
19 See the conventional account in John G. A. POCOCK, The Ancient 
Constitution and the Feudal Law. A Study of English Historical Thought in 
the Seventeenth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987; an 
insightful account may be read in Anna Maria BATTISTA, La «Germaina» di 
Tacito nella Francia illuminista, in Studi urbinati, vol. 53, 1979, pp. 93-131, 
now republished with an introduction by Diego Quaglioni, by Quattroventi, 
Urbino, 1999. 
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pleased» (20). But, whereas in England and France the Saxon 
myth had been used to curtail absolutism (21), Jefferson reverted 
to this precedent to establish, on historical and legal grounds, the 
American claim to independence. 
By expatriating, the colonists had re-enacted the experience 
of «their Saxon ancestors», whom had «in like manner» in the 
5th century «left their native wilds and woods in north of 
                                                
20 Algernon SIDNEY, Discourses Concerning Government, cit., p. 376.  
Sidney’s remarks are particularly significant as they are inscribed in a work 
heavily influenced by 16th century French jurisprudence and its political use 
of Tacitus and his Germania. See Diego QUAGLIONI, «Suivant Taciet». Anna 
Maria Battista e la “questiona germanica” nella Francia settecentesca, in 
Anna Maria BATTISTA, La «Germaina» di Tacito nella Francia illuminista, 
cit., pp. 19-20.  
21 A fascinating reading of this particular kind of historical discourse in give 
in Michel FOUCAULT, «Il faut défender la société». Cours au Collège de 
France (1975-1976), edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, A. 
Gallimard, Paris, 1997, translated into English as «Society must be 
defended». Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, Picador, New 
York, 2003. According to Foucault, this discourse on the Saxon heritage of 
English law and politics «developed completely within the historical 
dimension (ibid, p. 55) and was interested «in defining and discovering, 
beneath the forms of justice that [had] been instituted, the order that [had] 
been imposed, the forgotten past of real struggles, actual victories, and 
defeats which [might] have been disguised but which remain[ed] profoundly 
inscribed. It [was] interested in rediscovering the blood that [had] dried in the 
codes, and not, therefore, the absolute right that lie[ed] beneath the transience 
of history; it [was] interested not in referring the relativity of history to the 
absolute of the law, but in discovering, beneath the stability of the law of the 
truth, the indefiniteness of history (ibid., p. 56). This had been the «discourse 
of the Puritans, the discourse of the Levellers. And then fifty years later, in 
France at the end of the reign of Louis XIV» it had been spoken from the «the 
opposite side», but it was  «still the discourse of a struggle against the king 
[…]» (ibid., p. 59). It had been «discovered, or at least asserted» in 17th 
century England, once it began to appear «that the history of the Saxons after 
their defeat at the Battle of Hastings, [was] not the same as the history of the 
Normans who were the victors in the same battle». One man’s victory was 
another man’s defeat. «The victory of the Franks and Clovis» was also «read, 
conversely, as the defeat, enserfment, and enslavement of the Gallo-Romans. 
What look[ed] as right, law, or obligation from the point of view of power 
look[ed] like the abuse of power, violence, and exaction when [was] seen 
from the viewpoint of the new discourse […]» (ibid, pp. 69-70). 
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Europe» and, «under [the same] universal law», had «possessed 
themselves of the island of Britain […] and had established 
there that system of laws which has long been the glory and 
protection of that country» (22). 
Jefferson recalled the Saxon precedent to clarify the legal 
effects of expatriation and apply them to the American case: as 
no claim «of superiority or dependence» had ever been asserted 
over Saxon expatriates by «that mother country from which they 
had migrated», and as «no circumstance [had] occurred to 
distinguish materially the British from the Saxon emigration», 
no such claim of superiority or dependence could have been 
advanced by Britain over American settlers, thus proving 
emigration to be at the origin of American self-government (23). 
The connection between expatriation and self-government 
came into even sharper focus one year later, in a succinct 
paragraph of the draft Jefferson submitted to the committee 
established by the Second Continental Congress to draw up a 
declaration explaining why the thirteen colonies had taken up 
arms against Britain (24).  
«Our forefathers, inhabitants of the island of Gr. Britn. […] 
having […] long endeavored to bear up against the evils of 
                                                
22 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (Manuscript Text of A Summary View of the Rights of 
British America), cit., pp. 121-122. 
23 Ibid., p. 122. 
24 For an introduction to the drafting history of the Declaration of the Causes 
and Necessities for Taking Un Arms see Julian P. BOYD, The Disputed 
Authorship of the Declaration on the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up 
Arms, 1775, in Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 74, 
1950, pp. 51-73. The multiple drafts are printed in The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. 1. cit., pp. 187-219. 
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misrule, left their native land to seek on these shores a residence 
for civil & religious freedom. At the expence [sic] of their blood 
[…], to the […] ruin of their fortunes, with the relinquishment 
of every thing quiet & comfortable in life, they effected 
settlements in the inhospitable wilds of America; they there 
established civil societies […] with various forms of 
constitutions but possessing all, what is inherent in all, the full 
& perfect powers of legislation» (25). 
In this remarkable passage, tellingly written in a language 
highly reminiscent of earlier jurisprudence on plena potestas 
(26), Jefferson condensed and combined two of the most 
distinctive principles of his constitutionalism. On the one hand, 
he argued that each society had «the right […] and the inherent 
power to legislate for its own affairs» (27), on the other, he 
suggested that expatriation had perfected the inherent power of 
colonial societies to legislate autonomously. 
In order to sustain his argument, Jefferson implicitly reversed 
                                                
25 Thomas JEFFERSON, Composition Draft of the Declaration of the Causes 
and Necessities for Taking Un Arms, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 
1. cit., p. 193. 
26 Learned readers of the day would hardly have missed Jefferson’s echo of 
John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government: «the full and perfect powers 
of legislation» is, in fact, an expression that repeats almost verbatim one of 
the Locke’s «formules les plus heureuses» to describe his understanding of 
sovereignty. See John LOCKE, Two Treatise on Government, cit., p. 356. For 
a preliminary comment see Luisa SIMONUTTI, La souveraineté comme 
problème chez Locke, in Penser la souveraineté à l’époque moderne et 
contemporaine, vol. 1, edited by Gian Mario Cazzaniga and Yves Charles 
Zarka , Edizioni ETS, Pisa, 2001, pp. 141-158: 141. 
27 Armand London FELL, Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and the 
Legislative State, vol. 6, American Tradition and Innovation with 
Contemporary Import and Foreground, book 1, Foundations (to Early 19th 
Century), cit., p. 48. 
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the traditional point of view on expatriation. Instead of 
considering it exclusively as a limit to legislative authority, as 
had been done for instance by Marta, he regarded it as its natural 
foundation and claimed colonial societies possessed «within» 
themselves «the sovereign powers of legislation» precisely 
because they had been established by «expatriated men» (28). 
Men who had relinquished and dissolved their ties to the 
commonwealth of origin and were, as such, no longer subject to 
any external jurisdiction.  
Expatriation, thus, became the title of American subjecthood, 
the origin of its legal and political capacity, the source of its 
self-government, and the foundation of the power to enforce it. 
By expatriating, the colonists had quitted Britain and 
dissolved their allegiances to its body politic, ceasing to be 
English subjects and unburdening themselves from «any claim 
of superiority or dependence asserted over them by that mother 
country from which they had migrated» (29). So, the powers of 
legislative self-government inherent in the newly established 
American societies could perfect themselves free from any 
external constraint.  
No reader of the time would have failed to perceive in 
Jefferson’s words the echo of ancient principles of public law, 
                                                
28 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (Manuscript Text of A Summary View of the Rights of 
British America), cit., p. 132. ID., letter to Judge John Tayler, 17 June 1812, 
cit., p. 135. 
29 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (Manuscript Text of A Summary View of the Rights of 
British America), cit., p. 122. 
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upon which late medieval and early modern jurists had erected 
the doctrine of sovereignty, and upon which Jefferson was 
attempting, with renewed effort, to lay the foundations of 
American independence (30).  
Supremacy, understood as independence from higher civil 
authorities, had been one of the defining features of sovereignty, 
ever since the 13th century, when legal scholars had begun to 
acknowledge the majesty of those free kings who refused to 
recognize alium supra se (31). Over time, several Glossators 
consolidated this doctrine in the formula rex superiorem non 
recognoscens in regno suo est imperator. The maxim enjoyed a 
remarkable success and later generations of scholars repeatedly 
adopted it, endlessly varying its wording and progressively 
broadening its meaning, until the formula came to express, a 
century later, the self-sufficiency of all municipal legal systems, 
possessing in full the well-rounded powers of self-government 
(plena et rotunda potestas), while holding within themselves «le 
ragioni della propria vita» (32). Thus, at the dawn of modernity, 
                                                
30 There would see to be a conflation within Jefferson’s though of 
Germanistic (or rather Saxon) and Romanistic (or rather Medieval) principles 
of law. For a similar conflation see Gerhard DILCHER, The Germanists and 
the Historical School of Law: German Legal Science between Romanticism, 
Realism, and Rationalization, cit. 
31 See Francesco CALASSO, I Glossatori e la teoria della sovranità. Studio di 
diritto comune pubblico, Giuffrè, Milano, 1957, p. 23. 
32  Ibid: «[…] da principio, infatti, essa [the maxim rex sumperiorem  non 
recognoscens in regno suo est imperator] aveva voluto semplicemente dire 
questo: che quei poteri medesimi che la coscienza dell’epoca riconosceva 
all’imperatore, “dominus mundi”, sopra l’impero universale, dovevano essere 
riconosciuti a ciascun re libero, entro l’ambito del proprio regno. Da questa 
proposizione la formula non tardò ad allargarsi ben oltre la cerchia dei re 
liberi, fino a comprendere tutti gli ordinamenti particolari i quali, avendo in 
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superiority came to be understood as fullness of power and was 
defined, by jurists such as Jean Bodin, as the supreme power to 
legislate and, even more importantly, derogate ordinary 
legislation (33). This, in short, was the complex legacy behind 
Jefferson’s restatement of John Locke’s earlier claim that the 
«one Supreme Power […], to which all the rest are and must be 
subordinate» is «the Legislative» one inherent in all political 
societies (34). 
Jefferson almost certainly ignored the writings of Continental 
Glossators, but nevertheless he familiarized himself with the 
essential tenets of their doctrine on sovereignty by reading 
Bracton, who incorporated and paraphrased in his treatise 
several of their maxims (35). After all, Jefferson was well aware 
that the «terms» and principles of European «civil law» had 
been «introduced […] into the English law» «by Ecclesiastics», 
                                                                                                     
se medesimi le ragioni della propria vita, possedevano anche i poteri relativi 
per la esplicazione di questa; e non mancò, inoltre, di riverberare i suoi 
riflessi sul sistema delle fonti del diritto, capovolgendo lo schema originario 
di un diritto comune assoluto, escludente i diritti particolari in contrasto con 
esso, per affermare la priorità del ius proprium come manifestazione 
spontanea e libera, e quindi legittima, della vita degli ordinamenti particolari, 
e assegnando al diritto comune una funzione sussidiaria di  regolatore e 
coordinatore supremo». 
33 See Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, Introduzione, cit., p. 43.  
34 John LOCKE, Two Treatise of Government, cit., pp. 366-367. 
35 On Jefferson and Bracton see Edward DUMBAULD, Thomas Jefferson and 
the Law, The University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1978, pp. 14, 20; and 
Merrill D. PETERSON, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: a Biography, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1970, re-issued in 1975, pp. 17-18. On 
Bracton’s incorporation of early civil law doctrine see the classic Frederic 
MAITLAND, Select Passages from the Works of Bracton and Azo, Bernard 
Quaritch, London, 1895. 
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such as Bracton (36). And he was equally aware of the influence 
that Bracton’s reception of the supremacy doctrine had exercise 
over the Anglo-American legal tradition, which had come to 
conceive sovereignty precisely as the absence of any superior 
civil jurisdiction (37).  
«Parem autem non habet rex in regno suo, quia sic amitteret 
preaeceptum, cum par in parem non habeat imperium. Item nec 
multo forties superiorem, neque potentiorem habere debet, quia 
sic esset inferior sibi subiectionis, et inferiors pares esse non 
possum potentioribus» (38). 
Jefferson did not deny that his «bold» doctrine on expatriation 
had not won the support of his contemporaries. His fellow 
British Americans praised its eloquence, but were wary of its 
radicalism (39). 
                                                
36 Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, cit., p. 123. See also 
Thomas JEFFERSON, The Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson. A 
Repertory of his ideas on Government, cit., p. 355: «Bracton too was an 
ecclesiastic […]». 
37 See, for example, Matthew HALE, The History of the Common Law of 
England, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1971, p. 19: «[…] the 
King of England does not recognize any Foreign Authority as superior or 
equal to him in this Kingdom, neither do any Laws of the Pope or Emperor, 
as they are such, bind here: But all the Strenght that either the Papal or 
Imperial Laws have obtained in this Kingdom, is only because they have 
been received and admitted either by the Consent of Parliament […] or else 
by immemorial Usage […]». 
38 Henry BRACTON, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, On the Laws 
and Customs of England, vol. 2, cit., p. 33. 
39 Thomas JEFFERSON, Autobiography, in Thomas Jefferson, Writings, cit., p. 
9: «[…] I prepared a draught of instructions to be given to the delegates 
whom we should send to Congress […] In this I took the ground which from 
the beginning I had thought the only one orthodox or tenable, which was that 
the relation between Gr. Br. and these colonies was exactly the same as that 
of England & Scotland after the accession of James & until the Union, and 
the same as the present relations with Hanover, having the same Executive 
chief but no other necessary political connection; and that our emigration 
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According to the prevailing view in English legal scholarship, 
British American colonies were peripheral legal systems, subject 
to the general authority of the British empire, and retained only 
marginal powers of self-government, largely derived from 
British concessions.  
In the first edition of his Commentaries, «which appeared in 
four volumes between 1765 and 1769», William Blackstone 
(1723-1780) «claimed that the American colonies were 
‘conquered or ceded countries’, and consequently were ‘distinct’ 
and ‘dependent’ dominions of England, ‘the mother country’. 
According to eighteenth-century theories of sovereignty, this 
meant, as Blackstone put it, that ‘the common law of England 
[had] no authority there’; being conquered territory, the colonies 
were ‘subject […] to the control of Parliament’, legislating on 
behalf of the Crown» (40).  
«In 1774 William Maurray (Lord Mansifield) reinforced 
Blackstone’s view, stating that because the colonies were 
conquered territories, ‘they [had] their whole constitution from 
the crown’» (41). England had, in other words, «treated the 
British colonies as ‘subordinate’ in a variety of respects and 
                                                                                                     
from England to this country gave her no more rights over us, than the 
emigrations of the Danes and Saxons gave to the present authorities of the 
mother country over England. In this doctrine however I had never been able 
to get any one to agree with me but Mr. Wythe. […]. It was read generally by 
the members [of the Virginia convention], approved by many, but thought 
too bold for the present state of things; but they printed it in pamphlet form 
[…]». 
40 G. Edward WHITE, Law in American History, vol. I, From the Colonial 
Years through the Civil War, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012, p. 
116. 
41 Ibid. 
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since the Glorious Revolution the principal body exercising 
‘dominion’ over them had been Parliament» (42). 
To counter this doctrine, the colonists began claiming that the 
first colonial settlers had «brought with them» from England, 
«and transmitted to their Posterity», «all the Liberties, 
Privileges, Franchises, and Immunities, that [had] at any Time 
been held […] by the People of Great Britain» (43). So it was 
through the legal authority of emigration that the colonists 
believed they had maintained the rights of natural born 
Englishmen and were still entitled to invoke the protection of 
common law against royal and parliamentary encroachments 
(44).  
«The British position […] was basically that no matter what 
rights migrated to the colonies, they were subject to 
parliamentary supremacy. American Whigs, by contrast, not 
only claimed all rights existing in the mother country but 
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 Patrick HENRY, Virginia Resolves, in Journals of the House of Burgessess 
of Virginia, 1761-1765, edited by John Pendelton Kennedy, Richmond, 1907, 
p. 360. The principle was not unheard of in English case law. According to 
one particular theory, in fact, common law followed the subjects, so when 
«Subjects of England, by Consent of their Prince, go and possess an 
uninhabited desert Country; the Common Law must be supposed their Rule, 
as ‘twas their Birthright, and as ‘tis the best, as to be presumed their Choice; 
and not only that, but even as Obligatory, ‘tis so». The argument of council in 
Dutton v. Howell is quoted in John Phillip Ried, Constitutional History of the 
American Revolution, vol. I, The Authority of Rights, cit., p. 120. 
44 See John Phillip RIED, Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 
vol. I, The Authority of Rights, cit., pp. 114-123. Because of this, there seems 
to be an appreciable semantic difference between the notion of migration and 
that of expatriation. Whereas migration simply implies a factual event – the 
flight from one territory to another – which in itself possesses no necessary 
legal relevance, expatriation is first and formost a legal notion, as it 
inherently implies the unilateral relinquishment of all juridical ties with the 
country of origin.  
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derived from migration itself additional rights or, at least, extra 
protection for these rights» (45).  
Jefferson did not share either point of view. He believed that 
the foundations of independence laid at the origin of American 
settlements and argued that their self-government did not 
depend from any royal grant. Rather, it stemmed from the very 
nature of American societies. Having been established by 
expatriated men, these societies were by definition superiorem 
non recognoscentes. The choice to continue the union with the 
empire had been taken only after American jurisdictions had 
been fully constituted as self-governing bodies politic. So, the 
settlers’ decision to subject themselves to a common sovereign 
had not extinguished neither their right nor their power to self-
govern. It had, however, transformed their claim to 
independence into one of legislative autonomy. Yet, once the 
conditions upon which British Americans had agreed to subject 
themselves to the British monarch had been violated by that 
same magistrate who should have secured their autonomy, the 
ancient claim to independence could have been, and was 
effectually, fully resumed.  
This unique understanding of American legal history led 
Jefferson to reject the common conviction that British emigrants 
had brought with them from England and transplanted into 
America their common law rights. According to this doctrine, 
English common law was to be considered as the general law of 
the colonies, while for Jefferson English common law had 
                                                
45 Ibid., pp. 120-121.  
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become the American «lex loci» only in so far as it had been 
expressly adopted by colonial legislators and had proven 
applicable to local circumstances (46). Had a general 
incorporation of English common law been acknowledged 
instead, the dignity and foundations of American independence 
would have been undermined (47), for, in Jefferson’s opinion, 
«there were only two legitimate sources of law in America»: 
«the law of nature and the law enacted by the American people» 
(48). And English common law belonged to neither.  
Therefore, Jefferson could legitimately argue that if a partial 
and selected adoption of English common law had indeed 
                                                
46 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to John Manners, 12 June 1817, in The Papers 
of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol. 11, January to August 1817, 
edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2014, p. 433. 
47 Although he did not share this point of view, James Kent acknowledged 
that according to some «the dignity or independence of [American] Courts» 
had been affected «by adopting» English judicial precedent. See Manning v. 
Manning, 1 Johns. Ch. 527, 531 (N.Y. Ch. 1815), quoted in John H. 
LANGBEIN, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, in Yale Law 
School Legal Scholarship Repository, Faculty Scholarship Series, 1993, p. 
569. 
48 Lynton Keith CALDWELL, The Jurisprudence of Thomas Jefferson, in 
Indiana Law Journal, vol. 18, n. 3, 1943, p. 199. See further Thomas 
JEFFERSON, letter to John Goodenow, 13 June 1822, quoted ibid., pp. 200-
201: «That [the English common law] makes more or less part of the laws of 
the States is, I suppose, an unquestionable fact. Not by birthright, a conceit as 
inexplicable as the trinity, but by adoption».  And ID., Draft of a Declaration 
of Rights Prepared for the Virginia Convention of August 1774, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 119: «We the subscribers 
inhabitants of the colony of Virginia do declare that the people of the several 
states of British America are subject to the laws which they adopted at their 
first settlement and to such others as have been since made by their 
respective Legislatures duly constituted and appointed with their own 
consent. That no other Legislature whatever may rightfully exercise authority 
over them, and that these privileges they hold as the common rights of 
mankind, confirmed by the political constitutions they have respectively 
assumed, and also by several charters of compact from the crown». 
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occurred, it had been justified only by reasons of expediency, 
for colonial iura propria were wholly self-sufficient (49). And, 
in this sense, Jefferson believed that the American settlements 
had been, from their very origin, the expression of a plena 
potestas or, as he translated the notion, of the «full and perfect 
powers of legislation» (50), which had secured the self-
sufficiency of all American jurisdictions.  
It had been, in other words, the language of a “tempered” 
absolutism that had provided Jefferson with the conceptual 
framework needed to establish American independence (51). 
And, quite consistently, Jefferson did not give up the idea of a 
higher law, a law common to mankind, binding all nations and 
                                                
49 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (Manuscript Text of A Summary View of the Rights of 
British America), cit., p. 122: «[…] settlements having been thus effected in 
the wilds of America, the emigrants thought proper to adopt that system of 
laws under which they had hitherto lived in the mother country […]». 
50 Thomas JEFFERSON, Composition Draft of the Declaration of the Causes 
and Necessities for Taking Un Arms, cit., p. 193. 
51 The original anti-tyrannical character of absolutism has been at the heart of 
the Italian historiography on Jean Bodin. An effective summary of its main 
findings is provided in Diego QUAGLIONI, Il pensiero politico 
dell’assolutismo, cit., see especially pp. 111, 121-123. The idea that Jefferson 
reverted to one of the old languages of the Western spirit to articulate his 
claim of independence his also put forth and quite compellingly, though from 
a partially different vantage point, in Peter S. ONUF and Annette GORDON-
REED, «The Most Blessed of Patriarchs». Thomas Jefferson and the Empire 
of Imagination, cit., pp. 227-228: «American settlers could […] trace their 
roots to regions that had been conquered and oppressed by the same corrupt 
and tyrannical regime that now sought to deprive them of their freedom. […]. 
It also led [Jefferson] to emphasize the importance of recovering the ancient 
languages of liberty, for the spirit of free people survived in the words that 
expressed their common sentiments. Uncorrupted, authentic language 
sustained communities. For romantic nation makers like Jefferson, the history 
of a people’s poetry, song, and music was the vital source of their collective 
identity. Jefferson’s ecstatic response to the poems of “Ossian”, the “rude 
bard of the North” and “the greatest Poet that has ever existed”, anticipated 
the young patriot’s quest for a usable, national past». 
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integrating their legal systems (52). He simply was not willing to 
recognize it in the English common law, which he considered a 
municipal law, the law of one particular polity, separate and 
distinct from the American societies. This common law of 
mankind was instead «the law of nature and of nature’s god» 
(53), that universal law that granted individuals the right to 
expatriate and secured their right to establish sovereign 
jurisdictions.  
Qualifying expatriation as an institute of natural law was of 
critical importance to Jefferson. For only by proving that 
expatriation consisted in the universal right to dissolve former 
political obligations and constitute new sovereign jurisdictions 
could the American founding be said to have been effectuated 
de iure. And here laid, in Jefferson’s mind, the origin of 
American politics: in the foundational swerve «from “I” to 
“we”» (54), in the leap from the individual’s right to relinquish 
«the country in which birth or other accident» might have placed 
him, to the shared constitutional enterprise of men establishing 
new societies and «seeking» together «subsistance and 
happiness wheresoever they may be able, or may hope, to find 
                                                
52 On the relation between absolutism and natural law see Diego QUAGLIONI, 
Assolutismo laico e ricerca del dritto naturale, in Il pensiero politico, vol. 
25, n. 1, 1992, pp. 96-106. 
53 Thomas JEFFERSON, Original Rough Draught of the Declaration of 
Independence, cit., p. 423. 
54 John STEINBECK, The Grapes of Wrath, The Wiking Press, New York, 
1939, re-published by Penguin, London, 2006, p. 152. Jefferson’s Epicureism 
is briefly discussed in Stephen GREENBLATT, The Swerve. How the World 
Became Modern, WW. Norton & Company, New York, 2011, pp. 262-263. 
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them» (55). 
 
2. Conquest  
Jefferson invoked a second title to sustain American 
independence: conquest (56). Although he did not ascribe to it 
the same decisive importance he had given to expatriation, 
conquest allowed him to sharpen the effects of American 
subjecthood and strengthen its standing. As such, it seems he 
considered it to be a subordinate title.  
It had been the subjecthood gained through expatriation that 
had granted Americans the standing necessary to claim 
jurisdiction over the territories in which they established 
themselves. But to give effectiveness to that claim, those 
territories had to have been conquered by the expatriates 
themselves, acting on their own behalf and not on behalf of any 
third party, not even of the British crown. Jefferson was well 
aware of it and meant accordingly to prove, in the Summary 
View, that the lands acquired by British expatriates in North 
America had been seized at the expense of their blood and 
treasure alone.  
«America was conquered, and her settlement made and 
                                                
55 Thomas JEFFERSON, A Bill Declaring Who Shall be Deemed Citizens of 
this Commonwealth, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, edited by 
Julian P. Boyd et al., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950, pp. 476-
479. 
56 Jefferson’s understanding of conquest has been considered mostly in 
passing by scholarship and, for the most part, it does not appear to have been 
appreciated as a title distinct from expatriation. A general overview is give in 
Andrew CAYTON, Jefferson and the Native Americans, in A Companion to 
Thomas Jefferson, edited by Francis D. Cogliano, cit., p. 246. 
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firmly established at the expence [sic] of individuals, and not of 
the British public. Their own blood was spilt in acquiring lands 
for their settlement, their own fortunes expended in making that 
settlement effectual. For themselves they fought, for themselves 
they conquered, and for themselves alone they [had] a right to 
hold» (57).  
As Britain had not provided either financial nor military 
assistance, all pretenses to consider these lands as dependencies 
subject to its foreign rule could be rightfully dismissed (58). 
Hence, to quote Machiavelli, Jefferson concluded that power 
over America had been acquired by the expatriates «armis 
propriis et virtute» (59).  
There is more here than the simple assertion that the material 
effort to establish new outposts in the wilds of America had 
been largely, if not exclusively, carried out by British emigrants. 
There is the precisely Machiavellian understanding that the 
foundations of newly established commonwealths, those «nuovi 
ordini e modi» recalled with such insistence by Hannah Arendt 
                                                
57 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (Manuscript Text of A Summary View of the Rights of 
British America), cit., p. 122. 
58 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Refutation of the Argument that the Colonies 
Were Established at the Expence of the British Nation, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., pp. 277-285. See also John P. REID, 
Constitutional History of the American Revolution, vol. 1, The Authority of 
Rights, cit., p. 124-131; and Brian STEELE, Thomas Jefferson and American 
Nationhood, cit., p. 32. The distinction between imperium and dominium 
within the British empire and the respective views on Jefferson and Adams 
are recalled in David ARMITAGE, The Ideological Origins of the British 
Empire, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 175-176. 
59 Niccolò MACHIAVELLI, Il principe, in ID., Opere, vol. 1, edited by Corrado 
Vivanti, Torino, Einaudi-Gallimard, 1997, p. 130. 
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in her essay on the meaning of Authority (60), «rare volte 
periclitano», or in other words can withstand subversion, 
«quando dependono da loro propri e possono forzare», only 
when they do not depend from foreign jurisdictions and may 
avail themselves of the use of their own force (61).  
If Arendt was right in arguing that «the actors of the 
American Revolution» had indeed been «spared the effort of 
“initiating a new order of things” altogether», it was only 
because «the colonization of America had preceded the 
Declaration of independence» (62). So, the efforts of Jefferson 
and the other framers of the American republic could fall back, 
and consciously did fall back, on earlier «charters and 
agreements», confirming and legalizing «an already existing 
body politic», brought to life through expatriation and conquest 
(63). This allowed them, and it allowed Jefferson in particular, to 
place the foundations of independence, i.e. the titles of 
American sovereignty, at the earliest moment in the history of 
the colonies. And there they laid, securing the colonies 
autonomy within the empire, until later usurpations and abuses 
revived them and projected onwards their effects. 
Establishing that the colonization had been carried out armis 
propriis had a further implication. Because, by relying on 
themselves alone to effect settlements, the colonists had 
                                                
60 Ibid, p. 132. See Hannah ARENDT, What is Authority?, in ID., Between Past 
and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought, The Viking Press, New 
York, 1961, re-published by Penguin, London, 1993, p. 140-141. 
61 Niccolò MACHIAVELLI, Il principe, cit., p. 132. 
62 Hannah ARENDT, What is Authority?, cit., p. 140. 
63 Ibid. 
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acquired an original title over the territories in which they had 
settled, they had also acquired the right to enforce their self-
government against Parliamentary encroachments. 
«The large strides of late taken by the legislature of Great 
Britain towards establishing over these colonies their absolute 
rule, and the hardiness of the present attempt to effect by force 
of arms what by law or right they could never effect, render it 
necessary for us also» he wrote «to change the ground of 
opposition, and to close with their last appeal from reason to 
arms» (64).  «And as it behoves those, who are called to this 
great decision» he went on «to be assured that their cause is 
approved before supreme reason; so it is of great avail that it’s 
[sic] justice be made known to the world […]» (65).  
This opening paragraph of Jefferson’s fair copy of the 
Declaration of the Causes and Necessities for Taking Up Arms 
deserves close reading. Jefferson began by asserting 
parliament’s effort to establish an absolute rule over the 
colonies, i.e. a rule unrestrained by the existence of American 
rights of self-government as well as American legislatures. He 
qualified this attempt as unlawful, insisting that Parliament had 
attempted to achieve through force a power it was not entitled to 
claim by right and thus reaffirmed the radical antithesis between 
ius and factum that informed his entire constitutionalism. As a 
result of Parliament’s military enforcement of its act of 
                                                
64 Thomas JEFFERSON, Fair copy of the Declaration of the Causes and 
Necessities for Taking Up Arms, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, 
cit., p. 199. 
65 Ibid. 
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usurpation, the Americans embraced arms in their own defense, 
but felt compelled to prove their iusta causa resistendi.  Their 
armed resistance had not turned them away from reason. Their 
military actions were instead consistent with it, because they 
complied with the recta ratio of the Western legal tradition and 
adhered to the law. Thus, arms and reason, or as Machiavelli 
would have had it «iustitia et armi» (66), had been the grounds of 
American colonization and turned into the grounds of American 
independence (67).  
«Noi abbiamo detto di sopra come a uno principe è 
necessario avere e’ sua fondamenti buoni, altrimenti di necessità 
conviene che ruini. E’ principali fondamenti che abbino tutti li 
stati, così nuovi come vecchi o misti, sono le buone legge e le 
buone arme […]» (68). 
Machiavelli’s thought, which seems to have been very much 
in Jefferson’s mind as he drafted his remarks on the American 
conquest (69), cannot be understood without reference to the 
language of Western jurisprudence (70). It is to this lexicon and 
to its original utterance, the Institutes of Justinian, that the 
reference to arms and reason belongs. Machiavelli could have 
read it, not unlike Jefferson, in the opening lines of the treatise: 
                                                
66 Niccolò MACHIAVELLI, La cagione dell’ordinanza, dove la si truovi e cosa 
abbisogni, in ID., Opere, vol. 1, cit., p. 26. 
67 See Diego QUAGLIONI, Machiavelli, the Prince, and the Idea of Justice, 
cit., pp. 112-113. 
68 Niccolò MACHIAVELLI, Il principe, cit., p. 150. 
69 For the Machiavellian or Republican interpretations of Jefferson’s thought 
see Peter S. ONUF, Making Sense of Jefferson, cit., pp. 19-49. 
70 See Diego QUAGLIONI, Machiavelli, the Prince, and the Idea of Justice, 
cit., p. 113. 
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«Imperatoriam maiestatem non solum armis decoratam sed 
etiam legibus oportet esse armatam […]» (71). Such implicit 
recollection uncovers not simply the correlation between the use 
of force and politics, but the essence of sovereignty itself. It is 
sovereignty, understood in keeping with Justinian’s notion of 
maiestas, which is armis decorata and legibus armata (72). So, 
by adopting such a Machiavellian understanding of the need to 
establish new commonwealths upon the conjunction of arms and 
reason, Jefferson – who was and attentive reader of Justinian’s 
Institues  (73) – might have wished to suggest, as has been 
written à propos the Florentine secretary, that «buone armi e 
buone leggi sono il primo e fondamentale principio di tutto il 
corpus giustinianeo» and therefore «di tutto il supporto 
autoritativo della scienza del diritto pubblico» (74).  Moreover, 
this same authoritative foundation laid at the origin of the 
English legal tradition, as Bracton himself had incorporated the 
                                                
71 Corpus Iuris Civilis, vol. 1, Institutiones, edited by Paul Kruger and 
Theodor Mommsen, Weidmann, Berlin, 1965, p. XXII.  
72 See Diego QUAGLIONI, La sovranità, cit., p. 38. 
73 On Jefferson’s reading of Justinian’s Institutes and Roman Law more 
generally see the preliminary inquiry provided in Henry C. MONTGOMERY, 
Thomas Jefferson Admirer and User of Roman Law, in Synteleia Vincenzo 
Arangio Ruiz, edited by Antonio Guarino and Luigi Labruna, Jovene, Napoli, 
1964, pp. 170-175. On Jefferson’s belief in the superiority of the civil law 
over the common law as «a system of perfect justice» see Thomas 
JEFFERSON, letter to John Tyler, 17 giugno 1812, in The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, Retirement series, vol. 5, edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al., 1 
May 1812 to 10 March 1813, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009, p. 
135; and ID.,  letter to John Brazier, 24 agosto 1819, in Letters of Thomas 
Jefferson Concerning Philology and the Classics, edited by Thomas 
Fitzhugh, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1919, p. 50: «The lawyer 
finds in the Latin language the system of civil law most conformable with the 
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74 Diego QUAGLIONI, La sovranità, cit., p. 38. 
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opening of Justinian’s Institutes in his treatise and had thus 
claimed that: «In rege qui recte regit necessaria sunt duo haec, 
arma videlicet et leges, quibus utrumque tempus bellorum et 
pacis recte possit gubernari» (75). 
One can only wonder, in the absence of any further research, 
whether this Justinian idea of sovereignty manifesting itself 
through enforceable laws and rightful force played any role in 
the drafting history of the right of a sovereign people to bear 
arms inscribed in the second amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States and its inevitable connection to the 
sovereignty enjoyed by each person over his own conscience 
inscribed in the first. As citizens of a republic became sovereign 
over themselves and free to collectively defend their right to 
self-government from external constraints shouldn’t they have 
retained for themselves the vestments of power as well? (76) 
Conquest fulfilled a further and rather peculiar function. It 
grounded American jurisdictions, it settled them within a given 
territory. These legal systems had not been constituted as 
territorial entities, quite the contrary. Being established through 
expatriation, they had come to existence by severing their ties to 
a territorial state, rather than becoming one. And because of this, 
                                                
75 Henry BRACTON, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, On the Laws 
and Customs of England, vol. 2, cit., p. 18. Both «arma» and «leges» have 
been underlined in Coke’s edition of Bracton, see Henry BRACTON, De 
legibus et consuetidinibus Angliae, Londini: Apud Richardum Tottellum, 
1569, book 3, Ad quod rex creatus sit in ordinaria iurisdictione, fol. 1 r, 
Special Collection, Edward Bennett Williams Law Library, Georgetown 
University Law Center, Washington, D.C.  
76 See, as a first reference on the history of the second amendment, Akhil 
Reed AMAR, America’s Constitution: a Biography, Random House, New 
York, 2005, pp. 322-326. 
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power, at least as Jefferson understood it, «was not only prior to 
the Revolution, it was in a sense prior to the colonization of the 
continent» (77). Hadn’t the Mayflower Compact been «drawn 
up» while the Pilgrims were still «on the ship» and «signed» 
only «upon landing»? (78) Didn’t this prove that the powers of 
legislation – considered by Jefferson to be inherent, at all times, 
within every society (79) –  had seen their first light while the 
expatriates were still at sea? And didn’t Jefferson expressly 
contend that «[w]hile those bodies are in existence to whom the 
people have delegated the powers of legislation they alone 
possess and may exercise these powers. But when they are 
dissolved» or relinquished «the power reverts to the people, who 
may use it to unlimited extent, either assembling together in 
person, sending deputies, or in any other way they may think 
proper»? (80)  
 Regardless of «their obvious fear of one another», British 
expatriates had availed themselves precisely of such power «to 
combine […] together into a ‘civil Body Politick’» and hold 
each other accountable «solely by the strength of mutual 
promise» (81). So, they were able to constitute, upon embarking 
                                                
77 Hannah ARENDT, On Revolution, cit., p. 167. 
78 Hannah ARENDT, On Revolution, cit., p. 167. 
79 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (Manuscript Text of A Summary View of the Rights of 
British America), cit., p. 132: «From the nature of things, every society must 
at all times possess within itself the sovereign powers of legislation».  
80 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (Manuscript Text of A Summary View of the Rights of 
British America), cit., p. 132. 
81 Hannah ARENDT, On Revolution, cit., p. 167. This passing reference to fear 
bears a large significance in the history of Hannah Arendt’s own education. 
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on their common quest, new political societies that enjoyed 
power and were entitled to claim rights, chiefly those of «men, 
of expatriated men» (82). And Jefferson emphasized it by 
implying that the colonists had acquired jurisdiction through 
expatriation and territory, only later, through conquest. 
The distinction between these two titles is significant in itself, 
but it acquires additional importance by suggesting Jefferson’s 
proximity to a particular trait of Bodin’s Republique. Although 
evidence gathered by reviewing Jefferson’s book catalogues 
shows that he purchased his copy of the Republique about ten 
years after he had drafted his revolutionary writings, Jefferson’s 
                                                                                                     
When in 1960 she sent to her former mentor and lover Martin Heidegger a 
copy of her recently published The Human Condition, translated in German 
as Vita Activa, Arendt enclosed a letter apologizing she had not dedicated to 
him the work she almost entirely owed to his inspiration. The Human 
Condition was, in fact, Arendt’s own interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of 
Dasain. The treatise took its move, just as Heidegger had done in Sein und 
Zeit, but even more openly in his Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen 
Philosophie, from a reinterpretation of Aristotle. But, whereas Arendt «pur 
ispirandosi ai commenti heideggeriani di Aristotele, si serve del filosofo 
Greco per una rivalutazione dell’agire politico in senso che oggi diremmo 
‘democratico, Heidegger al contrario si servì di Aristotele per quella 
svalutazione pessimistica della politica e della democrazia che in qualche 
misura spiega anche la sua temporanea adesione al nazismo». Unlike Arendt, 
Heidegger had, in fact, described the predominant emotion of the political 
life, the ζωή πρακτική, or in other words the vita activa, as fear. See Enrico 
BERTI, Le passioni tra Heidegger e Aristotele, in Bollettino della Società 
filosofica italiana, vol. 206, 2012, pp. 23-29: 28 
82 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Judge John Tayler, 17 June 1812, cit., p. 
135.. Hannah Arendt did not recognize that the society of expatriates had 
become sovereign. Instead she claimed that these «[…] new bodies politic 
really were ‘political societies’, and their great importance for the future lay 
in the formation of a political real that enjoyed power and was entitled to 
claim rights withuot possessing or claiming sovereignty», Hannah ARENDT, 
On Revolution, cit., p. 168. This political realm was that of autonomy. But 
such societies became autonomous only once, in Jefferson’s view, 
settlements had been effected. See Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft Instructions to 
the Virginia Delegates in the Continental Congress (Manuscript Text of A 
Summary View of the Rights of British America), cit., p. 122.  
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understanding of the political capacity of American societies as 
being the exercise of the full and perfect powers of legislation 
over a corporate body politic rather than over a specific 
territory, appears to be consistent with Bodin’s own definition of 
statehood.   
At the very opening of the Republique, Bodin had defined 
statehood as the just exercise of sovereignty over a collective 
body of families and what they shared in common. «Republique 
est un droit gouvernement de plusieurs mesnages, & de ce qui 
leur est commun, avec puissance souveraine» (83).  Territoriality 
was not part of his definition.  Jurisdiction could exist regardless 
of it. And wherever sovereignty happened to be exercised over a 
body comprised of at least three families there Bodin recognized 
the existence of a state: «[…] aussi le peuple peut estre escarté 
en plusieurs endroits, ou du tout esteint, encore que la ville 
demeure en son entier: car ce n’est pas la ville, ny les personnes 
qui sont la cité, mais l’union d’un peuple sous une seigneurie 
souveraine, encor qu’il n’y ayt que trois mesnages» (84).     
This doctrine was expanded further in the sixth chapter of the 
first book, where Bodin, recalled the motto Cicero had attributed 
to Pompeus (Ad Atticum, VII, 11, 3), non est in parietibus res 
publica, to prove that legal systems and political societies did 
not require a territorial or physical consistency to exist, their life 
being primarily that of obligations and rights, rather than that of 
                                                
83 Jean BODIN Les six livres de la Republique, cit., livre 1, chapitre 1, Quelle 
est la fin principale de la Respublique bien ordonnee, p. 1. 
84 Ibid., livre 1, chapitre 2, Du mesnage, & la difference entre la Republique 
& la famille, p. 13.  
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bricks and walls (85). And Jefferson must have found this claim 
rather congenial, if indeed the markings highlighting such 
passage in his copy of the Republique may be considered to be 
additional evidence of his own thought (86), as expressed several 
years later, in a letter to John Taylor, by quoting a few verses of 
sir William Jones (1746 – 1794), that summarized effectively 
the entire doctrinal debate over the nature of legal and political 
bodies: (87) 
 
 What constitutes a state? 
Not high rais’d battlements, or labor’d mound, 
 Thick wall, or moated gate: 
Not cities proud with spires and turrets crown’d 
 No: Men, high-minded men; 
 Men, who their duties know; 
But know their rights; and, knowing, dare maintain. 
                                                
85 Ibid., livre 1, chapitre 6, Du citoyen, & la difference d’entre le subiect, le 
citoyen, l’estranger, la ville, cité, & Republique, p. 76. See also Diego 
QUAGLIONI, I limiti della sovranità. Il pensiero di Jean Bodin nella cultura 
politica e giuridica dell’età moderna, cit., pp. 277-294. 
86 See Jean BODIN Les six livres de la Republique, cit., livre 1, chapitre 6, Du 
citoyen, & la difference d’entre le subiect, le citoyen, l’estranger, la ville, 
cité, & Republique, pp. 75-76: The full underlined passage reads thusly: 
«[…] comme il en print aux Atheniens à la venue du roy de Perse, auquel ils 
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leur cite ne pouuit ester sauuee, sinon auec murailles de bois: ce que 
Themistocle interpreta, que la cite (qui gist au corps legitime des citoyens) ne 
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Megalopolis, lesquels aduertis de la venue de Cleomenes Roy de 
Lacedemone, vuiderent tous: elle n’estoit pas moins ville qu’au parauant: 
mais ce n’estoit ny cite s’enfuit hors de la ville. Ainsi parloit Pmpee le grand, 
apres auoir apparents siegneurs, & quittant la ville à Cesar, vsa de ces mots: 
Non est in parietibus Repblibica».  
87 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to John Taylor, 28 May 1816, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, Retirement series, vol. 10, May 1816 to 18 January 1817, 
edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2013, p. 88.  
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 These constitute a state. 
 
Glosses could be appended to each verse, recalling how walls 
and moated gates had been taken or rejected, over the course of 
the Western legal tradition, as the material manifestations of a 
body politic.  To Isidore of Seveille’s (560 ca. – 636) maxim 
civitas non saxa sed habitatores vocantur (Etym., 5, 2, 1), one 
could juxtapose Bodin’s indictment of Bartolus for having 
reduced the iuris societas to the material edifices of a city, 
«Bartolus, qui civitatem moris definit […]» (88). And the 
allegations of authorities could enlist several more passages 
from Brunetto Latini (1220 ca. – 1294/95), Baldus de Ubaldis 
(1327 – 1400), Paulus Castrensis (1360 ca. – 1441), up to John 
Locke and even later Carlo Cattaneo (1801 – 1869) (89). But 
what is even more notable is that, however these debates 
reached the shores of America, Jefferson and his correspondents 
seem to have been quite aware of their legal and political 
implications. 
 
3. Citizenship 
Had it not been for the Bill Declaring Who Shall be Deemed 
Citizen of this Commonwealth, drafted in the aftermath of 
independence, there would hardly be any trace of Jefferson’s 
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89 See Diego QUAGLIONI, «Civitas»: appunti per una riflessione sull’idea di 
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doctrine on citizenship and its complex re-interpretation of the 
common law tradition set by the landmark judgment rendered in 
the Calvin’s case and published by sir Edward Coke in his 
Reports (90).  
The Bill Jefferson drafted was part of a larger revision of the 
laws of Virginia. Once the new state Constitution had entered 
into force, the legislature commissioned five of its members to 
revise the laws of the Commonwealth and render them 
consistent with the new republican form of government. Having 
been elected to the commission in 1776 – along with George 
Wythe, Edmund Pendelton, George Mason, and Thomas 
Ludwell Lee – Jefferson spent the following three years drafting 
some of the most radical proposals submitted to the assembly 
(91).   
Expatriation and conquest had justified American claims to 
independence against the tyrannical usurpations and abuses of 
Britain, but once independence had been achieved and new 
republican governments were being put in place, the laws on 
subjecthood and citizenship, disciplining the fundamental 
political obligation between rulers and ruled, required their own 
revision (92). Jefferson attended to it, drafting a Bill that 
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this Commonwealth, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, edited by 
Julian P. Boyd et al., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950, pp. 476-
479. 
91 See Julian P. BOYD, The Revisal of the Laws 1776-1786, in The Papers of 
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established citizenship as the title of republican sovereignty (93).  
The main purpose of the Bill was to specify who would have 
enjoyed the rights of citizenship within the commonwealth of 
Virginia. This implied that Jefferson held it was within the 
discretional power of the commonwealth to regulate citizenship, 
according its rights to some while denying them to others. As 
such, the Bill refrained from qualifying citizenship as a natural 
right, but treated it primarily as an institute of the ius civile, 
while indirectly acknowledging it also belonged to the ius 
gentium by providing a specific procedure for naturalization of 
foreign emigrants.  
The wording chosen by Jefferson to classify the means of 
acquisition and exclusion from citizenship could not have been 
more prescriptive or selective. «Be it enacted by the General 
Assembly, that all white persons born within the territory of this 
commonwealth and all who have resided therein two years next 
before the passing of this act, and all who shall hereafter migrate 
into the same […] and all infants wheresoever born, whose 
father, if living, or otherwise, whose mother was a citizen at the 
time of their birth, or who migrate hither, their father, if living, 
or otherwise their mother becoming a citizen, or who migrate 
                                                
93 Scholarship has generally overlooked this Bill. An overview, mostly 
focused on expatriation, is provided in Douglas BRADBURN, The Citizenship 
Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774-1804, 
University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville and London, 2009, pp. 105-107. 
Some remarks are provided also in Peter THOMSON and Peter S. ONUF, 
(eds.), State and Citizen, British America and the Early United States, 
University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville and London, 2013, pp. VIII-X. 
See also, Merrill D. PETERSON, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A 
Biography, cit., pp. 153-154. 
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hither without father or mother, shall be deemed citizens of this 
commonwealth […]» (94).  
Leaving aside the coarse exclusion from citizenship based 
exclusively on the color of the individual’s skin, that held as 
aliens Christian Indians as well as free African Americans born 
in Virginia (95), and the residual cases involving residents and 
infants (96), the text articulated two distinct and complementary 
notions of citizenship: one acquired through birth (either iure 
loci or iure sanguinis), the other through naturalization.  Though 
the means of acquisition varied, the Bill drew no distinction 
between the two classes of citizenship: both were established by 
statue, both entitled their holders to the enjoyment of the same 
rights, and both were equally protected by the law.  
No preference was accorded to what Jefferson had called 
«natural born» in the provision on naturalization he drafted in 
his proposed Constitution for the Commonwealth of Virginia.  
«All persons who by their own oath or affirmation, or by 
other testimony shall give satisfactory proof to any court of 
record in this country that they purpose to reside in the same 7 
years at the least and who shall subscribe the fundamental laws, 
shall be considered as residents and entitled to all the right of 
                                                
94 Thomas JEFFERSON, A Bill Declaring Who Shall be Deemed Citizens of 
this Commonwealth, cit., pp. 476-477. 
95 Peter THOMSON, Preface, in State and Citizen, British America and the 
Early United States, edited by Peter Thomson and Peter S. Onuf, cit., p. IX. 
96 Jefferson’s concern with the protection of infants is reviewed in Holly 
BREWER, Beyond Education: Thomas Jefferson’s “Republican” Revision of 
the Laws Regarding Childern, in Thomas Jefferson and the Education of a 
Citizen, edited by James Gilreath, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 
1999, pp. 48-62. 
127 
 
persons natural born» (97).  
Here again, the main purpose of the provision was to confer 
equal standing to persons who had acquired citizenship either 
through naturalization or at birth. Jefferson sought to achieve 
this end by extending the rights enjoyed by «natural born» to 
naturalized citizens. However, while no apparent preference was 
accorded to natural born citizens, the ambiguous wording of the 
provision suggested that, whereas naturalization was an institute 
of municipal law and as such could have been repealed by an 
amendment to the Constitution, the rights of citizenship enjoyed 
by persons born under the protection of the Commonwealth 
were instead natural. As an institute of natural law, natural born 
citizenship required no defining provision and Jefferson’s draft 
Constitution in fact provided none.  
Qualifying citizenship as the natural obligation each 
individual owed to the Commonwealth protecting his rights was 
supported by the authoritative precedent set in English 
jurisprudence by the Calvin’s case decided in 1608  by the 
Court of Exchequer Chamber (98).  
                                                
97 Thomas JEFFERSON, Third Draft of the Virginia Constitution, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 363. 
98 Calvin’s case, in English Reports, vol. 77, King’s Bench Division, 6, 
Containing Coke, Parts 5 to 13, Stevens & Sons, London, 1907, pp. 377-411. 
The literature on the case is vast. See William S. HOLDSWORTH, A History of 
English Law, vol. 9, Methuen & co., London, 1926, pp. 72-86. For an 
overview of the debate that opposed Charles H. McIllwain to Robert L. 
Schuyler over the influence exercised by the Calvin’s case in American early 
jurisprudence see Harvey WHEELER, Calvin’s Case (1608) and the McIlwain-
Schuyler Debate, in The American Historical Review, vol.  61, n. 3, 1956, pp. 
587-597 and the bibliography therein provided. More recently the case has 
come under scrutiny in Polly J. PRICE, Natural Law and Birthright 
Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), in Yale Journal of Law and 
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According to Coke’s report, the court deciding the case had 
maintained that Scottish subjects of James VI born after their 
king had ascended the throne of England in 1603 were entitled 
to claim protection of their rights in front of English courts of 
common law and could not be dismissed as aliens. Although 
English municipal laws had not extended to the Scots the 
common law rights enjoyed by Englishmen, the Court 
nevertheless deemed that Scotsmen owed to the common king 
of England and Scotland an allegiance «as well within  [their] 
realm, &c. as without», in exchange for which they were 
entitled to the King’s protection throughout all the kingdoms 
under his rule (99). This entitlement, which had the practical 
effect of extending to Scotsmen the rights of proper Englishmen, 
conferred to all those who were «born under the obedience, 
power, faith, ligealy, or ligeance of the King» the status of 
«natural subjects» (100).  
The judgment seems to have been often read as the first 
English enunciation of the notion of «territorial birthright 
citizenship» (101). However, this interpretation, and its 
contention that «all persons born within any territory held by the 
King of England were to enjoy the benefits on English law as 
                                                                                                     
Humanities,vol. 9, n. 1, 1997, pp. 73-146. For an account on Coke’s 
historical jurisprudence see Harold J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution, II. The 
Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition, cit., 
pp. 238-245. 
99 Calvin’s case, cit, p. 386. 
100 Ibid., p. 383. 
101 Polly J. PRICE, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case 
(1608), cit., p. 73.   
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subjects of the king» (102), seems to have excessively 
emphasized the relevance of territoriality in the acquisition of 
citizenship, to the detriment of the personal bond between 
subject and lord which lay instead at the heart of the text 
reported by Coke and the tradition on which it relied. According 
to Coke, in fact, the ligeance owed by the subjects to the king 
who offered them protection «was of as great an extension and 
latitude, as the royal power» itself and could not be considered 
«local» or confined to any specific realm (103).  Not only 
because, as several contemporary interpreters have conceded, 
«the protection and government of the King [was] general over 
all his dominions and kingdoms» (104), but for the much more 
relevant reason that «ligeance [was] a quality of the mind» and, 
as such, could not be «confined within any place» (105). 
Obedience and subjecthood, in other words, were not primarily 
matters of territoriality, but rather of conscience and mutual 
obligation.  
This line of reasoning had its own origin in the Germanic 
notion of regia tuitio, which, as Ennio Cortese has shown, 
played a fundamental role in shaping the medieval 
understanding of citizenship (106). During the high Middle Ages, 
it had become custom for aliens protected by Germanic lords to 
adopt the laws of their rulers and thus obtain a limited private 
                                                
102 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
103 Calvin’s case, cit, p. 386. 
104 Ibid., p. 388. 
105 Ibid. 
106 See Ennio CORTESE, Cittadinanza (diritto intermedio), in Enciclopedia 
del diritto, vol. VII, Giuffè, Milano, 1960, pp. 132-140.  
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law capacity (107). This protection established, in the case of the 
Francs for instance, «un vincolo diretto con il re, una 
sottoposizione immediata a lui che consentiva di scavalcare 
giurisdizioni e poteri locali» (108).  
The direct link between subject and lord resulting from the 
tuitio, or mundeburdio, was exactly the same kind of direct 
obligation sought by Coke. «Now it appeareth by demonstrative 
reason» he claimed «that ligeance, faith, and obedience of the 
subject to the Sovereign, was before any municipal or judicial 
laws» (109). It was a personal bond, belonging to an essentially 
feudal conception of social relations (110). But, in Coke’s view, 
it did not emanate from any express oath, but from the nature of 
the relationship itself. «Every subject is by his natural ligeance 
bound to obey and serve his Sovereign» (111). And because «the 
                                                
107 See ibid., p. 134-135 
108 Ennio CORTESE, Il diritto nella storia medievale, vol. 1, L’alto Medioevo, 
Il Cigno Galileo Galilei edizioni, Roma, 1995, p. 270. 
109 Calvin’s case, cit, p. 392. 
110 See the classic William S. HOLDSWORTH, A History of English Law, vol. 
9, cit., p. 72: «The beginnings of the modern rules of the common law, which 
define the persons who are to be accounted as British subjects, do not make 
their appearance till England, in the course of the thirtheenth century, had 
lost the reater part of her continental posessions. These rules center round the 
doctrine of allegiance; for it is the duty of allegiance, owed by the subject to 
the crown, which differentiates the subject from the alien. This doctrine has 
its roots in the feudal ideal of a personal duty of fealty to the lord from whom 
lend is held; and, thou it has necessarily developed with the development of 
the position of the king, its origin in this idea has coloured the whole modern 
law on this topic». This conception is not far from Bodin’s, see Margherita 
ISNARDI PARENTE, Introduzione, cit., p. 47: «[…] il rapporto fra il signore e il 
suddito si configure ancora in forma nettamente bilaterale: “l’obbligo mutuo 
intercorrente fra il sovrano e il suddito, al quale ultimo il primo deve, in 
cambio di fedeltà e dell’obbedienza che ne riceve, consiglio, conforto, aiuto e 
protezione”».  
111 Calvin’s case., p. 393. 
131 
 
law of nature» establishing this personal bond was «part of the 
law of England», English courts were compelled to accord it 
preeminence over «any municipal or judicial law» (112).  Coke 
insisted on this preeminence of natural law, by contending that, 
unlike municipal law, it «never was nor could be altered or 
changed», for «jura naturalia sunt immutabilia» (113). And thus, 
Locke concluded that «Parliament could not take away that 
protection which the law of nature giveth» to all natural subjects 
of the king (114). 
It had been only one year since the death of Giacomo 
Menochio and not long after he and Marta had argued over the 
effects of this same principle in regards to expatriation (115). Just 
then, a similar question was emerging in English jurisprudence. 
Could the right of migration between kingdoms ruled by the 
same monarch limit the power of each municipal parliament to 
provide a positive definition of subjecthood? Calvin’s case 
found it could and reverted to the notion of natural subjecthood 
precisely to protect the freedom of movement of the king’s 
subjects from one realm to the other; thus preventing migration 
from impairing the rights of subjects establishing themselves in 
a jurisdiction which, although different from the one they had 
                                                
112 Ibid., p. 392. 
113 Ibid., pp. 392-393. 
114 Ibid., p. 393. 
115 The exact date in which the case was debated is unknown. Given 
Menochio’s death in 1607, Gorla argues it was discussed between the end of 
the 16th and the beginning of the 17th centuries. Not long before, that is, the 
Calvin’s case. See Gino GORLA, “Ius libertatis” e diritto “naturale” di 
libertà di espatrio, in un celebre caso discusso in Italia tra i secoli XVI e 
XVII (per un raffronto con i “diritti dell’uomo” dal 1789 a oggi), cit., p. 225. 
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been born in, was still under the protection of the same common 
sovereign.  
By virtue of its implications, British emigrants to North 
America began referring to Calvin’s case as evidence that 
migration had not extinguished their rights as natural born 
Englishmen (116). But in so doing, as Christopher Tomlins has 
argued, they missed the point of the ruling. Given that British 
emigrants had a right to quit their country, a question not 
directly addressed by the decision, the rights they enjoyed 
through migration were not those secured by the common law, 
but rather those conferred by natural law. Or, as Jefferson 
correctly called them, those inherent in men who chose to 
expatriate and quit the protection of their former sovereign. 
Whereas Scotsmen migrating to England had not exceeded the 
protection of their king, but had actually sought it, as evidenced 
by the Calvin’s case, Americans had relinquished their country 
and established themselves abroad by effecting settlements at 
the expense of their own military and financial efforts.  So, as no 
protection had been sought or provided, no subjecthood (natural 
or otherwise) could have been claimed. 
Jefferson still very much held dear the notion of a personal 
and mutual bond between rulers and rules, but rejected the idea 
that such obligation was in any way natural. He recovered 
instead an alternative conception of citizenship, widespread in 
                                                
116 See Christopher TOMLINS, Freedom Bound. Law, Labour, and Civic 
Identity in Colonizing English America, 1580-1865, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 82-92.  
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modern literature on public law and rooted in the history of the 
ius commune (117). Thus, Jefferson placed himself within the 
long scholarly tradition that had conceived citizenship 
essentially as a contract between the individual and the 
Commonwealth, which had found its earliest articulation in the 
notions of contractus cictadinaticus and civitas contracta 
shaped in the late 14th century by Bartolus (118). 
Instead of according any preference to the natural born 
                                                
117 A history of citizenship in the West is provided in Piero COSTA, Civitas. 
Storia della Cittadinanza in Europa, vol. 1-4, Laterza, Bari, 1999-2002. A 
highly compressed synthesis is given in Piero COSTA, The Discourse of 
Citizenship in Europe: A Tentative Explanation, in Privileges and Rights of 
Citizenship. Law and the Juridical Construction of Civil Society, edited by 
Julius Kirshner and Laurent Mayali, The Robbins Colletion, Berkeley, 2002, 
pp. 199-225. 
118 See See Ennio CORTESE, Cittadinanza (diritto intermedio), cit., p. 132. 
For a more detailed and specific analisys of the contributions offered by 
Bartolus see Julius KIRSHNER, «Civitas sibi faciat civem»: Bartolus of 
Sassoferrato’s Doctrine on the Making of a Citizen, in Speculum, vol. 48, 
1973, pp. 694-713; and Diego QUAGLIONI. Le radici teoriche della dottrina 
bartoliana della cittadinanza, in ID., «Civilis sapientia». Dottrine giuridiche 
e dottrine politiche fra medioevo ed età moderna. Saggi per la storia del 
pensiero giuridico moderno. Maggioli, Rimini, 1989, pp.127-144. The 
reflections on citizenship of Baldus, encompassed within the general 
Aristotelian framework of his thought, are reviewed in Joseph CANNING, The 
Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1987, pp. 159-184. On the legacy of medieval conceptions of 
citizenship in modern jurisprudence and political thought see Diego 
QUAGLIONI, «Omnes sunt cives civiliter». Cittadinanza e sovranità fra storia 
e diritto, in Dallo status di cittadino ai diritti di cittadinanza, edited by 
Fulvio Cortese, Gianni Santucci, Anna Simonati, Editoriale scientifica, 
Napoli, 2014, pp. 5-14. A highly interesting interpretation of Bodin’s 
doctrine on citizenship (understood as a bilateral obligation not dissimilar to 
the feudal one) is provided in Daniel LEE, Citizenship, Subjection, and Civil 
Law: Jean Bodin on Roman Citizenship and the Theory of Consensual 
Subjection, in Citizenship and Empire in Europe, 200-1900. The Antonine 
Constitution after 1800 years, edited by Clifford Ando, Franz Steiner Verlag, 
Stuttgart, 2016, pp. 113-134. According to Lee, Bodin maintained that 
citizenship could not be relinquished except by mutual consent and, in this 
sense, his intepretation of Bodin offers an important contrast to Jefferson’s 
doctrine on expatriation.  
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citizens, Jefferson constructed the Bill around his understanding 
of citizenship as an act of will: a «choice» consciously made by 
persons who intended to commit themselves to the 
Commonwealth they constituted as their own, rather than the 
mere act of «chance» by which a person born accidentally 
within the territory of the Commonwealth was held subject to its 
laws in exchange for its protection. Regardless of any natural 
obligation, all individuals were called to choose for themselves 
whether to be citizens of the commonwealth or not. Individuals 
born within the territory of Virginia had to choose whether to 
relinquish the citizenship they had acquired at birth and 
expatriate, whereas aliens immigrating in Virginia had to choose 
whether to settle within its jurisdiction and swear allegiance to 
its society. The heart of the Bill was, therefore, dedicated to 
establishing the institutes of naturalization and expatriation, 
which Jefferson framed as the foundations of the individual 
right to actively participate in the life of the Commonwealth or 
relinquish it entirely (119).  
Naturalization hinged on an «assurance of fidelity»: each 
migrant, who wished to establish himself within the 
commonwealth, had to declare «before any court of record» his 
intention «to reside therein» and offer «satisfactory proof» of his 
                                                
119 See contra Peter THOMSON, Preface, cit., pp. IX-X: «[…] Jefferson 
believed that the polity known as the commonwealth of Virginia lacked 
legitimacy because it had been called into beign without adequate reference 
to the people, so it comes as something of a surprise that his bill strengthened 
the legitimacy of the flawed commonwealth by requiring oaths of allegiance 
to it from its people». 
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commitment by swearing an «oath» of allegiance (120).  
Jefferson provided the text of the oath himself in his Bill 
Prescribing the Oath of Fidelity, and the Oaths of Certain 
Public Officers (121). «Be it enacted by the General Assembly 
that every person appointed to act in any office within this 
Commonwealth legislative, executive, or judiciary by authority 
from the laws thereof and all persons migrating hither to become 
citizens of the Commonwealth shall take  the following oath of 
fidelity before some court of record, or before the high court of 
Chancery or General court to be by such judge certified into his 
court, to wit: “I          do declare myself a citizen of the 
commonwealth of Virginia. I relinquish and renounce the 
character of subject or citizen of any Prince, or other state, 
whatsoever, and abjure all allegiance, which may be claimed by 
such Prince, or other state; and I swear to be faithful and true to 
the said commonwealth of Virginia, so long as I continue a 
citizen thereof. So help me God” […]» (122). 
Through this sworn oath of fidelity, recited before a court of 
justice, God was called to witness and guarantee the voluntary 
relinquishment of previous allegiances and the constitution of a 
new political bond between the individual acquiring citizenship 
and the commonwealth in which he sought to fulfill his material 
                                                
120 Thomas JEFFERSON, A Bill Declaring Who Shall be Deemed Citizens of 
this Commonwealth, cit., p. 477. 
121 See Thomas JEFFERSON, A Bill Prescribing the Oath of Fielity, and the 
Oaths of Certain Public Officers, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, 
cit., pp. 589-590. 
122 Ibid., p. 598, 589. I have reproduced the text of the enacting clause as 
drafted by Jefferson and published in the first footnote to the text rendered in 
The Jefferson Papers. 
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and spiritual needs. It was this willful act of commitment that 
constituted the origin of political obligations according to 
Jefferson. No simple residence within the territory of the 
Commonwealth, however prolonged, could have had the same 
effect, because it did not imply the same contractual relationship 
between the parties. A Commonwealth was not just a city, a 
material gathering of edifices and all that pertained to them, one 
could enter by simply inhabiting it. It was a «Society of Men», 
as Locke had admonished, a legal order known in the scientific 
language of the time as «Civitas» (123). The French, who 
followed Bodin, could distinguish this society of laws and men 
from the ville and call it cité (124), but, as Locke warned English 
readers, «City among us has a quite different notion» (125). 
Hence, entrance into the Commonwealth could not be gained 
but by a «positive engagement», an «express Promise and 
Compact» (126). This pledged compact, this sworn oath of 
                                                
123 John LOCKE, Two Treatise of Government, cit., p. 355. On the notion of 
civitas in medieval and modern European jurisprudence and its understanding 
as a particular kind of aedificiorum collatio see Diego QUAGLIONI, 
«Civitas»: appunti per una riflessione sull’idea di città nel pensiero politico 
dei giuristi medievali, cit., pp. 59-76. See also ID., The Legal Definition of 
Citizenship in the Late Middle Ages, in City States in Classical Antiquity and 
Medieval Italy, edited by Anthony Molho, Julia Emlen, Kurt Raaflaub, 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor and Stuttgard, 1991, pp. 155-167. 
124 See. Diego QUAGLIONI, I limiti della sovranità. Il pensiero di Jean 
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«Les Citoyens envers l’Etat»: The Individual as a Citizen from Bodin’s 
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Theory and Practice, edited by Janet Coleman, Carendon Press, Oxford, 
1996, pp. 269-280. 
125 John LOCKE, Two Treatise of Government, cit., p. 355. 
126 Ibid., p. 349. 
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fidelity, exchanged in the presence of God and fellow men (127), 
had been the foundation of the Commonwealth and became the 
act, in Jefferson’s Bill, through which immigrating individuals 
were entitled, under municipal law, to acquire citizenship and 
the right of participating in the exercise of the Commonwealth’s 
jurisdiction. 
Paolo Prodi has argued that this practice of oath-taking had 
been central in the history of Western constitutionalism since 
the early Middle Ages, as it had provided «the transcendent 
justification of the vertical ties binding rulers and subjects and 
the horizontal ties binding citizens within a city or state to each 
other» (128).  And this persuasion in the ability of mutually 
sworn obligations to constitute an agreement capable of binding 
a society together and subjecting its rulers to the laws 
collectively enacted was, to paraphrase Marc Bloch, a 
conviction according to which Jefferson still desired American 
societies to live by (129).  
He made it clear in 1801, contrasting in his first inaugural 
address «the exterminating havoc» afflicting Europe, a continent 
whose rulers its subjects had not chosen (nor could choose), to 
the well-being that the American people had secured for 
themselves, «to the thousandth and thousandth generation», by 
                                                
127 See Hannah ARENDT, On Revolution, cit., pp. 167, 170-173. 
128 Julius KIRSHNER, Rewiew of Paolo Prodi, Il sacrametno del potere: Il 
giuramento politico nella storia costituzionale dell’Occidente, in American 
Historical Review, vol. 98, n. 5, 1993, p. 1583. See also Paolo PRODI, Il 
sacramento del potere. Il giuramento politico nella storia costituzionale 
dell’Occidente, Il multino, Bologna, 1992. 
129 See Marc BLOCH, The Feudal Society, vol. 2, Social Classes and Political 
Organization, Routledge, London, 1965, p. 452. 
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«possessing a chosen country», a country they had chosen for 
themselves and constituted, through mutual pledged of sworn 
fidelity, as a iuris societas, i.e. a Commonwealth (130). 
Precisely because citizenship was an act of choosing and a 
sign of commitment its bond could be relinquished. Should a 
person desire to quit «the country, in which birth or other 
accident» might «have thrown» him and seek «subsistance and 
happiness wheresoever» he «may be able, or may hope to find 
them», he was entitled to exercise his «natural right» of 
expatriation (131).  
Jefferson openly acknowledged in the Bill that expatriation 
was a natural right, «incapable», as he would later write to 
Albert Gallatin, «of being rightfully taken from [man] even by 
the united will of very other person in the nation» (132). It was, 
in other words one of the iura naturalia Edward Coke had 
declared to be immutabilia in the Calvin’s case (133). And it 
provided the natural foundation for the establishment of self-
governing jurisdictions. For, if individuals did not possess a 
natural right to become citizens of any particular jurisdiction, 
natural law did grant them the right to dissolve ad nutum any 
municipal ties and establish entirely new ones. 
                                                
130 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, cit., p. 149. See Maurizio 
VALSANIA, Nature’s Man. Thomas Jefferson’s Philosophical Anthropology, 
University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville and London, 2013, p. 19. 
131 Thomas JEFFERSON, A Bill Declaring Who Shall be Deemed Citizens of 
this Commonwealth, cit., p. 477. 
132 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Albert Gallatin, 26 June 1806, quoted in Ari 
HELO, Thomas Jefferso’s Ethics and the Politics of Human Progress. The 
Morality of a Slaveholder, cit., p. 153. 
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It had been, once again, Coke who had claimed in Calvin’s 
case, that «magistracy and government are of nature» (134). By 
this he had meant that in all times and in all societies nature had 
established rulers and ruled. Like Machiavelli before him, who 
had written «il mondo fu sempre ad uno modo abitato da uomini 
che hanno avuto le medexime passioni; et sempre fu chi serve et 
chi comanda, et chi serve malvolentieri, et chi serve volentieri, 
et chi si ribella et è ripreso» (135), Coke insisted that «to 
command and to obey is of nature, and that magistracy is of 
nature» (136).   
Jefferson largely rejected this contention, but he did maintain 
that magistracy was from nature as well, although in a sense 
closer to Sidney’s than perhaps to Coke’s. It had been Sidney 
who had claimed, in the opening of this Discourses Concerning 
Government, that «the whole fabric of tyranny will be much 
weakened if we prove that nations have a right to make their 
own laws, constitute their own magistrates; and that such as are 
so constituted owe an account of their actions to those by whom, 
and for whom they were appointed» (137). This right, belonging 
to nations, was itself part of the law of nations, the ius gentium 
upon which medieval jurists had grounded the rights of self-
government, as it had been fully articulated in the 14th century 
by Baldus de Ubaldis in his commentary on the lex Omnes 
                                                
134 Calvin’s case, cit, p. 392. 
135 Niccolò MACHIAVELLI, Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana 
ribellati, in ID., Opere, vol. 1, cit., p. 24. 
136 Calvin’s case, cit, p. 392. 
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populi: «populi sunt de iure gentium ergo regimen populi est de 
iure gentium […]» (138).  
Through this meditation, Jefferson seems to have recovered a 
typically medieval conception of self-government, one rooted in 
a law that transcended municipal obligations and was thus 
capable of resisting against political encroachments. One against 
which Bodin had openly written, contending that autonomy 
could only exist as a sovereign concession (139). Early political 
absolutism could not allow intermediate societies to be exempt 
from the potestas absoluta of the sovereign and claim that the 
ius gentium had granted them a right of self-government that 
could challenge and limit sovereign prerogatives (140). 
Jefferson’s owed much to this Bodinian understanding of 
autonomy and took it to be the foundation of his doctrine on 
administrative decentralization. However, he distinguished 
administrative jurisdictions which had been granted the power 
of self-government, from societies which held those powers 
within themselves ab origine. And when it came to the latter, he 
was relentless in maintaining that their rights of self-government 
were rooted in the law of nature and nations.  
It was as a jurist educated on the Institutes and the Reports of 
Coke that Jefferson read modern literature on public law. So, 
                                                
138 Quoted in Francesco CALASSO, Autonomia, in Enciclopedia del diritto, 
vol. IV, Giuffrè, Milano, 1959, pp. 349-356: 354. See also Joseph CANNING, 
The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, cit., p. 104-113.  
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sovranità, cit., p. 54. On the medieval understanding of autonomy see 
Francesco CALASSO, I glossatori e la teoria della sovranità, cit., pp. 108-110. 
140 See Diego QUAGLIONI, «Civitas». Appunti per ua riflessione sull’idea di 
città nel pensiero politico dei giuristi medievali, cit., p. 74. 
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when he found, in Vattel’s (1714-1767) Le droit des gens, that 
«[i]l est des cas dans lesquels un citoyen est absolument en droit 
[…] de renoncer à sa patrie», the chief occurring whenever «le 
citoyen ne peut trouves sa subsistence dans sa patrie», for «la 
société politique, ou civile, n’étant contractée que dans le vue de 
faciliter à un chacun les moyens de livre & de faire un sort 
heureux & assure, il seroit absurdre de pretender qu’un member, 
à qui elle ne pourra procurer les chise les plus nécessaires, ne 
sera pas en droit de la quitter» (141);  or when he read that the 
same right existed whenever «le corps de la société, ou celui qui 
le représente, manqué absolument à ses obligations envers un 
citoyen» (142); or again when «la majeure partie de la nation, ou 
le Souverain qui la représente, veut établir des loix sur des 
choses à l’égard desquelles le pacte de societé ne peut obliger 
tout citoyen à se soummettre», as for instance «si le Souverain, 
ou la plus grande partie de la nation, ne veut souffrir qu’une 
seule religion dans l’Etat» (143), these propositions must not 
have appeared to him as simply an abstract enunciation of 
natural rights. Although a plain reading of Vattel might have 
suggested to a lesser reader that expatriation had no historical 
foundation, the earlier jurisprudence on iura naturalia shaped 
Jefferson’s doctrine and led him to see in the right to seek 
happiness elsewhere the foundation of what in earlier days 
                                                
141 Emmerich de VATTEL, Les droit des gens, ou principes de la loi naturelle, 
appliqués à la conduit & aux affaires des nations & des souverains, cit., livre 
1, chapitre 19, De la patarie, & de diverses matieres qui y ont rapport, p. 
119. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
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Sidney had considered to be – through his re-interpretation of 
Bodin (144) – the right men enjoyed of framing together a 
society, «having all power in themselves over themselves, 
subject to no other human law than their own» (145). 
                                                
144 On Sidney’s reading of Bodin see Jonahtan SCOTT, Algernon Sidney and 
the English Republic, 1623-1677, p. 19.  
145 Algernon SIDNEY, Discourses Concerning Government, cit., p. 99. 
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3 
 
 
 
EMBODYING SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 
2. Jefferson at the «tournant rousseauiste»  
When Jefferson arrived in Paris in 1784, as a diplomatic 
agent of the United States government (1), only twenty-two 
years had passed since the publication of Rousseau’s Du 
Contrat Social, ou Principes du droit politique had shaken 
European political wisdom to its core (2). The treatise had made 
no attempt to conceal its radical reversal of traditional public 
law (3). To the contrary, Rousseau emphasized at every page his 
effort to place the artificial and corporate body of the people at 
                                                
1 See William Howard ADAMS, The Paris Years of Thomas Jefferson, Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 1997; and Iain MCLEAN, The 
Paris Years of Thomas Jefferson, in A Companion to Thomas Jefferson, 
edited by Francis D. Cogliano, cit., pp. 110-127. More recently Annette 
GORDON-REED and Peter S. ONUF, «Most Blessed of Patriarchs». Thomas 
Jefferson and the Empire of Imagination, cit., pp. 97-132. 
2 See Yves Charles ZARKA, Rousseau and the Sovereignty of the People, in 
Rousseau, Between Nature and Culture. Philosophy, Literature, and Politics, 
edited by Anne Deneys-Tunney and Yves Charles Zarka, De Gruyter, Berlin, 
2016, pp. 137-150. See also, ID., Le tournant rousseauiste ou la reinvention 
de la souveraineté du peuple, in Penser la couveraineté à l’époque modern et 
contemporaine, edited by Gian Mario Cazzaniga and Yves Charles Zarka, 
Ets-Vrin, Pisa and Paris, 2001, pp. 287-302. 
3 See James MILLER, Rousseau. Dreamer of Democracy, Yale University 
Press, New Haven and London, 1984, pp. 118-119. 
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the helm of civil power (4). The novelty of this democratic 
subject challenged the traditional understanding of sovereignty, 
which had frequently cautioned against entrusting concrete 
political action to an abstract entity such as the people, whose 
historical character appeared at best passive and at worst 
seditious.  
Bodin, in particular, had warned, at least in the eyes of such 
18th century readers as Condorcet – who had abridged the 
Republique for the first volume of the Biblithèque de l’homme 
public, the series of political classics he edited in the last quarter 
of the 18th century – that «[l]a démocratie, ou gouvernement 
populaire […] est impraticable dans un pays étendu, par-tout 
elle est sujette à beaucoup de désordres & abus. […] ce qu’il y a 
de sûr, c’est que le désordre est inséparable de tout ce que le 
people fait en tourbe, & qui n’est point le fruit de l’examen & 
des réflexions des gens les plus sages […]» (5). In other words, 
Condorcet’s Bodin had shared with 18th century readers his 
doubts whether democracies could effecitvely compose into a 
superior harmony those fragmented interests that unsettled 
societies, given how democratic sovereignty belonged to those 
                                                
4 Jean-Jacques ROUSSEAU, Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du droit 
politique, in Oeuvre Complètes, vol. 3, edited by Robert Derathé, Gallimard, 
Paris, 1964, p. 361: «A l’instant, de lieu de la personne particulière de chaque 
contractant, cet acte d’association produit un corps moral & collectif, 
compose d’autant de membres que l’assemblée a de voix; lequel reçoit de ce 
même acte son unité, son moi commun, sa vie & sa volonté». 
5 Nicolas de CONDORCET, Bibliothèque de l’homme public, ou analyse 
raisonnée des principaux ouvrages François et étrangers, sur la Politique en 
général, la Législation, les Finances, la Police, l’Agriculture, & le 
Commerce en particulier, & sur le Droit naturel & public, Tome premier, a 
Paris: chez Buisson, 1790, pp. 96. 
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very factions that splintered the commonwealth’s unity and thus 
prevented the establishment of an effective mediatory power 
over the moltiplicity of compleating parties. 
«Tels sont les principes de l’excellent livre de Jean Bodin», 
concluded Condorcet. «Leur réunion forme la base d’un traité 
complet de droit public, le plus méthodique, le plus sage & le 
plus juste que l’on puisse présenter» (6). The year was 1790 and, 
while the revolution that according to Tocqueville would have 
eventually brought to completion the centralization of power 
initiated by the French monarchy in the 15th century was on its 
way, Condorcet recalled the “republican” lesson of Bodin – who 
had «[…] sucé avec le lait un esprit républicain» he maintained 
«presque toute sa vie» (7) – to present a complete scientific 
exposition of the foundations of power and, more importantly, 
of  the limitations needed to keep it in check and assure its 
justness (8). Hence, far from being the champion of a doctrine 
                                                
6 Ibid., p. 129. 
7 Ibid., p. 77. The same metaphor was used five years earlier by Jefferson in a 
letter addressed to Richard Price from Paris in 1785, see Thomas JEFFERSON, 
letter to Richard Price, 7 August 1785, in The Paper of Thomas Jefferson, 
vol. 8, 25 February to 31 October 1785, edited by Julian P. Boyd et al., 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1953, p. 356: «[The young men of 
Virginia] have sucked in the principles of liberty as it were with their 
mother’s milk, and it is to them I look with anxiety to turn the fate on this 
question [of slavery]». 
8 Much should be said and written on Condocet’s republican interpretation of 
Bodin and his participation in the larger revival of Bodinian thought that took 
place in the 18th century. This movement had been probably initiated, or at 
least substantially supported, by Jean-Charles de Lavie, who in 1755 had 
published an Abrégé de la République de Bodin in London, a copy of which 
was eventually acquired by John Adams. Introducing his edition, Lavie 
stressed the success enjoyed by Bodin’s doctrine in England and compared it 
to Montesquieu’s oeuvre. «La République de Bodin a eu, dans son temps, un 
succès semblable à celui dont l’Esprit des loix a joui de nos jours. […] On 
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justifying limitless power, Condorcet saw in Bodin one of the 
earliest interpretars of modern constitutionalism.  
Among the limitations placed by Bodin to check power, the 
subjecthood of sovereignty stood preeminent. Only a clearly 
identified and circumscribed subject, such as a prince, could 
effectively fulfill sovereignty’s demands and exercise its power 
with sound judgment9. «Enfin notre auteur, revenant aux 
différents genres de républiques, & balançant encore une fois le 
mérite de l’état populaire, aristocratique & royale, conclut 
toujours en faveur du dernier. Il recommande aux rois cette 
justice qu’il appelle distributive; il veut qu’elle soit de plus 
harmonique, c’est-à-dire, graduellement utile aux différens 
                                                                                                     
peut dire que l’un & l’autre on traité la même matiere considérée sous deux 
points de vue différentes. L’un en donnant les regles du Gouvernement des 
différentes Républiques, a exposé les meilleures loix des législateurs; l’autre 
a pénétré l’esprit qui les avoit animés». See Jean-Charles de LAVIE, Abrégé 
de la République de Bodin, Tome premier, a Londres: Chez Jean Nourse, 
1755, p. I-II. Condorcet echoed these same remarks (see Nicolas de 
CONDORCET, Bibliothèque de l’homme public, cit., pp 76, 78). Their 
implication was clear: because Bodin had been censured by the Catholic 
Church, his widest circulation had been in Protestant countries, especially 
England, where his thought became the foundation of later public law 
doctrines. On Lavie see Jean-Pierre DURAT, Le president Jean-Charles de 
Lavie, critique de l’Esprit des lois, in Etudes offertes a Pierre Jaubert. Liber 
amicorum, edited by Gérard Aubin, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 
Bordeaux, 1992, pp. 189-202. Mention of Lavie and his indebtedness to 
Bodin may be also found in Vittor Ivo COMPARATO, Il diritto di natura a 
Perugia tra la Repubblica romana e l’unità, in Annali di storia delle 
Univeristà italiane, vol. 18, 2014, pp. 221-241: 235. On Adams as reader of 
Bodin see Armand London FELL, Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and 
Legislative State, vol. VI, American Tradition and Innovation with 
Contemporary Import and Foreground, Book 1, Foundations (to Early 19th 
Century), cit., pp. 101-136.  
9 In her Introduction to the Italian translation of the Republique, Margherita 
Isnardi Parente has maintained that the sovereign’s subjecthood constituted 
the essential limitation to his power. See Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, 
Introduzione, cit., p. 32. 
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ordres de l’état, qu’il considère comme autant de cordes d’un 
même instrument: la corde du clergé est, dit-il, la plus délicate à 
toucher, on appuie plus l’archet d’ordinaire & on prince plus 
portement celle du tiers-état, ou du pauvre peuple; mais comme 
un bon musicien tire de son instrument les meilleurs sons 
possible, un bon roi & un ministre habile doivent savoir 
également employer toutes les cordes de l’administration pour 
en former des accords régulières & harmonieux» (10). Clearly, 
no collective body of people could carry out such an articulate 
and measured exercise of power.  
                                                
10 Nicolas de CONDORCET, Bibliothèque de l’homme public, cit., pp. 128-129. 
There appears to be a slight misinterpretation of Bodin’s words in this 
passage, as Condorcet would seem to confuse distributive and harmonic 
justice, two categories sharply distinguished by Bodin. On Bodin’s notion of 
harmonic justice see Michel VILLEY, La Justice harmonique selon Bodin, in 
Jean Bodin. Verhandlungen der internationalen Bodin Tagung, edited by 
Horst Denzer, Beck, Munich, 1973, pp. 69-86. The history of the reception of 
this particular theory of justice would not seem to have been yet written. But 
even before Condorcet reformulated Bodin’s doctrine in the late 18th century, 
the same notion appears to have been adopted one century earlier by 
Algernon Sidney in his Court Maxims. See Algernon SIDNEY, Court Maxims, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 23: «This is the work of a 
prudent lawgiver or political man. If there were not difficulty in it, those 
endowed with that science they call policy would not deserve the honour 
which by all wise men is given to them. That body is well composed as to 
duration and performance of all acts belonging unto it, which has such a 
mixture of elements that no one is wanting or too much abounds. And that 
tune in music is well framed in which the sharpness of one tone is sweetened 
by the gravity of another; and the perfection of the harmony consists in the 
due proportion of one unto the other. So in civil societies those deserve praise 
that make such laws as conduce to a civil harmony wherein the several 
humours, natures, and conditions of men may have such parts and places 
assigned to them, that none may so abound as to oppress the other to the 
dissolution of the whole; and none be o wanting as that the part naturally 
belonging to it should be left imperfect. But everyone, in his own way and 
degree, may act in order to the public good and the composing of that civil 
harmony in which our happiness in this world does chiefly consist». 
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But Rousseau had claimed otherwise, subverting Bodin’s 
judgment, or rather re-establishing on new grounds «i concetti 
fondamentali della République» (11).  
Condorcet did not shy from this confrontation, he rather 
engaged in it hand to hand and placed at the opening of the 
following volume in the series of the Biblithèque – which 
gathered, among others, writings by Francesco Guicciardini, 
Thomas More, and Francis Bacon (12) – a telling quotation 
drawn precisely from Rousseau’s Contrat social, later 
reproduced in all subsequent volumes. «Quelque foible 
influence que puisse avoir ma voix dans les affaires publiques, 
le droit d’y voter suffit pour m’imposer le devoir de m’en 
instruire» (13).  
Far from allowing that popular sovereignty could rest on 
abstract generalities or rationalistic principles, Condorcet 
insisted that the popular exercise of sovereign power required an 
educated citizenry, largely conversant in the historical subtleties 
of legal and political thought. «D’après la nouvelle 
constitution», he wrote in the general preface of the series, «il 
n’est personne qui ne puisse être appelé à discuter & à defender 
les intérêts de son contons, de sa province, & même de tout le 
                                                
11 Salvo MASTELLONE, Storia ideologica d’Europa da Savonarola a Adam 
Smith, Sansoni, Firenze, 1979, p. 336.  
12 Nicolas de CONDORCET, Bibliothèque de l’homme public, ou analyse 
raisonnée des principaux ouvrages François et étrangers, sur la Politique en 
général, la Législation, les Finances, la Police, l’Agriculture, & le 
Commerce en particulier, & sur le Droit naturel & public, tome troisième, a 
Paris: Chez Buisson, 1790. The first two volumes had been published jointly.   
13 Ibid., p. 2. The quotation is taken from Jean-Jacques ROUSSEAU, Du 
Contrat Social, cit., p. 351 
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royame: l’artisan, que la nature a doué d’un génie supérieur, 
peut désormais être porté par le vœu général, aux premières 
places du gouvernement, & donner les loix à sa patrie. Mais le 
génie ne supplée point les connaissances qu’on n’a pas; &, il 
faut l’avouer, ces connaissances si nécessaires doivent être bien 
rares chez un people qui nait, per ainsi dire, à la liberté» (14). 
While popular sovereignty was not rejected but rather 
embraced, the whole editorial enterprise launched by Condorcet 
seems to have critiqued the abstractness of Rousseau’s claims. 
And although Jefferson had already left France in 1790, when 
the first issue of the Biblithèque was published, the time he 
spent in France between 1784 and 1789, and his personal 
friendship with Condorcet (15), allowed him, in all likelihood, to 
engage in the public discourses that prepared the massive 
intellectual and editorial review of European jurisprudence and 
political thought published in response to the unconcealed 
revision of received political wisdom provoked by Rousseau.  
During this time, Jefferson undertook his own critique of 
Rousseau’s doctrine. Now that the sovereignty of American 
societies had been established and the discussion of a federal 
                                                
14 Nicolas de CONDORCET, Bibliothèque de l’homme public, Tome premier, 
cit., pp. iv-v. The particular insistence on local interests and intermediate 
bodies should not go unnoticed, as it belongs to a Bodinian critique of 
Rousseau’s abstract sovereignty and its firm dismissal of any intermediate 
power between individual subjects and the corporate sovereign. Not only had 
Bodin emphasized the constitutional role of intermediated bodies, but their 
constitutional relevance had been recalled and further stressed by Lavie in his 
Des corps politiques et de leurs gouvernements, published by Duplain, in 
Lyon in 1764. See Jean-Pierre DURAT, Le president Jean-Charles de Lavie, 
critique de l’Esprit des lois, cit., pp. 193-197. 
15 See Iain MCLEAN, The Paris Years of Thomas Jefferson, cit., pp. 110-127. 
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constitution was under way, the abstractness of the people 
became one of his major concerns. And, as turmoil mounted in 
France, he began questioning who actually exercised power 
where only an artificial entity, removed from the here and now 
of history, claimed to be sovereign.  
As he became more involved in the efforts of French liberals 
to assess the rights of men and citizens, Jefferson committed 
these reflections to his correspondence and summarized them in 
one of the most famous and controversial letters to James 
Madison (16). Although the exchange between Jefferson and 
Madison on the nature of popular sovereignty raised perhaps 
more questions than it ultimately answered, it testifies how 
intesly both men struggled over the riddles of popular 
sovereignty and consciously commitment themselves towards 
opening «the way to the historical experience of real 
democracy» (17). More precisely, it chronicles their pursuit of a 
conception of sovereignty «capable of being embodied» in the 
actual institutions of an historical people (18). In this sense, their 
exchange took part in that broad «critique of Rousseau’s 
sovereignty» which needed to take place, according to Yves 
                                                
16 See Herbert E. SLOAN, Principle and Interest: Thomas Jefferson and the 
Problem of Debt, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, re-published by 
University Press of Virginia, 2001, pp. 62-70. On the relationship between 
Jefferson and Madison see Andrew BURNSTEIN and Nancy ISENBERG, 
Madison and Jefferson, Random House, New York, 2010.  
17 Yves Charles ZARKA, Rousseau and the Sovereignty of the People, cit., p. 
137 
18 Ibid. 
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Charles Zarka, if the sovereignty of the people was ever to 
become «the real principle of historical democracies» (19). 
 
2. The subject of popular sovereignty: the living generation 
On the 6th of September 1789, Jefferson addressed a letter to 
James Madison from Paris (20). The letter would not reach its 
destination until several months later. Jefferson carried it with 
him as he returned to the United States later that September and 
did not mail it but on the 9th of January 1790 (21). Madison 
replied on the following 4th of February, with a letter as dense as 
the one he had received (22).  
This exchange on the nature of democratic power and the 
rights enjoyed by each generation of a sovereign people to 
govern itself independently is perhaps the best known instance 
of the vast correspondence that the two statesmen shared over 
the fifty years of their intense political collaboration and 
                                                
19 Ibid. See contra Ari HELO, Thomas Jefferson’s Ethics and the Politics of 
Human Progress. The Morality of a Slaveholder, cit., p. 120: «The act of 
giving on’s consent to political society provides the grounds of Jefferson’s 
grand concept of generational independence, which could rest equally well 
on Lockean or Rousseauean theory». 
20 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to James Madison, 6 September 1789, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 15, 27 March 1789 to 30 November 1789, 
edited by Julian P. Boyd et al., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1958, 
pp. 392-398. 
21 See Charles F. HOBSON and Robert A. RUTLAND, Madison’s Rebuttal to 
«the Earth Belongs to the Living», in The Paper of James Madison, vol. 13, 
20 January – 31 March 1791, edited by Charles F. Hobson and Robert A. 
Rutland, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1981, p. 18. 
22 See James MADISON, letter to Thomas Jefferson, 4 February 1790, in The 
Papers of James Madison, vol. 13, cit., pp. 18-26. 
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personal friendship (23). It marks also a significant divergence in 
the often consistent constitutional doctrines of the two 
Virginians. This distance has not gone unnoticed. Much of the 
scholarship has drawn attention to the difference in argument, 
and even in tone, displayed by the two letters. «The impression 
one gathers here» observed Adrianne Koch in one of the first 
attempts to interpret the significance of this exchange, «is that 
Jefferson is more speculative and more daring in putting 
forward dynamic generalizations, and that Madison is the more 
astute politician» (24).  
Far from fading, this impression has instead lingered on in 
the literature, strengthening itself over time, as the intellectual 
personalities of Jefferson and Madison have been increasingly 
portrayed as those of men who shared a common commitment to 
constitutionalism, but were set apart by their different 
inclinations towards abstraction (25).  
Because of this enduring template, interpretations of the 
exchange have mostly offered a rationalistic reading of the 
principles advanced by Jefferson and Madison, tempered – in 
                                                
23 See James Morton SMITH, (ed.), The Republic of Letters: The 
Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 1776-1826, 
voll. 1-3, cit.  
24 Adrianne KOCH, Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration, Alfred 
A. Kopf, New York, 1950, p. 63. 
25 The distinction is reiterated once again, for instance, in Andrew BURSTEIN 
and Nancy ISENBERG, Madison and Jefferson, a cit., pp. 207: «Madison was 
predisposed toward a structure that bent but did not break. No matter the 
issue, he always sought to uphold the usefulness of civil institutions. 
Jefferson, in contrast, celebrated the unfettered freedom of natural rights, the 
sovereignty of the individual, and his entitlement to protest whatever law 
curtailed personal liberty. Madison and Jefferson did not merely have 
different priorities; their manner of thinking was fundamentally different».  
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the most authoritative analysis – by an effort to construe the 
alternative takes within their respective contexts: revolutionary 
France in the case of Jefferson and the constitutional republic of 
the Unites States in the case of Madison (26).  
This line of interpretation has been ultimately consolidated 
by Herbert Sloan in his 1995 study entitled Principle and 
Interest: Thomas Jefferson and the Problem of Debt (27). To this 
day, this remains the standard reference in the literature. Sloan’s 
book considers generally Jefferson’s attitudes towards debt and 
                                                
26 Among the most rationalistic interpretations see Daniel J. BOORSTINE, The 
Lost World of Thomas Jefferson, Beacon Press, Boston, 1948, pp. 204-213. 
More sophisticated, but no less abstract is the view offered in Maurizio 
VALSANIA, Nature’s Man. Thomas Jefferson’s Philosophical Anthropology, 
cit., pp. 71-72. Emphasis on context has been instead placed in Julian P. 
BOYD, The Earth Belongs in Usufruct to the Living, in The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. 15, cit., pp. 384-391. Not much more than a paraphrase is 
provided in David N. MAYER, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas 
Jefferson, cit., pp. 302-308. As it is often quoted and discussed in the 
literature, I should also mention Richard K. MATTHEWS, The Radical 
Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson: An Essay in Retrieval, in Midwest Studies 
in Philosophy, vol. 28, 2004, pp. 37-57 (which abridged the earlier ID., The 
Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson. A Revisionist View, University Press of 
Kansas, Lawrence, 1984).  Matthews has a great merit: amid a literature that 
has mostly ignored Hannah Arendt, he recovered her interpretations of 
Jefferson’s constitutionalism and returned to Jeffersonian scholarship what 
remains the single most insightful and convincing reading of Jefferson’s 
1789 letter. However, his essay is unfortunately compromised by a number of 
serious misunderstandings of Jefferson’s though that lead his interpretation 
astray. The most egregious one seems to be his claim that «Jefferson never 
embraced the notion that a society could create a fundamental law that was 
superior to other laws». See ibid., p. 48. Matthews mistakes the object of 
Jefferson’s criticism for his thought and thus ends up reaching untenable 
conclusions. See Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, cit., pp. 
118-129 and especially pp. 121-125. 
27 Herbert E. SLOAN, Principle and Interest: Thomas Jefferson and the 
Problem of Debt, cit., see especially pp. 50-85. A condensed version of this 
book, focused mostly on the interpretation of the letter at hand is given in ID., 
«The Earth Belongs in Usufruct to the Living», in Jeffersonian Legacies, cit., 
pp. 281-315. 
154 
 
provides a highly introspective, almost psychological 
interpretation of the 1789 letter to Madison, in which Jefferson 
famously claimed that each generation held the earth in usufruct 
and was thus not allowed to bind, either financially or 
constitutionally, its successors. According to Sloan, this 
puzzling principle would have voiced Jefferson’s personal 
anxieties towards his own growing indebtedness and the 
mounting indebtedness of the American states. It would also 
have voiced the larger concern, shared by Jefferson along with 
his closest French connections, over the «dead hand of the past» 
and its stalling grip on a society committed to disband the old 
regime it had been subjected to (28).  
Many, if not most, reviewers have praised this reading, as it 
offered a biographical explanation for the ambiguities of 
Jefferson’s apparently whimsical argument and justified 
Madison’s rather cool reply by considering not only his 
remoteness from the revolutionary scene of France, but also his 
commitment to the newly ratified federal constitution (29). 
However, while personal experiences and local contexts may 
undoubtedly have shaped the understanding of constitutional 
issues of both men, Jefferson took great care in warning 
Madison that the doctrine he submitted to his consideration 
belonged «to the fundamental principles of every government» 
and was, as such, removed from the contingency of time and 
                                                
28 Ibid., p. 285. 
29 See, for all, Cathy MATSON, Review of Principle and Interest: Thomas 
Jefferson and the Problem of Debt by Herbert Sloan, in The William and 
Mary Quarterly, vol. 54, n. 3, 1997, pp. 669-671. 
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place (30).  In other words, despite being occasioned by a 
particular course of events, it addressed the essential questions 
of power and its limitation in a democratic society. Madison’s 
articulate reply did curb or dismiss many of Jefferson’s claims, 
but it did so by moving from several of the same underlining 
authorities on which Jefferson had relied. So, both texts carried-
on the same ongoing effort of re-interpreting the traditional 
notions of public law, handed down by modern European 
jurisprudence, in light of the revolutionary transformations that 
were occurring in the conception of sovereignty and in the 
institutional exercise of its power (31).  
The letter written to Madison began with a clear articulation 
of the question Jefferson wished to address and the answer he 
provided for it (32).  
 
                                                
30 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to James Madison, 6 September 1789, cit., p. 
392. 
31 See Paola PERSANO, La catena del tempo. Il vicolo generazionale nel 
pensiero politico francese tra Ancien Régime e Rivoluzione, Eum, Macerata, 
2007, pp. 127: «Proprio Jefferson, protagonista in ambiente Americano di un 
confront serrato con Madison su questo tema, spingerà il suo interlocutore a 
ritornare al giusnaturalismo seicentesco per comtrobattere alla tesi radicale 
secondo cui una generazione non ha mai il diritto di costringere le 
generazioni successive a pagare I debiti contratti». See contra Merrill D. 
PETERSON, Mr. Jefferson’s «Sovereignty of the Living Generatioin», in 
Virginia Quarterly Review, vol. 52, n. 3, 1976, pp. 437-447. Interpreting this 
letter, Peterson draws the rationalistic argument to its ultimate concllusions. 
«The nation began in revolt not only against the British Empire but against 
the empire of the past. It began with a fundamental commitment to redeem 
man from history, with all its cumulated guilts and terrors, and to place him 
in possession of himself. […] It was this faith that lay behind the most radical 
idea in the Jeffersonian catalogue: ‘the sovereignty of the living generation’», 
ibid. 
32 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to James Madison, 6 September 1789, cit., p. 
392. 
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«Dear sir, 
I sit down to write to you without knowing by what occasion I 
shall send my letter. I do it because a subject comes into my head 
which I wish to develop a little more than is practicable in the hurry of 
the moment of making up general dispatches. 
The question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind 
another, seems to never have been stated either on this or our side of 
the water. Yet it is a question of such consequence as not only to merit 
decision, but place also, among the fundamental principles of every 
government. The course of reflection in which we are immersed here 
on the elementary principles of society has presented this question to 
my mind; & that no such obligation can be so transmitted I think very 
capable of proof». 
 
The question put to Madison was clearly a legal one, a 
question – according to Jefferson – never raised before, neither 
by European nor American scholarship. And, though its wording 
seemed to understate the scope of the inquiry, the «question 
Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another» bore 
momentous implications, as it concerned the determination of 
the power enjoyed by each generation over itself and its 
successors (33). It was, in other words, a question about 
sovereignty, which introduced a new political subject, the 
generation of men. And, though Jefferson clearly acknowledged 
that his reflections were occasioned by the crisis currently 
shaking the received wisdom that supported the legal and 
political order of France, he specified very consciously that his 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
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considerations addressed the nature of power and its limitations 
beyond any contingent concern (34). 
Framed in these terms, the question was indeed new and 
Jefferson could consider himself among the first to have raised 
it, because up until that particular juncture – Zarka’s tournant 
rousseaviste – «[…] la souveraineté du peuple n’était pensée 
comme fondement possible de la légitimité du pouvoir politique, 
que pour être aussitôt neutralisé» (35).  
According to the common experience, sovereignty most 
typically belonged to an individual, the sovereign prince. And 
while Jefferson was acknowledging, in his letter, that 
sovereignty had passed in the hands of a new political subject, 
by asking whether this corporate sovereign could bind its 
successors, he was rephrasing an ancient jurisprudential 
question that had been traditionally asked in relation to the 
powers of a sovereign prince. In this sense, Jefferson’s question 
recalled the earlier scientific understanding of sovereignty and 
implied a comparison with those doctrines which had denied to 
the sovereign the power of binding his successors. Chief among 
                                                
34 For an analysis of the course of events in which Jefferson was immersed 
see Herbert E. SLOAN, Principle and Interest: Thomas Jefferson and the 
Problem of Debt, cit., pp. 62-70 
35 Yves Charles ZARKA, Le tournant rousseauiste ou la reinvention de la 
souveraineté du peuple, cit. p. 288: «Rousseau n’a pas inventé la notion de 
souveraineté du peuple, loin de là. On pourrait facilement montrer que cette 
notion a une longue histoire. Pour s’en tenir aux Temps Modernes, on doit 
noter que les monarchomaques protestants font usage de cette notion dans la 
dernière partie du XVIe siècle. La souveraineté est pour eux celle du peuple 
ou de ses représentants. Ce qu’il faut cependant remarquer, c’est qu’avant 
Rousseau la souveraineté du peuple n’était pensée comme fondement 
possible de la légitimité du pouvoir politique, que pour être aussitôt 
neutralisée». 
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them had been the doctrine of Jean Bodin, which had dealt most 
extensively with the matter in the eighth chapter of the first 
book of his Republique.  
By 1789 Bodin had found his way into Jefferson’s library. 
The book catalogues prove that Jefferson had acquired his copy 
of the Republique in the early period of his European diplomatic 
mission. And, in any case, he must have possessed it by the end 
September 1789, when Jefferson left the continent bound for the 
United States. So, Bodin’s presence in Jefferson’s intellectual 
and physical life at the time he drafted his letter to Madison is 
no longer hypothetical. Plus, given the importance ascribed to 
Bodin by Condorcet and his restatement of the Republique in the 
first volume of the Biblithèque de l’homme public published 
shortly after Jefferson’s departure from France, it does not seem 
far fetched to assume that Bodin might have been among the 
authors discussed by Jefferson and Condorcet in the early days 
of the French Revolution. Finally, the relevance of the 
highlighted passages in the first book of Jefferson’s copy of the 
Republic for the development of Jefferson’s own constitutional 
thought, especially as it pertains to the ideas outlined in this 
letter, seems to further support the assumption that Jefferson 
relied on Bodin to articulate the doctrine of generational 
sovereignty he shared with Madison in 1789.  
According to Bodin, in fact, the freedom from laws enacted 
by predecessors was at the heart of sovereignty’s definition (36). 
                                                
36 See Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, Introduzione, cit., pp. 44-45; Diego 
QUAGLIONI, La sovranità, cit., p. 51. 
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This «puissance absolue & perpetuelle» required its holder to be 
un-subjected throughout his entire life-time to any law, save 
those fixed by God and nature, les loix de Die & de nature so 
often recalled by Bodin, and those set to be the fundamental 
laws of the commonwealth, les loix qui concernent l'estat du 
royaume (37). Hence, sovereignty consisted essentially for Bodin 
in the supreme power of giving and amending municipal law. 
«Or il faut que ceux-là qui son souveraines, ne soyent 
aucunement subiects aux commandements d’autruy, & qu’ils 
puissant donner loy aux subiects, & casser au aneantir les loix 
inutiles, pour en faire d’autres: ce que ne peut faire celuy qui est 
subiect aux loix, ou à ceux qui ont commandement sur luy» (38). 
From this proposition Bodin drew an inescapable conclusion: 
the sovereign prince could not be subjected to the laws of his 
predecessors and was certainly not bound by his own. «Si donc 
le Prince souverain est exempte des loix de ses predecesseurs, 
beaucoup moins seroit-il tenu aux loix & ordonnances qu’il fais: 
car on peut bien recevoir loy d’autruy, mais il est impossible par 
naure de se donner loy, non plus que commander à soy mesme 
chose qui despende de sa volonté, comme dit la loy, Nulla 
obligation consistere potest, quae a voluntate promittentis 
statum capit; qui est une raison necessaire, qui monster 
evidemment que le Roy ne peut ester subiect à ses loix» (39). In 
                                                
37 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la Republique, cit., livre 1, chapitre 8, De la 
soveraineté, p. 122. Underlined passages such as this are the ones highlighted 
by vertical dashes in Jefferson’s copy of the Republique. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., livre 1, chapitre 8, De la soveraineté, p. 132. 
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short, no sovereign could be truly such, had the municipal 
constraints enacted by his predecessors remained in force.  
This tenet, later repeated by Grotius and Pufendorf (40), 
enunciated the same conclusion outlined by Jefferson in his 
letter, where, in a similar manner, Jefferson denied to each 
generation the power of constraining its successors (41).  
 
«I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self-evident, ‘that 
the earth belongs in usufruct to the living’: that the dead have neither 
powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by any individual 
ceases to be his when himself ceases to be, & reverts to the society. 
[…] Then no man can by any natural right oblige the lands occupied, 
or the persons who succeed him in that occupation, to the payment of 
debts contracted by him. For if he could, he might, during his life, eat 
up the usufruct of the lands for several generations to come, & then 
the lands would belong to the dead, & not the living, which would be 
the reverse of our principle». 
 
Of all the markings in the Republique, the most striking may 
be found in the ninth chapter of the first book. It is a very small, 
inconspicuous marking on page 182, made by only two vertical 
dashes, highlighting the following passage: «[…] car les Princes 
souuerains à bié parler, ne sont qu’usufruictiers, ou pour mieux 
dire, vsagers du bien & dommaine publique» (42). Should one 
choose to follow Jacob-Peter Mayer’s advice and read the 
                                                
40 See Paola PERSANO, La catena del tempo. Il vincolo generazionale nel 
pensiero politico francese tra Ancien régime e Rivoluzione, cit., pp. 119-122. 
41 See Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to James Madison, 6 September 1789, cit., 
p. 392-393. 
42 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la Republique, book 1, chapter 9, Du prince 
tributaire ou feudataire, & s’il est souverain, & de la prerogatiue d’honneur 
entre les Princes souuerains, cit., p. 182. 
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markings inscribed in the Republique in relation to Jefferson’s 
constitutional thought (43), it would be hard not to wonder 
whether Jefferson had in mind this very passage, while claiming 
that the earth belonged in usufruct to the new corporate 
sovereign embodied by the living generation.  
The analogy between these two arguments is further 
heightened by the exemplum referred by Bodin to illustrate the 
aforementioned principle. «Et pour ceste cause Charles IIII. 
ottroyant la confirmation des priuileges à ceux de Perouze, y 
adiousta ceste clause, TANT QV’IL VIVROIT […]» (44). Precisely 
because the prince held in usufruct the public domain, Charles 
IV could confirm the privileges granted to the citizens of 
Perugia only for as long as he lived. Privileges and decrees 
expired at the death of each successive sovereign. And 
consequently, «[…] à la venue des nouveaux Rois», «tous les 
colleges & communautés demandent confirmation de leurs 
privileges, puissance, & iurisdiction: & mesmes les Parlements 
& Cours souveraines, aussi bien que les officiers particuliers» 
(45).  
This earlier remark, from chapter eight of the same book of 
the Republique, is equally highlighted by vertical dashes and 
concludes a long passage dedicated by Bodin to laws and their 
coming into force. Far from being perpetual, municipal laws 
                                                
43 Jacob Peter MAYER, Jefferson as Reader of Bodin. Suggestions for Further 
Studies, cit., p. 27.  
44 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la Republique, cit., livre 1, chapitre 9, Du 
prince tributaire ou feudataire, & s’il est souverain, & de la prerogatiue 
d’honneur entre les Princes souuerains, p. 182. 
45 Ibid., livre 1, chapitre, 8, De la soveraineté, p. 132. 
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remained in force for as long as the legislator who enacted them 
retained the sovereign powers of legislation, so: «[…] il est bien 
certain que les loix, ordonnances, lettres patentes, priuileges, & 
ottrois des Princes, n’ont aucune force que pendant leur vie, s’ils 
ne sont ratifiés par consentement expres, ou du moins par 
souffrance du Prince, qui en a congnoissance, & mesmement 
des priuileges» (46). Therefore, no tacit acquiescence could 
prolong the life of such enactments, without impairing the 
successor’s sovereignty. 
Had Jefferson not read these remarks in his copy of the 
Republique, he would nonetheless have been familiar with them, 
as they were directly quoted and discussed by John Locke in the 
first part of his Treatise on Government: «[…] in Bodin’s 
words: It is certain, that all Laws, Priviledges, and Grants of 
Princes, have no force, but during their Life; if they be not 
ratified by the  express Consent, or by Sufference of the Prince 
following, especially Priviledges» (47). 
If indeed these passages of the Republique furnished the basis 
for Jefferson’s doctrine, it would seem he interpreted them more 
in keeping with the later lesson of Grotius, rather than with the 
actual text of Bodin. It had been Grotius, in fact, who had 
distinguished those who hold «summum imperium summum 
modo», from those who have it «modo non summo» (48).  The 
distinction, recalled by Algernon Sidney who warned that 
                                                
46 Ibid., livre 1, chapitre 8, De la soveraineté, pp. 131-132. 
47 John LOCKE, Two Treatise of Government, cit., p. 147 
48 As quoted in Algernon SIDNEY, Discourses Concerning Government, cit., 
p. 115. 
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Grotius had probably «looked upon the first sort as a thing 
merely speculative» (49), allowed Grotius to maintain that 
sovereignty could be held either in property, or in usufruct, or 
for a limited duration of time. «Cependant quelle que soit l’une 
des trois manières dont la souveraineté est possédée», observed 
Zarka «sa nature et l’étendue de son exercice restant les memes» 
(50).  
Whereas usufruct qualified for Bodin simply the title by 
which the sovereign held the public domain, in Grotius it 
became one of the titles by which the prince could hold 
sovereignty itself. And this latter interpretation seems, indeed, 
closer to Jefferson’s position, accoding to which: «This corporal 
globe, and everything upon it belongs to its present corporal 
inhabitants, during their generation. They alone have a right to 
direct what is the concern of themselves alone, and to declare 
the law of that direction […]» (51). Hence, Jefferson could 
                                                
49 Ibid. Was the medieval distinction between protestas absoluta and potestas 
ordinaria et ordinata part of Sindey’s understanding of public law? This 
observation would seem to suggest it, as it implies that Sidney was aware that 
according to the the masters of the ius commune sovereigns enjoyed potestas 
absoluta only in the abstract and possessed in actuality only a potestas 
ordinaria et ordinata. See Diego QUAGLIONI, La sovranità, cit., p. 25-29. 
50 Yves Charles ZARKA, La mutation du droit de résistance chez Grotius et 
Hobbes: du droit collectif du peuple au droit de l’individu, in Le Droit de 
résistance, XIIe-XXe siècle, edited by Jean-Claude Zancarini,, pp. 144-145. 
As Zarka highlights, Grotius is able to draw this distinction because he 
distinguishes «deux sujets de la souveraineté: un sujet commun (subjectum 
commune) qui est l’Etat (civitas) et un sujet propre (subjectum proprium) qui 
est la personne une ou multiple du souverain», ibid., p. 143. See also Daniel 
LEE, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought, cit., pp. 
268-271. 
51 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Samuel Kercheval, 12 July, 1816, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol. 10, May 1816 to January 
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conclude that, whereas sovereignty was formally held by the 
people, the funn exercise of its powers belonged to the living 
generation. 
The combined mediation of Bodin and Grotius, later recalled 
by Pufendorf (52), seems furthermore to have reconnected 
Jefferson to those medieval doctrines that had fashioned the 
exercise of popular sovereignty as a kind of usufruct. Medieval 
jurists had found in the Corpus Iuris «a text which seemed 
expressly to indicate in the Will of the People the source of 
Rulership. Ever since the days of the Glossators the universally 
accepted doctrine was that an act of alienation performed by the 
People in the Lex Regia» had transferred the ultimate power 
«from the populus to the princeps» (53). The legal nature of this 
translatio, however, was hotly debated.  
According to a first interpretation «there had been a 
definitive alienation, whereby the People [had] renounced [their] 
power for good», subjecting themselves to the imperium of the 
prince (54). On the other hand, a second interpretation «saw the 
translatio as a mere concessio», whereby the people had granted 
to the prince simply the use of their supreme power and 
                                                                                                     
1817, edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al., Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2013, p. 227.  
52 See Paola PERSANO, La catena del tempo. Il vincolo generazionale nel 
pensiero politico francese tra Ancien Régime e Rivoluzione, cit., pp. 119-122. 
53 Otto von GIERKE, Political Theories of the Middle Age, translated with an 
introduction by Frederic William Maitland, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1958, pp. 39, 43. For a more recent discussion of this doctrine 
see Daniel LEE, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional 
Thought, cit. 
54 Otto von GIERKE, Political Theories of the Middle Age, cit., p. 43. 
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remained entitled to resume it, upon conditions (55). This 
concessio was regarded as a kind of usufruct, which established 
a bilateral relationship between the wielder of sovereignty and 
its holder and allowed medieval jurists to maintain that 
«Sovereignty remained in the People despite the institution of a 
Monarch» (56). 
This second interpretation proved to be highly influential. 
Otto von Gierke has, in face, argued that the theory of popular 
sovereignty built by jurists such as Cynus Pistoriensis and 
Paolus Castrensis upon the notion of usufruct influenced –  
trough the later mediation of Hotman, Du Plessis Mornai and 
the other Huguenot jurists of the 16th century –  the doctrines of 
Althusius and Grotius (57). Moreover, it would seem likely that 
this same interpretation ultimately reached Jefferson himself, 
leaving a trace of its memory in his constitutional doctrine. 
Whether, instead, Jefferson chose to qualify sovereignty as 
the relationship between its holder and the res upon which it 
insisted to avoid the ambiguity of Rousseau’s formulation of 
democratic sovereignty, according to which «tout le peuple 
statue sur tout le peuple» and thus entertained no relationship 
                                                
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., p. 45. These doctrines, and Gierke’s own interpretations of them, 
have been recently reviewed by Daniel Lee, according to whom the 
Glossators exploited the difference, inherent in Roman Law, between 
jurisdictions held suo iure and alieno beneficio. See   Daniel LEE, Popular 
Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought, cit., pp. 25-50. 
57 See Otto von GIERKE, Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der 
naturrechtlichen Staatstherrien. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
Rechtssystematik, Breslau, 1880, translated in Italian as Giovanni Althusius e 
lo sviluppo storico delle teorie politiche giunaturaliste, edited by Antonio 
Giolitti, Einaudi, Torino, 1943, re-published in 1974, pp. 111-165. 
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but with itself, «il ne considère que lui-même», remains a 
question open to speculation (58). But, be that as it may, 
Jefferson did construct the agent of popular sovereignty in sharp 
contrast to Rousseau’s doctrine (59). 
 
«What is true of every member of the society individually, is true 
of them all collectively, since the rights of the whole can be no more 
than the sum of the rights of the individuals. To keep our ideas clear 
when applying them to a multitude, let us suppose a whole generation 
of men to be born on the same day, to attain mature age on the same 
day, & to die on the same day, leaving a succeeding generation in the 
moment of attaining their mature age all together. Let the ripe age be 
supposed of 21. years, & their period of life of 34. years more, that 
being the average term given by the bills of mortality to person who 
have already attained 21. years of age. Each successive generation 
would, in this way, come on, and go off the stage at a fixed moment, 
as individual do now. Then I say the earth belongs to each of these 
generations, during it’s [sic] course, fully, and in their own right. The 
2d. generation revives it clear of debts & incumbrancers of the 1st. the 
3d. of the 2d. & so on. For if the 1st. could charge it with debt, then 
the earth would belong to the dead & not the living generation. Then 
no generation can contract debts greater than may be paid during the 
course of it’s [sic] own existence».  
 
Whereas much of the Contrat social is dedicated by 
Rousseau to present the people as an artificial and corporate 
body, possessing a life and will of its own, as well as a common 
ego distinct from that of its individual subjects (60), once 
independence had been declared, Jefferson proved himself far 
                                                
58 Jean-Jacques ROUSSEAU, Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du droit 
politique, cit., p. 379. 
59 See Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to James Madison, 6 September 1789, cit., 
p. 393. 
60 See Diego QUAGLIONI, La sovranità, cit., p. 85. 
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less concerned with the abstract proclamation of popular 
sovereignty, than with the exploration of its actual exercise. The 
fear that, by establishing a perpetual constitution, the Founders 
might have denied their successors the freedom to establish their 
own laws and devise a form of government suited to their own 
needs, led Jefferson to distinguish between the abstract 
entitlement to sovereignty, belonging (of course) to the people 
and the substantial exercise of its prerogatives (61). These 
belonged to each generation separately. Through their exercise 
alone could each people «choose for [itself]», as a distinct 
historical entity, «the form of government [it] believ[ed] most 
promotive of [its] own happiness» (62).  
This distinction between the wielder of sovereignty and its 
holder, led Jefferson to consider the living generation as the 
actual agent of sovereign power. Unlike the people, who Bodin 
had thought would never die, «le people ne meurt iamais» (63), 
generations were, if not mortal, at least transient. They passed, 
as did individual human beings, allowing for power to be 
successively acquired by each new generation «fully, and in [its] 
own right» (64). In a passage that seems almost to unravel the 
implications of Jefferson’s condensed thought, Bodin observed 
that the identity of the people was not altered by the flow of 
time: «Or la loy dit que le people ne meurt iamais, & tient que 
                                                
61 See Hannah ARENDT, On Revolution, cit., p. 232. 
62 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Samuel Kercheval, 12 June, 1816, cit., p. 227.  
63 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la Republique, cit., book 1, chapter 2, Du 
mesnage, & la difference entre la Republique & la famille, cit., p. 12. 
64 See Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to James Madison, 6 September 1789, cit., 
p. 393. 
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cent, voire mil ans apres, c’est le mesme people […]» (65). 
However, all usufructs granted to the collectivity expired within 
the passing of what Bodin considered the longest possible span 
of a human life, a hundered years: «l’usufruict laisse à la 
Republique, est reuni à la proprieté, qui autrement seroit inutile, 
cent ans apres: car on presume, que tous ceux qui vivent, 
meurent en cent ans […]» (66). True, Bodin continued, men were 
«immortels par succession» (67), and could perpetuate 
themselves, as Jefferson would have said two hundred years 
later, «to the thousandth and thousandth generation» (68), 
«comme la nauire de Thesee, qui dura tant qu’on eut soin de le 
reparer» (69), through a cycle that secured the integrity of a 
people and the continuity of a commonwealth. But all these 
implications, which seem so tightly related to one another, were 
not openly addressed by Jefferson in his letter to Madison. No, 
Jefferson’s emphasis fell on the transience of the living 
generation, rather than on the continuity of the people.  
At first, Jefferson presented Madison with a purely artificial 
image of the generation, conceived in perfect analogy with the 
individual human being. Yet, he soon moved beyond this 
rudimentary persona ficta and presented a more natural and, at 
the same time, more complex description of the constant 
                                                
65 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la Republique, cit., livre 1, chapitre 2, Du 
mesnage, & la difference entre la Republique & la famille, p. 12. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Thomas JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address, cit., p. 149. 
69 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la Republique, cit., book 1, chapter 2, Du 
mesnage, & la difference entre la Republique & la famille, cit., p. 12. 
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succession of renewal and decay within the body of a people 
(70).  
 
«What is true of a generation all arriving to self-government on the 
same day, & dying all on the same day, is true of those in a constant 
course of decay & renewal, with this only difference. A generation 
coming in & going out entire, as in the first case, would have a right in 
the 1st. year of their self-dominion to contract a debt for 33. years, in 
the 10th. for 24. in the 20th. for 14 in the 30th. for 4. Whereas 
generations, changing daily by daily deaths & births, have one 
constant term, beginning at the date of their contract, and ending when 
a majority of those of full age at that date shall be dead. The length of 
that term may be estimated from the tables of mortality, corrected by 
the circumstances of climate, occupation, &c. peculiar to the country 
of the contractors. Take, for instance, the table of M. de Buffon 
wherein he states 23,994 deaths, & the ages at which they happened. 
Suppose a society in which 23,994 persons are born every year, & live 
to the ages states in this table. The conditions of that society will be as 
follows. 1st. It will consist constantly of 617,703. persons of all ages. 
2ly. Of those living at any one instant of the time, one half will be 
dead in 24. years 8. months 3dly. 10,675 will arrive every year at the 
age of 21. years complete. 4ly. It will constantly have 348,417 persons 
of all ages above 21. years. 5ly. And the half of those of 21. years & 
upwards living at any one instant of time will be dead in 18. years 8. 
months, or say 19. years as the nearest integral number. Then 19. 
Years is the term beyond which neither the representatives of a nation, 
nor even the whole nation itself assembled, can validly extended a 
debt».    
 
This, which appears to be one of the most perplexing 
paragraphs in the letter, has been generally interpreted as an 
expression of Jefferson’s fascination with numbers as well as a 
testimony of his close reading of Condorcet, who outlined 
                                                
70 See Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to James Madison, 6 September 1789, cit., 
p. 394. 
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similar observations in his Sur la nécessité de faire ratifier la 
constitution par les citoyens (71).  
Relying on mortality tables compiled by Buffon, Jefferson 
attempted to prove the convergence of natural and political 
sciences on the question of generational sovereignty. Power 
could be exercised fully by the living generation, without 
compromising the rights of its successors, because its course 
could be scientifically calculated and fixed to accommodate the 
succession of sovereign power within a republic. Whereas 
traditional legal scholarship had reverted to the notion of 
succession to prove that the «continuity of the king’s natural 
body – or of individual kings acting in hereditary succession 
[…] – was vouched for by the dynastic idea» (72), Jefferson 
reverted to the same notion of succession to deconstruct the 
abstractness of the people into the natural and transient body of 
each individual generation. In this sense, Jefferson’s letter seems 
to have been an attempt to move away from the abstractions that 
had dominated the political language, especially of the English 
and French monarchies, and address what Harold Laski has 
called «the most real problem of modern politics»: the actual 
attainment of popular sovereignty (73).   
                                                
71 See Herbert E. SLOAN, Principle and Interest. Thomas Jefferson and the 
Problem of Debt, cit., pp. 58-59. On Condorcet see Iain MCLEAN, The Paris 
Years of Thomas Jefferson, cit., pp. 121-123. 
72 Ernst H. KANTOROWICZ, The King’s Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval 
Political Theology, cit., p. 383. See also Bruno PARADISI, Il pensiero politico 
dei giuristi medievali, cit., pp. 319-336. 
73 Harold J. LASKI, The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1921, re-issued in 1931, p. 227. On Laski’s 
conception of popular sovereignty and the contemporary doctrine of 
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Hence, this doctrine furnished the basis of Jefferson’s 
«advocacy» of periodic «constitutional change» (74). The need 
to regularly revise the fundamental compact, which animated 
Jefferson’s «occasional, and sometimes violent, antagonism 
towards the Constitution and particularly against those who» 
(75), in his own words, «look at constitutions with sanctimonious 
reverence, and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too 
sacred to be touched» (76), was motivated – according to Hannah 
Arendt – by Jefferson’s intuition that popular sovereignty 
needed to be perpetually exercised in order not to be lost (77). 
 
«On similar grounds it may be proved that no society can make a 
perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs 
always to the living generation. They may manage it then, & what 
proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct. They are 
masters too of their own persons, & consequently may govern them as 
they please. But persons & property make the sum of the objects of 
government. The constitution and the laws of their predecessors 
extinguished then in their natural course, with those who gave them 
being. […] Every constitution then, & every law, naturally expires at 
the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, & not 
of right».  
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pp. 395-396. 
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Should power be exercised beyond its natural term, should 
the constitution or the laws be enforced longer than the 
legislator who enacted them retained the right to exercise «the 
sovereign powers of legislation» (78), acts of right would turn 
into acts of force and pervert government into a tyranny, since: 
(79) 
 
«[…] between society & society, or generation & generation, there 
is no municipal obligation, no umpire but the law of nature. […] by 
the law of nature, one generation is to another as one independent 
nation to another».  
 
It had been John Milton who had warned that a usurper had 
as much right to govern a people as could be claimed by a 
foreign king: «[…] how much right the King of Spaine hath to 
govern us at all, so much right hath the King of England to 
govern us tyrannically» (80). By considering generations as 
separate societies and even separate nations, Jefferson seems to 
have been recalling this same principle to sustain his doctrine 
and warn against the perils of attributing sovereignty to an 
abstract entity removed from the actual association of a 
commonwealth’s citizens.  
 Jefferson’s interest in Bodin, and in his later readers, should 
not come as a surprise. Bernard Bailyn and Gordon Wood have 
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extensively proven that sovereignty was the fundamental issue 
confronted by the founders during the revolution (81). So, 
Jefferson’s careful reading of 16th century French political 
literature is nothing but consequential. In fact, it was during 
early modernity, and especially in the aftermath of the French 
wars of religion, that the principles of medieval 
constitutionalism began to be re-shaped into a new conception 
of supreme power and of its fundamental limitations. Jefferson 
himself seems to have acknowledged this, when he noted his 
debt to French history: «[this] principle that the earth belongs to 
the living, and not to the dead, is of very extensive application 
and consequences, in every country, and most especially in 
France» (82).  
But how could Jefferson - and for that matter Bodin - 
maintain that the sovereigns were free from the laws enacted by 
their predecessors? What was the legal justification? 
The question points directly to the heart of Bodin’s doctrine: 
the prince is sovereign in so much as his legislative power is 
absolute, i.e. unconstrained by positive municipal law, whether 
it be enacted by himself or by his predecessors. His only 
constraints are dictated by natural and divine law and by the 
fundamental laws of the kingdom. And this is remarkably the 
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exact same argument laid down by Jefferson in his letter to 
Madison: «[…] between society and society, or generation and 
generation, there is no municipal obligation, no umpire but the 
law of nature» (83). Sovereigns, whether they may be individual 
princes or a collective people embodied in one particular 
generation, wiled a power unrestrained by civil law and checked 
exclusively by natural law. 
In light of these considerations, the ultimate purpose of 
Jefferson’s letter to Madison appears to have been the 
attribution of sovereignty’s defining traits to the power 
exercised by the living generation. In Jefferson’s Bodinian view, 
in fact, this power should have been considered both perpetual 
and absolute. The power was perpetual because, as Bodin had 
explained, it remained in the hands of the sovereign for his 
entire lifetime and was seamlessy transferred from one holder of 
to the next, hence Jefferson’s insistence on calculating the exact 
length of a generation’s life-span, «si on disoit perpetuelle, qui 
n’a iamais fin, il n’y auroit souveraineté qu’en l’estat 
Aristocratique & populaire, qui ne meuret point […]. Il faut 
donc entendre ce mot perpetuel, por la vie de celuy qui a la 
puissance» (84). And the power was absolute, not because it was 
limitless, but rather because no positive constraint could bind it, 
«[…] si nous disons que celuy a puissance absolue, qui n’est 
point subiect aux loix, il ne se trouvera Prince au monde 
souverain, veu que tous les princes de la terre sont subiects aux 
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loix de Dieu, & de nature, & a plusieurs loix humaines 
communes à tous peoples» (85), for its only constraints were set 
by the laws of nature and of God, «[…] quant aux loix diuines & 
naturelles, tous les Princes de la terre y sont subiects, & n’est 
pas en leur puissance d’y contreuenir, s’ils ne veulent ester 
coulpables de leze-maiesté diuine, faisant guerre à Dieu, sous la 
grandeur duquel tous les Monarques du monde doyuent faire 
ioug, & baisser la teste en toute crainte & reuerence» (86).  
The kind of political absolutism brought about by the French 
revolution and foreshadowed in Rousseau’s writings, had only 
began to unfold itself in the years of Jefferson’s residence in 
France. At that time, and still shortly after Jefferson’s departure, 
Bodin was considered to be a champion of limited sovereignty. 
And although some had already begun to place particular 
emphasis on the more authoritarian traits of his thought, others, 
such as Condorcet, insisted on recalling the several limitation’s 
Bodin had put in place to check sovereignty. «La qualification 
d’absolue mérite quelque explication. Il n’y a point de puissance 
que l’on puisse qualifier ainsi, si l’on entend par-là un pouvoir 
au-dessus de toutes les loix divines & humaines; mais un prince 
est absolu, lorsqu’il peut faire tout ce qui est juste, & que la 
seule injustice lui est interdite; lorsqu’il n’est oblige qu’a ce qui 
est du droit naturel & du droit des gens; qu’il n’a au-dessus de 
lui que Dieu & sa conscience, & qu’il peut faire tout ce que l’un 
& l’autre ne lui défendent pas. Cependant, dans tous les temps 
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& dans tous les pays du monde, les princes ne son pas absolus. 
Il y a des souverainetés restreintes & bornées […]» (87). And 
moreover: «Ainsi le souverain n’est tel, que lorsque sa puissance 
est indépendante de tout autre, & qu’il n’est lié que par les loix 
constitutives, qui le fond ce qu’il est; il fait les loix particulières 
& il y déroge selon son bon Plaisir & le bien de ses sujets» (88). 
In short, Condorcet presented Bodin as the herald of a 
souveraineté restreinte & bornée, i.e. a sovereignty restrained 
by the fundamental law of nature and nations and the 
fundamental laws of the realm. These limitations obliged the 
prince to act within the confines of rightfulness and justice 
alone. And they offered Condocet’s readers a precise 
interpretation of Bodin, that emphasized the full complexity of 
absolutism and stressed his constitutional insights over his 
asserted justification of raw power and its effectiveness.  
The multiple dimension of the law remained a fundamental 
feature of Jefferson constitutionalism. Men could rule their 
affairs through ordinary legislation and could frame their 
governments through their constitutions. But constitutions 
themselves had to comply with a higher law. In this sense, one 
could speak not only of the Higher Law Background of 
American Constitutional Law, but also of a higher law actually 
binding the constitution of the commonwealth (89). So, only a 
narrow and positivistic understanding of constitutionalism, one 
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that reduces all fundamental checks on power to sanctions 
provided by a written charter can allow to maintain that, 
«[w]hen considered as a coherent doctrine of timeless 
guarantees for stable government», Jefferson’s 
«constitutionalism inevitably falls apart» (90). 
Read in this light, the several highlighted passages in 
Jefferson’s copy of the Republique on the natural law limitations 
that constrain the power of the prince acquire a remarkable 
importance and could indicate how deeply Bodin’s insistence on 
the limitations constraining absolute power impressed Jefferson 
and led him to claim «as an axiom of eternal truth in politic, that 
whatever power in any government is independent, is absolute 
also […]. Independence can be trusted nowhere but with the 
people in mass. They are inherently independent of all but moral 
law» (91). 
Jefferson may have indeed raised more questions than he 
answered. After all, his reflections were committed to a letter, a 
fragment of a larger conversation entertained with Madison on 
an issue that still today is far from settled: how sovereign can a 
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people claim to be when the fundamental exercise of sovereign 
power is not at the disposal of its actual citizens? (92) 
Madison seemed less concerned with the question and 
emphasized in his answer that the corporate continuity of the 
people and its distinct subjecthood were sufficient grounds to 
claim the legitimacy for one generation to bind another, 
whenever such constitutional or financial obligations had been 
contracted in the overall interest of the people (93). More 
broadly, Madison claimed that the revolution had established a 
form of government worth cherishing. Its foundation had been 
the true aim of the revolution and so the revolutionary spirit 
could not be simply reduced to «beginning something new», as 
he assumed Jefferson had claimed in his letter, but it 
encompassed «starting something permanent and enduring» as 
well (94). Thus, Madison ultimately dismissed Jefferson’s 
preoccupations.  
But can the foundations of a society outlast the spirit that first 
put them in place? Jefferson wondered and feared throughout 
his lifetime that while the revolution «had given freedom to the 
people», it had «failed to provide a space where this freedom 
could be exercised» (95). If that was the case, then such freedom 
might eventually wither. A preoccupation that would be 
ultimately shared by one of Jefferson’s most sensitive readers. 
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«Je me suis souvent demandé où est la source de cette passion 
de la liberté́ politique qui, dans tous les temps, a fait faire aux 
hommes les plus grandes choses que l'humanité́ ait accomplies, 
dans quels sentiments elle s'enracine et se nourrit. Je vois bien 
que, quand les peuples sont mal conduits, ils conçoivent 
volontiers le désir de se gouverner eux-mêmes; mais cette sorte 
d'amour de l'indépendance, qui ne prend naissance que dans 
certains maux particuliers et passagers que le despotisme amené, 
n'est jamais durable : elle passe avec l'accident qui l'avait fait 
naître; on semblait aimer la liberté́, il se trouve qu'on ne faisait 
que haïr le maître. Ce que haïssent les peuples faits pour être 
libres, c'est le mal même de la dépendance» (96).  
 
3. The form of government of a democratic republic: the 
ward republics  
Jefferson’s fear, that the proclamation of popular sovereignty 
was in itself not sufficient to satisfy each citizen’s right to 
exercise his individual share of sovereign power, led him to his 
most decisive departure from Rousseau’s doctrine. Whereas 
Rousseau had expressly denied that actuation of popular 
sovereignty demanded the preservation of intermediate bodies 
reconciling the rights of individuals to the prerogatives of the 
whole (97), Jefferson came to regard the preservation and 
institution of intermediate bodies as the strongest foundation of 
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a «good and safe government» (98). Because of this persuasion, 
he grew increasingly unsatisfied with the mechanism of political 
representation put in place by early American constitutions to 
implement popular sovereignty (99). Though the adoption of 
representation was itself a departure from Rousseau, who had 
rejected the institute (100), Jefferson feared that the constitutions 
drafted in the aftermath of the American Revolution had 
succeeded in granting only to «the representatives of the 
people», and not to «the people themselves», the right and the 
opportunity to «engage in those activities of ‘expressing, 
discussing, and deciding’», which according to Hannah Arendt 
comprised the positive acts of freedom (101). Yet, Jefferson did 
not dismiss representation altogether. Indeed, it remained a vital 
principle of his constitutionalism (102), without exhausting by 
any measure the public space he strived to open for political 
participation.  
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By the late 18th century, representation had become one of 
the defining features of republican government, if not perhaps 
the most distinguishing institute of this renewed form of 
government (103). To succeed in his effort, Jefferson impressed 
to the notion a particular inflection that heightened its 
democratic trait. «Where I to assign to [the republic] a precise 
and definite idea», he wrote to John Taylor in 1816, «I would 
say that, purely and simply it means a government by it’s [sic] 
citizens, in mass, acting directly and personally, according to 
rules established by the majority: and that every government is 
more or less republican in proportion as it has in it’s [sic] 
composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action 
of the citizens» (104). As Gaetano Salvemini has shown in an 
article on The Concepts of Democracy and Liberty in the 
Eighteenth Century, published in a collection of essays on 
American constitutionalism edited by Conyers Read in 1938, 
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democracy was understood by Jefferson and his contemporaries 
as involving the direct participation of citizens in the direction 
of society (105). It was this distinctly democratic «direct action» 
that Jefferson placed at the heart of his definition of a republic, 
thus diminishing the relevance of representation as the defining 
institute of its characteristic public space (106). 
This particular inflection implied something more. Since 
«every government» could be «more or less republican», as it 
was predicated to a larger or lesser degree on the direct 
participation of its citizens in «the government of affairs» (107), 
Jefferson fashioned the republic more as a standard against 
which to measure particular forms of government, rather than as 
a particular form of government itself. In this sense, and only in 
this sense, Jefferson seems to have understood the notion of 
republic similarly to how it had been conceived by early modern 
public law. Authors such as Bodin had not used the term 
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republic to qualify a particular form of government, but to 
capture the essential features of all sovereign political entities 
(108). Likewise, Jefferson acknowledged that all forms of 
goverments shared, to some degree, republican features, given 
that «the whole body of the nation» remained in each society the 
true «sovereign» (109). Although governments could be entrusted 
«to a single person, as an emperor of Russia», to «a few persons, 
as the Aristocracy of Venice», or to «a complication of councils, 
as in [the] former regal government [of the colonies] or [the] 
present republican one [of the American federation]», such 
alteration in the form of government never amounted to an 
alteration in the subject of sovereignty and therefore never 
completely estinguished the direct involvement of citizens in the 
direction of their polities (110). Thus, Jefferson’s constitutional 
thought seems to have implied, though not fully developed, the 
distinction between “form of state” and “form of government” 
anticipated in Bodin’s Republique (111), to the effect of 
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rendering republican the form of state of all political societies, 
whether their government be monarchical, aristocratic, or 
instead purely democratic (112). A conception that would 
eventually be further developed by Tocqueville in his first De la 
démocratie in Amérique of 1835, according to whom: «Le 
principe de la souveraineté du people, qui se trouve toujours 
plus o moins au fond de Presque toutes les institutions 
humaines, y demeure d’ordinaire comme enseveli. On lui obéit 
sans le reconnaitre, ou si parfois il arrive de le produire un 
moment au grand jour, on se hâte bientôt de le replonger dans 
les ténèbres du sanctuaire» (113). 
Through such conception, Jefferson allowed for the 
development of a public space open to the direct participation of 
all citizens within each of the traditional forms of government 
and assumed such personal involvement to be the primary 
criterion by which to distinguish the several political regimes. 
«Societies exist under three forms sufficiently distinguishable» 
he wrote to James Madison in 1787, while still in Paris (114). «1. 
Without government, as among our Indians. 2. Under 
governments wherein the will of everyone has a just influence, 
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as in the case of England in a slight degree, and in our states, in 
a great one. 3. Under governments of force: as is the case in all 
other monarchies and in most of the other republics» (115). It is 
hard not to see, even at first glance, just how complex was the 
relationship between this partition proposed by Jefferson and the 
one offered by Montesquieu, almost forty years earlier, in Du 
l’esprit des loix. «Il y a trois espèces de gouvernemens; le 
Républicain, le Monarchique, & le Despotique. […] le 
gouvernement républicain est celui où le people en corps, ou 
seulement une partie du people, a la souveraine puissance; le 
monarchique, celui où seul gouverne, mais par des loix fixes & 
établies; au lieu que, dans le despotique, un seul, sans loi & sans 
règle, entraine tout par sa volonté & par ses caprices (116).  
For one, Montesquieu had claimed that: «Une société ne 
sçauroit subsister sans un gouvernement» (117). So, Jefferson’s 
first class of political societies, those without governments, 
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would seem to have been directly at odds with the most 
authoritative treatise on public law of his time.  According to a 
widely held view in the literature, this would not be particularly 
surprising. Although Jefferson had amply studied and 
transcribed excerpts from Montesquieu in the Legal 
Commonplace Book he kept as a student, devoting to L’esprit 
des loix more pages than to any other text abridged in his 
notebook, over time he grew increasingly critical of 
Montesquieu’s doctrine, to the point of arranging and promoting 
the English translation and American publication of Antoine-
Louis-Claude Destutt de Tracy’s critical commentary on 
L’esprit des loix (118).  However, a closer look at the 
implications of Montesquieu’s claim and at Jefferson’s 
understanding of Native American societies reveals a deeper 
harmony between the two propositions.   
The societies which according to Montesquieu could not 
subsist without a government were the political ones. 
Montesquieu could no longer refer to them by calling them 
republics, as they had been traditionally known to modern 
jurisprudence, because in his thought the republic had become a 
specific form of government, «le gouvernement républicain est 
celui où le people en corps, ou seulement une partie du people, a 
la souveraine puissance» (119), so it could no longer be the 
                                                
118 Jefferson’s complex relationship with Montesquieu is reviewed in James 
F. JONES, JR. Montesquieu and Jefferson Revisited: Aspects of a Legacy, in 
The French Review, vol. 51, n. 4, 1978, pp. 577-585. 
119 Charles-Louis de Secondat de MONTESQUIEU, De l’esprit des loix, cit., 
livre 2, chapitre 1, p. 10. 
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comprehensive name given to political bodies. The constitution 
of these bodies could be achieved whenever particular 
associations of men united themselves under a common 
sovereign power. «La reunion de toutes les forces particulièrs, 
dit trés-bien Gravina, forme ce qu’on appelle l’état politique» 
(120). It was because of this that Montesquieu could conclude, in 
a distinctly Bodinian fashion, that «La puissance politique 
comprend nécessairement l’union de plusieurs familles» (121). It 
had been Bodin who had, in fact, defined the commonwealth as 
«the lawful government of many families and of that which unto 
them in common belongeth» (the «forces particulièrs» later 
mentioned by Gravina) «with a puissant soveraigntie» (122): 
«Republique est un droit gouvernement de plusieurs mesnages, 
& de ce qui leur est commun, avec puissance souveraine» (123). 
Therefore, it would seem that by claiming that no political 
society could subsist without a government, Montesquieu was 
recalling the definition of commonwealth given by Bodin, who 
identified in the existence of sovereign power over an 
association of families, with all they held in common, the 
defining feature of what was coming into being as modern 
statehood (124). 
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123 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la Republique, cit., p. 1. 
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Montesquieu: l’éclipse de la souveraineté?, in Penser la souveraineté à 
l’époque moderne et contemporaine, vol. 1, edited by Gian Mario Cazzaniga 
et Yves-Charles Zarka, cit., pp. 199-214. 
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This same power of direction over a federation of families 
was what characterized Native American societies according to 
Jefferson. He largely described them in the 6th and 11th Queries 
of his Notes on the State of Virginia, which he wrote with the 
intention of refuting the assertions of Buffon, according to 
whom «Il ne faut pas aller chercher plus loin la cause de la vie 
disperse des sauvages & de leur éloignement pour la société: la 
plus précieuse étincelle du feu de la nature leur a été refuse; ils 
manquent d’ardeur pour leur femelle, & par conséquent d’amour 
pour leur semblables: ne connaissant pas l’attachement le plus 
vif, le plus tender de tous, leurs autres sentiments de ce genre, 
son froides & languissants: ils aiment foiblement leurs pères & 
leurs enfans; la société la plus intime de toutes, cette de la même 
famille, n’a donc chez eux que de foibles liens; la société d’une 
famille à l’autre n’en a point de tout: dès lors nulle réunion, 
nulle république, nulle état social» (125). This long passage, 
quoted by Jefferson in his Notes, reverted clearly to a Bodinian 
understanding of political societies and dismissed the existence 
of a Native American body politic on the grounds that the social 
ties within the Native American families were loose and those 
between the several Native American families simply non-
existent. No appreciable union of «forces particulièrs» had, in 
other words, established a Native American république (126). 
                                                
125 Quoted in Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, cit., pp. 58-
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126 Charles-Louis de Secondat de MONTESQUIEU, De l’esprit des loix, livre 1, 
chapitre 3, cit., p. 8. 
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 It was indeed within this Bodinian framework that Jefferson 
articulated his refutation (127). (Incidentally, this is of particular 
interest for the purpose of determining the extent of Jefferson’s 
engagement with Bodin’s doctrine, since, though the first draft 
of the Notes was completed by 1781, its publications in a private 
and limited edition issued in Paris did not occur till 1785, while 
the first publication at large occurred only two years later in 
London in 1787, once Jefferson had fully undertaken his 
diplomatic mission to France, at a time in which his direct 
knowledge of Bodin may no longer be considered merely 
speculative, given the presence of the Republique among the 
entries in the 1789 book catalogue). Jefferson dismissed the 
feebleness of social ties within Native American societies, 
bearing his own direct testimony to the contrary. «The Indian of 
North America being more within our reach, I can speak of him 
somewhat from my own knowledge, but more from the 
information of others better acquainted with him, and on whose 
truth and judgment I can rely. From these sources I am able to 
say, in contradiction to this representation [provided by Buffon], 
that he is neither more defective in ardour, nor more impotent 
with female, than the white reduced to the same diet and 
exercise […]; that he is affectionate to his children, carful of 
them, and indulgent in the extreme; that his affections 
comprehend his other connexions, weakening, as with us, from 
                                                
127 On Jefferson’s consideration of American Indian politial theories see 
Donald A. GRINDE Jr., Thomas Jefferson’s Dualistic Perceptions of Native 
Americans, in Thomas Jefferson and the Education of a Citizen, edited by 
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circle to circle, as they recede from the centre; that his 
friendship are strong and faithful to the uttermost extremity 
[…]» (128). The societies thus established by Native Americans 
through these social ties lacked neither organization, nor 
political direction, but rather mechanisms of external 
compulsion and coercive enforcement of positive laws. This 
resulted, as Jefferson highlighted, «from the circumstance of 
their having never submitted themselves to any laws, any 
coercive power, any shadow of government», their «only 
controls» being instead «their manners, and the moral sense of 
right and wrong» (129).  
So, when Jefferson claimed that Native American societies 
existed regardless of any government, what he seems to have 
implied is the absence of coercion, rather than the want of 
agency. An absence which strengthened, if not properly the 
sovereignty, at least the self-government of Native American 
societies and the direct action of Native American men. It is in 
this very specific and limited sense that Jefferson’s claim should 
be read: Native American societies had no government, not 
because they lacked those fundamental features of a body 
politic, summarized by Montesquieu at the opening of L’esprit 
de loix, but because Native American societies were not 
subjected to any external direction and were instead entirely 
self-governed. Hence, they enjoyed «an infinitely greater degree 
of happiness than those who live[d] under European 
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governments» (130), for happiness came to those who put their 
freedom to action in the common pursuit of the public affairs 
determining the destiny of  their society (131).  
This conclusion was strengthened by an even more overt 
refutation of Buffon submitted to Jefferson by Charles Thomson 
for the first English edition of his Notes and published as an 
appendix to the text (132). In his observations, Thomson 
expressly challenged the French naturalist and his claim that 
Native Americans where inherently «averse to society and a 
social life» (133). «Can any thing be more inapplicable than this 
to a people who always live in towns of clans?» he asked. «Or 
can they be said to have no ‘republic’, who conduct all their 
affairs in national councils […]?» (134). These councils, which 
Jefferson would eventually come to consider as the essential 
intermediate bodies of the American federal and decentralized 
form of government (135), were at the heart of Native American 
self-government. «The several towns or families that compose a 
tribe, have a chief who presides over it, and the several tribes 
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composing a nation have a chief who presided over the whole 
nation» (136). «The matters which merely regard the town or 
family are settled by the chief and principle men of the town; 
those which regard a tribe, such as the appointment of head 
warriors or captains, and settling differences between different 
towns and families, are regulated at a meeting or council of the 
chiefs from the several towns; and those which regard the whole 
nation, such as the making war, concluding peace, of forming 
alliances with the neighboring nations, are deliberated on and 
determined in a national council composed of the chief of the 
tribe, attended by the head warriors and a number of the chiefs  
from the towns, who are his counselors» (137).  
Because of these considerations, Jefferson held that Native 
Americans were «evidently in a state of nature» which had 
«passed the association of a single family», but had «not yet 
submitted to the authority of positive laws, or of any 
acknowledged magistrate» (138). Although this was sufficient to 
disprove that monarchy, or paternal government, was in any 
way natural, as had been largely claimed instead by the end of 
the 17th century in the political literature on the divine right of 
kings, and though it allowed Jefferson to maintain that self-
governed republics were the natural, and therefore spontaneous, 
                                                
136 See Charles THOMSON, Commentaries, published in Thomas JEFFERSON, 
Notes on the State of Virginia, cit., p. 202. 
137 Ibid., p. 203. 
138 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Francis W. Gilmer, 7 June 1816, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol. 10, cit., p. 155.   
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form of organization generally assumed by societies (139),  it still 
confirmed that an association resting entirely on personal 
persuasion was fit to become the political regime adopted 
exclusively by relatively small societies (140). «It will be said» 
wrote Jefferson, quite probably referring precisely to 
Montesquieu, «that great societies cannot exist without 
government. The savages therefore break them into small ones» 
(141). 
Once again, as had been the case ever since the discovery of 
America had forced Europe into a comparison with the radically 
other, Native American manners and societies proved to be the 
limit against which European jurisprudence tested its principles 
(142). The comparative effort undertaken by Jefferson in his 
review of the «savages» shared with the similar inquiry pursued 
two centuries earlier by Montaigne «un sentimento complesso» 
in which «l’ansia di percepire una nuova dimensione umana» 
furnished the basis for a reconsideration of received political 
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wisdom (143). But, while Montaigne’s encounter with the 
«savages» of the New World led him to call into question the 
universality of European political assumptions towards natural 
law and the validity of its traditional understanding (144), the 
question of what form of government was best suited for 
progressively larger societies, raised by Jefferson’s reflections 
on Native American manners, brought to the forefront of his 
constitutional inquiry a renewed commitment to the scientific 
relevance of Western jurisprudence and led him to reinterpret 
the lesson of Montesquieu and its own silent adaptation of that 
scholarly tradition, first articulated by Bartolus in his De 
regimine civitatis, on the relationship between the forms of 
government and the extension of societies (145).  
So, the historical discovery of the existence of an entirely 
self-governed political society in the woods of America 
increased for Jefferson the urgency of determining on what 
conditions self-government could be preserved in larger and 
more complex societies: «insomuch that were it made a 
question, whether no law, as among the savage Americans, or 
too much law, as among the civilized Europeans, submits man 
to the greatest evil; one who has seen both conditions of 
existence would pronounce it to be the last: and that the sheep 
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are happier of themselves, than under the care of the wolves» 
(146). 
The form of government that Jefferson believed to be most 
adequate to embody the sovereignty of the American people was 
representative, federal, and decentralized. Its institutional 
architecture was articulated through «a complication of 
councils» (147), described by Jefferson over time and in a variety 
of different writings, which he epitomized in the reflections on 
the ward republics that he committed to his late correspondence 
(148).  
The first of these councils were the representative assemblies 
within each of the federated republics of the union. Contrary to 
the opinion maintained by Montesquieu, Jefferson did not 
believe, that republics were necessarily best suited for small 
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Republics: The Wisest Invention of Self-Government, cit., pp. 264-277; as 
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societies. Within a small population directly involved in 
government, in fact, it would have been unlikely to find any 
third party truly indifferent to the interests at play, capable of 
pursuing the common good despite the urgency of partisan 
interests. On the contrary, in a republic governed by the 
principles of representation, the Founders were largely 
convinced that «the medium of a chosen body of citizens», 
removed from local interests and partisan passions, could 
effectively «refine and enlarge the public views» (149). «I 
suspect that the doctrine that small states alone are fitted to be 
republics», wrote Jefferson to a Genevan correspondent in 1795, 
«will be exploded by experience with some other brilliant 
fallacies accredited by Montesquieu and other political writers. 
Perhaps it will be found that to obtain a just republic (and it is to 
secure our just rights that we resort to government at all) it must 
be so extensive as that local egoisms may never reach it’s [sic] 
greater part, that on every particular question, a majority may be 
found in it’s [sic] councils free from particular interests, and 
giving therefore an uniform prevalence to the principles of 
justice. The smaller the societies, the more violent and more 
convulsive their schisms» (150).  
In a celebrated biography published over sixty years ago, 
Jean Starobinski claimed that Montesquieu had been generally 
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admired in «a silent and unpassionate way» (151). His thought 
had never raised the heated controversies that accompanied the 
reception of Voltaire or Rousseau. The questions it did raise had 
been long settled and later generations had eagerly engraved his 
legacy «into the marble of sculpture and into the metal of 
medals» (152). If this is true, it must be so for generations largely 
uninvolved with Montesquieu and essentially unconcerned with 
his thought because it seems not to apply to the generation of the 
Founding Fathers, which read Montesquieu as the pre-eminent 
authority on public law and passionately questioned his doctrine 
according to its political experience and its broader 
understanding of the Western legal tradition (153). Jefferson’s 
excerpt is a telling example, as it shows how, in this particular 
instance, he challenged Montesquieu’s doctrine and criticized 
him for having forgotten the true nature of sovereignty, which 
Jefferson conceived, in keeping with a longstanding 
jurisprudence, as the ultimate mediatory power, combining 
together the aggregate union of a society and preserving its 
internal complexity, while at the same time arbitrating between 
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the competing interests pursued independently by each of its 
individual parties (154).  
Precisely because of its nature, the exercise of sovereignty 
required to be entrusted to the agency of an organ capable both 
of representing the social complexity and of reconciling its 
enduring plurality into a corporate whole. This was the intrinsic 
merit and the express purpose of representation: «contrary to the 
principle of Montesquieu, it will be seen that the larger the 
extent of country, the firmer its republican structure, if founded, 
not on conquest, but in principles of compact and equality» (155). 
However, representation alone was not sufficient to guarantee 
that the will of each member of society exercised its «just 
influence» over government, since the American society was 
composed by individual citizens as well as federated states. 
Jefferson acknowledged the necessity of granting to both classes 
of subjects due participation in the ordering of society (156). 
Urged by the enactment of controversial legislation, the Alien 
and Sedition Acts, adopted to safeguard the Unites States during 
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the undeclared naval war with France in the last three years of 
the 18th century (157), Jefferson envisioned a particular 
constitutional role for state assemblies vis-à-vis the federation 
(158). In the so-called Kentucky Resolutions, the propositions 
drafted by Jefferson and adopted by the legislative assembly of 
Kentucky in 1798 (159), Jefferson maintained that «whensoever 
the general government assume[d] undelegated powers» each 
state legislature retained the right to declare its acts 
«unauthoritative, void, & of no force» (160). The several states 
composing the federation had not, in fact, «united on the 
principle of unlimited submission to their general government» 
(161). They had rather constituted «by a compact under the style 
and title of a Constitution» a «general government for special 
purposes» and delegated to it «certain definite powers», 
«reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of rights to 
their own self-government» (162). As a consequence, whenever 
«a tyrannical legislative body» moved «beyond constitutional 
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limitations and usurp[ed] the rights of the governed» (163), every 
federated state enjoyed, «in cases not within the compact, casus 
non foederis», a «natural right» to «nullify», of its own 
authority, such illegitimate «assumptions of power» (164).  
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This placed representative assemblies at the heart of 
Jefferson’s federal form of government, as they embodied both 
the complexity within and the associations without individual 
federated states. But Jefferson pushed his inquiry into the 
corporate nature of democratic republics even further and 
articulated an extensive doctrine on the decentralization of 
governmental and administrative power. 
The principle of decentralization had been foreshadowed in 
Jefferson’s Bill on the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, 
which had been presented to the legislative assembly of Virginia 
in 1779 (165). The text prescribed a subdivision of the state’s 
counties into minor administrative bodies, composed by all local 
electors gathered in assembly for the purpose of directly 
overseeing the administration of primary schools. These bodies 
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were called in the Bill, with an unmistakable reference to the 
elementary councils of the Anglo-Saxon polities, «hundreds» 
(166). This reference to the political organization of the Saxons 
was meant to signal Jefferson’s affinity to the constitutional 
tradition of the Germanic people, which had been taken 
precisely by Montesquieu, and before him by Algernon Sidney 
(167), to emphasize the constitutional relevance of intermediate 
bodies within larger political societies (168).  
Late in life, Jefferson rephrased and enlarged his conception 
of administrative decentralization. He began by warning that 
«the way to have good and safe government» was «not to trust it 
all to one», but rather «to divide it among the many, distributing 
to every one exactly the functions he [was] competent to» (169). 
This meant «dividing and subdividing» the general republic into 
the several different corporate bodies composing it, entrusting to 
the federal government «the defence of the nation» and the care 
of its «foreign & federal relations», conferring to the 
governments of each federated state the protection of civil 
rights, the enforcement of laws and the administration of the 
police, assigning to the counties the oversight of local concerns, 
and finally delegating to the elementary administrative bodies, 
now called by Jefferson «wards», the direction of their own 
                                                
166 Ibid., p. 527. 
167 Algernon SIDNEY, Discourses Concerning Government, cit., p. 376-377. 
168 See Anna Maria BATTISTA, La “Germania” di Tacito nella Francia 
illuminista, cit. 
169 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Jospeh C. Cabell, 2 February 1816, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol. 9, September 1915 to 
April 1816, edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al., Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2012, pp. 436-437. 
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internal concerns (170). It was only «by dividing and subdividing 
these republics», Jefferson added, «from the great National one 
down thro’ all it’s [sic] subordinations», by decentralizing the 
national government until it ended «in the administration of 
every man’s farm and affairs by himself», and by «placing 
under every one what his own eye could superintend» that each 
individual citizen could be «elevated to a majestic dignity» and 
see his participation in the exercise of popular sovereignty 
effectively secured (171). 
«Divide the counties into wards of such size as that every 
citizen can attend, when called on, and act in person» he further 
enjoined to a correspondent in 1816 (172). «Ascribe to [the 
citizens] the government of their wards in all things relating to 
themselves exclusively» (173). Hence, the only power delegated 
by the people will concern enterprises «beyond [their] 
competence» and will be ceded, «by a synthetical process», «to 
higher & higher orders of functionaries, so as to trust fewer and 
fewer powers, in proportion as the trustees become more and 
more oligarchical» (174). 
Certainly Jefferson had in mind Montesquieu’s observations 
on the nature of sovereignty and the organization of government 
within a democracy as he wrote to Samuel Kercheval and 
Joseph Cabell in 1816. «Le peuple, qui a la souveraine 
                                                
170 Ibid., p. 437. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Samuel Kercheval, 12 July 1816, cit., p. 225. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Jospeh C. Cabell, 2 February 1816, cit., p. 
437. 
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puissance, doit faire par lui-même tout qu’il peut bien faire; et 
qu’il ne peut pas bien faire, qu’il fasse par sa ministères» (175). 
But who can say that, in reading these observations, Jefferson 
might not have recalled the lesson imparted by Milton? A lesson 
so close to the text and the spirit of his own doctrine on the 
elementary republics of the wards and the gradation of ever 
higher jurisdictions within the compound federal republic, that it 
would almost seem as if Jefferson had adopted Milton, having 
fully internalized his thought, and undertaking its development 
along the lines traced by the literature on federalism at 
Jefferson’s immediate disposal: Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis, 
Pufendorf’s De iure naturae et gentium, Barbeyrac’s 
commentary and translation of both authors, Montesquieu’s own 
remarks in L’esprit des loix to mention but a few of the texts 
that contributed to further the questions addressed by Johannes 
Althusius, the chief  17th century interpreter of popular 
sovereignty and federalism, whose Politica methodice digesta 
was held by the Loganian Library in Philadelphia ever since 
James Logan (1647-1751) had brought with him a copy of the 
text to the New World, as he emigrated there from England in 
1699, but who – at present – does not seem to have directly 
influenced the thought of either Jefferson or the other Founders 
(176). 
                                                
175 Charles-Louis de Secondat de MONTESQUIEU, De l’esprit des loix, cit., p. 
12. 
176 On the federal authorities most directly referenced by the Founders see 
Allison LA CROIX, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 2010. On Althusius and 
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It had been Milton, in fact, who rather than «envisioning the 
state as a household with a single patriarch» had made, in the 
words of Gregory Chaplin, «the single patriarch of every 
household a sovereign» (177). Or, to put it differently, it had been 
                                                                                                     
his readers see Otto von Gierke, Giovanni Althusius e lo sviluppo storico 
delle teorie politiche giunaturaliste, cit.; Thomas O. HUGELIN, Early Modern 
Concepts for a Late Modern World. Althusius on Community and 
Federalism, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, 1999, especially pp. 
109-112 for considerations on Montesquieu (and Madison); Diego 
QUAGLIONI, Quale modernità per la «Politica» di Althusius?, in Quaderni 
fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, vol. 39, 2010, pp. 
631-647; and for a review of the legal and political lexicon of Althusius see 
Francesco INGRAVALLE and Corrado MALANDRINO, (eds.), Il lessico della 
«Politica» di Johannes Althusius. L’arte della simbiosi santa, giusta, 
vantaggiosa e felice, Olschki, Firenze, 2005.To my knowledge, the only 
evidence of a direct familiarity given by one of the Founding Fathers to the 
thought of Althusius is provided by a simple marginal notation inscribed by 
John Adams in his English translation of Condorcet’s Outlines of an 
Historical View of the Progress of the Human Mind, London: J. Johson, 
1795, p. 201.   The text has been digitized and may be read at 
https://archive.org/stream/outlinesofhistor00cond#page/200/mode/2up. 
Adams, as was his custom, annotated the name of Althusius in 
correspondence of the brief passaged dedicated by Condorcet to his thought: 
«Such are the opinions which Althusius and Languet, and afterwards 
Needham and Harrington, boldly professes, and investigated thoroughly». 
The opinions were summarized thusly by Condercet: «Ashamed at seeing the 
people oppressed, in the very faculty of their conscience, by kings, the 
superstitious of political slaves of the priesthood, some generous individuals 
dared at length to investigate the foundations of their power; and they 
revealed this grand truth to the world: that liberty is a blessing which cannot 
be alienated; that no title, no convention in favour of tyranny, can bind a 
nation to a particular family; that magistrates, whatever may be their 
appellation, their functions, or their power, are the agents, not the masters, of 
the people; that the people have the right of withdrawing an authority 
originating in themselves alone, whenever that authority shall be abused, or 
shall cease to be thought useful to the interests of the community; and lastly, 
that they have the right to punish, as well as to cashier their servants», ibid., 
pp. 200-201. No particular reference to federalism was made. 
177 Gregory CHAPLIN, Milton Against Servitude: Classical Friendship, 
Tyranny, and the Law of Nature, in Discourses and Representations of 
Friendship in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700, edited by Daniel T. 
Lochman, Maritere López, and Lorna Hunton, Ashgate, Franham, 2011, p. 
216.  
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Milton who, in 17th century England, had recalled the compound 
nature of political bodies, which, not only were composed 
according to Bodin’s teaching by a plurality of families united 
under a common sovereign power, but partook in that concerted 
gradation of jurisdictions which Milton had certainly read in 
Claude de Seyssel’s La Grande Monarchie de France (178), and, 
in all probability, had also seen described by Dante in the 14th 
chapter of the Monarchia’s first book, a treatise he referenced in 
his Commonplace Book amid considerations on the nature of 
sovereignty and the tyrannical degeneration that ensued 
whenever the separation of spiritual and temporal jurisdictions, 
or the separation between the several temporal jurisdictions, 
became blurred (179).  To prevent governments from 
degenerating into tyrannies, Milton maintained in The Tenure of 
Kings and Magistrates that the power «which is at the root and 
source of all liberty», that is «the power to dispose and 
oeconomize in the Land which God hath giv’n [to the people], 
as Maisters of Family in thir own house and free inheritance» 
had to be preserved against all attempts to eradicate it (180).   
The full implementation of this principle and the 
decentralization of administrative jurisdictions down to the 
                                                
178 Milton expressly referrs to Seyssel in The Tenure, see John MILTON, The 
Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, cit., p. 159. For an introduction to 
Seyssel’s thought see Enzo SCIACCA, Le radici teoriche dell’assolutismo nel 
pensiero politico francese del primo cinquecento (1498-1519), Giuffrè, 
Milano, 1975, pp. 87-156. 
179 See John MILTON, Commonplace Book, in ID., Complete Prose Works of 
John Milton, vol. 1, cit., pp. 438, 475-477. 
180 Milton expressly referrs to Seyssel in The Tenure, see John MILTON, The 
Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, cit., p. 159. 
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individual iurisdictio domestica, Jefferson’s «farm» (181), 
required the establishment of a particular institutional 
arrangement. Within the American states there were regions 
where this institutional arrangement had spontaneously 
established itself, as had happened in New England where local 
townships had become, to quote Tocqueville, «la source des 
pouvoirs sociaux» (182). But, as Jefferson realized very well, 
similar institutions had not arisen everywhere and were absent 
in Virginia and in the other southern states. It thus became 
necessary, in order to truly guarantee to each citizen the same 
participation in the exercise of sovereignty, to establish through 
positive law, what had not established itself autonomously. It 
was this specific realization which led Jefferson to advocate for 
the establishment of the «elementary republics of the wards» 
(183). 
Unlike the townships, which were originally autonomous 
societies, the wards stood exclusively «on the basis of the law» 
and held only «a delegated share of powers» (184). Because of 
this, rather than being a «bottom-up organization», as they have 
been recently described (185), they were presented by Jefferson 
as being the institutional result of an inverse process of 
legislative subdivision of central authority.  
                                                
181 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Jospeh C. Cabell, 2 February 1816, cit., p. 
437. 
182 Alexis de TOCQUEVILLE, De la démocratie en Amerique, cit., p. 60. 
183 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Jospeh C. Cabell, 2 February 1816, cit., p. 
437. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Maurizio VALSANIA, Nature’s Man. Thomas Jefferson’s Philosophical 
Anthropology, cit., p. 64. 
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Hence, two distinct notions of self-government co-existed in 
Jefferson’s constitutionalism. One was original, the other 
derivative. One was natural, the other artificial. And one was 
grounded in the law of nature and nations, while the other was 
established through municipal law. The great merit of this 
distinction was that it allowed the expansion of self-government, 
and permitted autonomy to flourish even where it had not 
spontaneously established itself. Moreover, it ultimately secured 
the decentralization of government, without undermining the 
sovereign unity of the body politic (186). 
Such intermediate bodies had been considered by 
Montesquieu as the essential institutions of a well-regulated 
monarchy. «Les pouvoirs intermédiaires, subordonnés & 
dépendant, constituent la nature du gouvernement monarchique, 
c’est-à-dire, de celui où un seul gouverne par des loix 
fondamentales. J’ai dit les pouvoirs intermédiaires, 
subordonnés, & dépendants: en effet, dans la monarchie, le 
prince est la source de tout pouvoir politique & civil. Ces loix 
fondamentales supposent nécessairement des canaux moyens 
par où coule la puissance: car, s’il n’y a dans l’état que la 
                                                
186 Because of this, sovereignty remained for Jefferson «coextensive with the 
general mechanism of power». And, through the gradation of authority, 
sovereignty remained also «coextensive with the entire social body». So 
sovereignty remained ultimatly for Jefferson «the theory that goes from 
subject to subject, that establishes the political relationship between subject 
and subject». See Michel FOUCAULT, Society Must be Defended, cit., pp. 35, 
43. Contrary to this Tocquevillian interpretations was Santi Romano, see 
Santi ROMANO, Decentramento amministrativo, in Enciclopedia giuridica 
italiana, vol. 6, part 1, 1897, now published in ID., Scritti minori, vol. 2, 
Diritto amministrativo, edited by Guido Zanobini, Giuffrè, Milano, 1950, p. 
29. 
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volonté momentanée, & capricieuse d’un seul, rien ne peut être 
fixe, & par conséquent aucune loi fondamentale» (187). Jefferson 
maintained that they characterized the distinctive form of 
government by «a complication of councils» that had been 
adopted, to a lesser degree, by the «former regal government» of 
the colonies and, to a larger one, by the «present republican» 
government of the American federation (188). This remarkable 
continuity seems to be explained, not only by Jefferson’s 
persuasion that whatever the form of government sovereignty 
remained with the corporate body of the people, but also by the 
critique of Montesquieu’s distinction between forms of 
government advanced by Destutt de Tracy. It had been Destutt 
de Tracy, in fact, who had shown how Montesquieu had 
arbitrarily ascribed to each form of government principles or 
institutions shared by all (189). But there may be a further and 
deeper explanation for Jefferson’s general appreciation of the 
constitutional importance of intermediate bodies.  
It had been, once again, early modern public law and, in 
particular, Bodin who had insisted on the constitutional role 
intermediate bodies maintained even within a society unified by 
an indivisible sovereign power. This had been one of the most 
vexing questions addressed by Bodin’s doctrine and one on 
which he repeatedly returned at almost every successive edition 
                                                
187 Charles-Louis de Secondat de MONTESQUIEU, De l’esprit des loix, livre 2, 
chapitre 4, cit., p. 20. 
188 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Edmund Randolph, 18 August 1799, cit., p. 
168. 
189 See Antoine-Louis-Claude DESTUTT DE TRACY, Commentaire sur L’esprit 
des lois de Montesquieu, Th. Desoer, Paris, 1822, livre 8, pp. 95-107. 
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of the Republique (190). In Jefferson’s edition of the treatise, the 
question was addressed in the seventh chapter of the third book, 
the only chapter which bears, in Jefferson’s whole copy, pencil 
markings. These markings highlight a selection of passages 
which synthesize Bodin’s persuasion in the constitutional role 
played by intermediate bodies in the prevention of the tyrannical 
degeneration of power. «Donc pour resoudre ceste question, s’il 
est bon d’auoir des estats, colleges & communautés, & si la 
Republique s’en peut passer, on peut dire, à mon aduis, qu’il n’y 
a rien meilleur pour maintenir les estates populaires, & ruïner 
les tyrannies […]» (191). Whether the markings in this chapter of 
the Republique may be Jefferson’s or not, it seems that Jefferson 
shared Bodin’s search for a well-concerted institutional 
arrangement and sought to achieve it by acknowledging the 
derivative nature of the wards’ self-government and the 
constitutional relevance of establishing «a gradation of 
authorities, standing each on the basis of law, holding every one 
                                                
190 See Diego QUAGLIONI, I limiti della sovranità. Il pensiero di Jean Bodin 
nella cultura politica e giuridica dell’età moderna, cit., pp. 81-105. 
191 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la Republique, cit., p. 499. As indicated in 
the preface, this passage is highlighted by a plus sign penciled in the margin 
of the text. Earlier, on p. 495 (and then on the first line of the following p. 
496) this other passage in enclosed by penciled in brackets. «Nous avons dit 
que les hommes par societés & compagnies mutuelles, s’acheminerent aux 
alliances & communautés des estates, corps & colleges, pour composer en fin 
les Republiques que nous voyons: qui n’ont point de fondament plus seur 
apres Dieu, que l’amitié & bienueuillance des uns envers les autres: laquelle 
amitié ne se peut maintenir que par alliances, societés estats, communautés, 
confraires, corps & colleges».  It is certainly rather tempting to imagine 
Tocqueville remembering these words, while insisting on the fundamental 
importance of associations in the American polity. Is it to daring to imagine 
Jefferson having them in mind as well, as he repeatedly dismissed the 
Hobbesian assumption of man’s natural hostility to his fellow men? 
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its delegated share of powers, and constituting truly a system of 
fundamental balances and checks on the government» (192). 
«Where every man is a sharer in the direction of his ward-
republic, or of some of the higher ones», Jefferson further 
observed, «and feels that he is a participator in the government 
of affairs not merely at an election, one day in the year, but 
every day; when there shall not be a man in the state who will 
not be a member of some one of it’s [sic] councils, great or 
small, he will let the heart be torn out of his body sooner than 
his power be wrested from him by a Caesar of a Bonaparte» 
(193).  
Once again, it had been Bodin who had taken Caesar to be an 
examples of the tyrant’s typical aversion towards intermediate 
bodies. He described Caesar’s effort to dissolve them in a 
dramatic passage that lead to one of the highlighted paragraphs 
in Jefferson’s copy of the Republique. «Neantmoins Claude le 
Tribun, pour maintenir le people en contrecarre de la noblesse, à 
laquelle il renoncea, & se faisant adopter par un homme roturier, 
pour ester Tribun, restitua tous les colleges & confrairies, & les 
augmenta: mais si tost que Cesar fut Dictateur, il les abolit pou 
maintenir sa puissance, & ravaller celle du people: Depuis 
Auguste ayant assure son estat, les remit par edict expres: & 
                                                
192 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Jospeh C. Cabell, 2 February 1816, cit., p. 
437. On the importance of a well-concerted institutional arrangement in 
Bodin see See Diego QUAGLIONI, La sovranità, cit., pp. 53-56. 
193 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Jospeh C. Cabell, 2 February 1816, cit., p. 
437.  
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Neron le tyran les supprima; & tousiours les tyrans ont eu en 
haine les estates, corps & communautés des peoples […]» (194). 
The constitutional relevance of these bodies, which allowed 
all individual citizens to enter into the public space of the 
commonwealth  and take part in its deliberations, was further 
heightened by Jefferson’s firm conviction that every 
government degenerated «when trusted to the rulers of the 
people alone» (195). Whenever public awareness diminished and 
attention to public affairs lessened, than «you and I», Jefferson 
claimed, «and Congress, and Assemblies, judges and governors 
shall all become wolves» (196). Despotism, as Jefferson came to 
understand the absolute centralization of power, was a form of 
government in which the acquiescent passiveness of the 
                                                
194 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la republique, cit., p. 500. Two other 
passages are enclosed by brackets in the same chapter. The first occurs on p. 
502. «I’ay dit que la mediocrité, qui est louable en toutes choses, se doit aussi 
garder és estats Aristocratiques, & iustes Royautés, pour le regard des corps 
& colleges: car d’oster tous les corps & communautés, c’est ruïner un estat, 
& en faire une barbare tyrannie: aussi est il dangereux de permettre toutes 
assemblees & toutes confrairies: car bien souvent on y couve des 
coniurations, ou des monopoles: nous en auons trop d’exemples: qui a esté la 
cause d’oster plusieurs fois les confrairies par edict expres, qui toutesfois 
n’ont iamais peu ester executés: il vaut beaucoup  mieux arracher les abus, 
comme les mauvaises herbes, que d’arracher les bonnes & mauvaises tout 
ensembleles les bonnes & mauuaises tout ensemble». The second, on the 
following p. 503, the last one in the chapter. «Or tout ainsi qu’il n’y a rien 
meilleur pour la force & union des subiects que les corps & communautés, 
aussi n’y a il rien plus expedient pour asseruir les ennemis vaincus, que leur 
oster premierement les corps & colleges, comme tresbien pratiquerent les 
Rommaines apres auoir vaincu les Rois de Macedonie: & depuis encores les 
Acheans assubiectis, le consul Mummius concilia omnia singularum 
Achatiae nationum, & Phocensium, ac Boetorum, aut in alia parte Graecia 
delenit. Puis apres les auoir rendus bons subiects & obeïssans, il est dit, 
antiqua concilia genti cuique restituta». 
195 Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, cit., p. 148. 
196 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Edward Carrington, 16 January 1787, cit., 
p. 48. 
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citizenry extinguished all passion for independence and subdued 
its spirit of resistance, allowing the ruler to monopolize «the 
right of action», banish his subjects «from the public realm», 
confine them «into the privacy of their households, and 
demanded of them that they mind their own, private business» 
(197).  
Once the demise of all challenges to centralism perfected 
itself, then the particular happiness experienced by each citizen 
of a republic in the collective determination of society’s 
common destiny could no longer be pursued. But as long as the 
people retained the clear awareness of their sovereignty, than 
even a «despot» would have been forced to govern them 
according to their republican spirit (198). And although this 
particular form of republican government had «its evils too», the 
principle being «the turbulence» to which it was subjected (199), 
Jefferson stressed, by quoting a passage from Sallust he had 
read in all likelihood in Rousseau’s Contrat social, «Malo 
periculosam libertatem quam quietam servitutem» (200). 
Thus, Jefferson fully understood the relational nature of 
power and the threat posed by «l’affermazione di un potere 
assoluto di tipo nuovo, perché realmente unico, indivisibile, e 
non limitato da altro che dalla propria volontà di imporre a se 
                                                
197 Hannah ARENDT, On Revolution, cit., p. 130. 
198 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Samuel Kercheval, 12 July 1816, cit., p. 223: 
«Where then is our republicanism to the found? Not in our constitution 
certainly, but merely in the spirit of our people. That would oblige even a 
despot to govern us republicanly».  
199 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to James Madison, 30 January 1787, cit., p. 92. 
200 Ibid. See Jean-Jacques ROUSSEAU, Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du 
droit politique, cit., p. 405. 
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stesso dei limiti costituzionali» (201). This power had arisen once 
the French Revolution realized Rousseau’s desire to see all 
intermediate bodies liquidated. While the warning against all 
forms of authority which pretended to subject individuals and 
uniform them under  an equalizing power would not be fully 
articulated until the publication of Tocqueville’s second 
Democratie in Amerique in 1840, the intuition of this danger 
seems to have been already alive in Jefferson’s awareness that 
«what [had] destroyed liberty and the rights of man in every 
government which [had] ever existed under the sun» had been 
«the generalising & concentrating all cares and powers into one 
body» (202), since – as Montesquieu had warned back in L’esprit 
des loix – «Les hommes sont tous égaux dans le gouvernement 
républicain; ils sont égaux dans le gouvernement despotique: 
dans le premier, c’est parce qu’ils sont tout; dans le second, 
c’est parce qu’ils ne sont rien» (203).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
201 Diego QUAGLIONI, La sovranità, cit., p. 86. 
202 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Joseph C. Cabell, 2 February 1816, cit., p. 
437. 
203 Charles-Louis de Secondat de MONTESQUIEU, De l’esprit des loix, cit., 
livre 6, chapitre 2, p. 101. 
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THE FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 
 
 
3. The religious foundation of jurisprudence  
It has been suggested in the scholarly literature that the 
religious pilgrimage undertaken by Jefferson in his lifetime led 
him to his most intimate and intense inquiry into the moral and 
theological premises of social bonds and political action (1). 
This suggestion, which has been recently recalled in the latest 
contributions on Jefferson’s commitment to the principle of 
religious freedom (2), was first advanced over thirty years ago 
by Eugene Sheridan, in his introduction to the volume dedicated 
by The Papers of Thomas Jefferson to the publication of the two 
edited versions of the Gospels that Jefferson prepared late in life 
for his political meditation and spiritual edification: The 
Philosophy of Jesus, which he compiled in 1803, and The Life 
                                                
1 The expression is borrowed from Paul K. CONKIN, The Religious 
Pilgrimage of Thomas Jefferson, in Jeffersonian Legacies, cit., pp. 19-49. 
2 See Annette GORDON-REED and Peter S. ONUF, «The Most Blessed of 
Patriarchs». Thomas Jefferson and the Empire of Imagination, cit., pp. 267-
299; John RAGOSA, Religious Freedom. Jefferson’s Legacy, America’s 
Creed, University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville and London, 2013; 
Daniel L. DREISBACH, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation between 
Church and State, New York University Press, New York and London, 2002. 
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and Morals of Jesus, which he began in 1819 and completed in 
all probability by the summer of the following year (3).  
In compiling these works, Sheridan claimed that Jefferson 
was responding to a problem «that was of deep concern to him: 
how to guarantee the perpetuation of republican government in 
the United States at a time when, as it seemed to him, political 
factionalism and social disharmony were threatening to 
undermine its basic foundations» (4). «Jefferson’s solution to 
this problem», Sheridan continued, «was an effort to foster the 
social harmony that he considered essential for the survival of 
America’s republican experiment by formulating a moralistic 
version of Christianity on which all men of good will could 
agree» (5). 
Despite overlooking Jefferson’s engagement with the age-old 
effort to repair the moral and theological premises of law that 
had been shaken by the 16th century Wars of Religion (6), 
Sheridan’s interpretation had the great merit of acknowledging 
                                                
3 See Eugene R. SHERIDAN, Introduction, in Thomas JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s 
Extracts from the Gospels, «The Philosophy of Jesus» and «The Life and 
Morals of Jesus», edited by Dickinson W. Adams et al., Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1983, pp. 3-42. 
4 Ibid., p. 13. An even more open acknowledgment of the religious premises 
of Jefferson’s constitutionalism is in Eugene R. SHERIDAN, Liberty and 
Virtue: Religion and Republicanism in Jeffersonian Thought, in Thomas 
Jefferson and the Education of a Citizen, edited by James Gilreath, cit., pp. 
242-263. 
5 Ibid., p. 13. 
6 See Anna Maria BATTISTA, Alle oringini del pensiero libertino. Montaigne 
e Charron, cit., pp. 191-216. More recently, Italo BIROCCHI, Alla ricerca 
dell’ordine. Fonti e cultura giuridica nell’età moderna, Giappichelli, Torino, 
2002, pp. 159-180. The English reader may turn to Charles S. EDWARDS, 
Hugo Grotius: the Miracle of Hollande. A Study of Political and Legal 
Thought, Nelson Hall, Chicago, 1981. 
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Jefferson’s firm conviction in the necessity of assuming a 
common system of moral beliefs, concerning primarily the 
exercise of religious freedom, as the foundation of the American 
republic (7).  
Jefferson’s earliest pursuit of religious questions appears to 
have occurred sometime around 1765 (8), when he began to 
transcribe, in one of the commonplace books he kept as a young 
man, several passages on the nature of Christianity extracted 
from the Philosophical Works of Henry Saint-John, Viscount 
Bolingbroke (1678-1751) (9). The passages he extracted, and 
committed to this personal digest of moral authorities, re-
meditated the 17th century lessons of Hugo Grotius and John 
Locke (10). Their progressive naturalization of religion had been 
equally distinguished by the rejection of dogmatism and the 
                                                
7 The notion of belief systems is central in the historiography of Harold 
Berman, see Harold J. BERMAN, The Historical Foundation of Law, in Emory 
Law Journal, vol. 54, 2005, pp. 13-24.  
8 See Eugene R. SHERIDAN, Introduction, cit., p. 5. 
9 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s Literary Commonplace Book, edited by 
Douglas L. Wilson, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, pp. 24-55, 
155-157. As Wilson argues in his introduction, it would appear that Jefferson 
started keeping this commonplace book around 1758, at the time when he 
began his classical studies under Rev. James Maury. He kept up the practice 
in his later years as a college student and during the time he spent reading 
law under George Wythe. But, by the time Jefferson got married in 1772 and 
began his political career one year after, his habit of commonplacing moral 
authorities came to an end. See Douglas L. WILSON, Introduction, in Thomas 
JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s Literary Commonplace Book, cit., p. 4. 
10 For a preliminary review of Bolingbroke’s use of Grotius see Isaac 
KRAMNICK, Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age 
of Walpole, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1968, pp. 87-89. 
The naturalization of religious doctrines in Grotius and his complex relation 
to Antitrinitarian confessions is addressed in Henk NELLEN, Hugo Grotius. A 
Lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church and State, 1583-1645, Brill, Leiden 
and Boston, 2014, especially pp. 422-437, 529-535. 
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support for religious freedom (11). Moreover it had prepared the 
advent of what the 18th century came to call the natural religion 
(12): a theistic profession of belief that retained, in the history of 
its own conception, the legacy of those several denominations 
that had challenged, to a greater or lesser degree, in the 
aftermath of the Protestant Reformation, the Trinitarian dogma 
and had called for a simplification of the articles of faith, that 
had allowed them, according to the pioneering work of 
Francesco Ruffini, to be among the first, and certainly among 
the most steadfast, defenders of the freedom each person 
enjoyed within the forum of conscience from all forms of 
external compulsion (13). Thus, early modern Antitrinitarianism 
was at the root of Jefferson’s religious persuasion. 
Through Bolingbroke, Jefferson first came to share with early 
Antitrinitarianism a strong skepticism towards the historicity of 
biblical accounts (14). It was Bolingbroke who taught him to 
                                                
11 The progressive naturalization of religion that developed in the 17th century 
and prepared the later advent of a so-called natural religion is discussed in 
Pietro PIOVANI, Linee di una filosofia del diritto, in ID., Per una filosofia 
della morale, Bompiani, Milano, 2010, p. 744. 
12 See Harold J. BERMAN, The Impact of Enlightenment on American 
Constitutional Law, in Yale Journal of Law and Humanities, vol. 4, n. 2, 
1992, pp. 311-334. 
13 See Francesco RUFFINI, La libertà religiosa. vol. 1, Storia dell’idea, 
Fratelli Bocca Editori, Torino, 1901, see especially pp. 68-98 on 
Socinianism; pp. 107-108 on Grotius and the relations between Socinianism 
and Dutch Arminianism, as well as pp. 110-122 on Locke. Among the 
several authors considered by Ruffini, there is also Jefferson, see pp. 336-
339. No second volume was ever published. On Ruffini see Diego 
QUAGLIONI, «A ciascuno il suo»: libertà religiosa e sovranità in Francesco 
Ruffini, in Pólemos, vol. 2007, n. 2, 2007, pp. 33-43. 
14 See Douglas L. WILSON, Register of Authors, Henry Saint-John, Viscout 
Bolignbroke, in Thomas JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s Literary Commonplace 
Book, cit., pp. 155-157. The critical inquiry into Scriptural text that 
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summon the authority of Scripture to the tribunal of his own 
conscience and compare «the various and contradictory 
testimonies» it offered, «balancing the degrees of probability 
that resulted from them», with no less rigor than the one 
demanded in ordinary «judicature» (15).  
Jefferson kept this lesson at heart, repeated it to the young 
men he mentored, and acted according to it late in life, when he 
began selecting passages from the Gospels and compiling them 
together to present a purely historical account of the life of 
Jesus, along with an unadulterated testimony of his teachings, 
freed from the errors of the Evangelists, as well as the 
mystifying subtleties of theological dogmatism (16). As he wrote 
                                                                                                     
flourished amongst Antitrinitarias, especially of Italian origin, see Francesco 
RUFFINI, La libertà religiosa, cit., p. 71. 
15 Henry Saint-John, Viscount BOLINGBROKE, Philosophical Works, essay n. 
4, section 2, quoted in Thomas JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s Literary 
Commonplace Book, cit., entry 23, p. 33; entry 25, p. 34.  
16 The editions of the New Testament that Jefferson used to compile his 
extracts were first accounted for in Edgar J. GOODSPEED, Thomas Jefferson 
and the Bible, in The Harvard Theological Review, vol. 40, n. 1, 1947, pp. 
71-76. A further account was later given in Eugene R. SHERIDAN, 
Introduction, cit., pp. 27, 30-31. Although Jefferson possessed some of the 
finest editions of the Gospels, including those edited by Erasmus, Montanus 
and de Bézè (see Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library 
of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, cit., pp. 93-94, 100, 101) he seems to have been 
rather disinterested in obtaining particular editions for his compilations. In 
the case of The Philosophy of Jesus he availed himself of an English edition 
of the King James Bible, published in Dublin by George Grierson in 1791. 
Whereas, in the case of The Life and Morals of Jesus, Jefferson placed in 
parallel columns extracts from Greek, Latin, French, and English verions of 
the Gospels. The Greek and Latin edition he used was published in London 
by Wingrave in 1794 and reproduced respectively the Greek text as edited by 
Johannes Leusden (first published in Utrecht in 1675) and the celebrated 
Latin text prepared by Benedictus Arias Montanus. The French was taken 
from the edition prepared by Jean Frédéric Ostervald and published in Paris 
by J. Smith in 1802, while the English came from an edition of the New 
Testament printed in Philadelphia by Jacob Johnson in 1804. 
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to James Fishback in 1809, «[r]eading, reflection and time have 
convinced me that the interests of society require the 
observation of those moral precepts only in which all religions 
agree», leaving aside instead «those particular dogmas in which 
all religions differ» and which are «totally unconnected with 
morality» (17).  
Men, who like Jefferson, lived in the aftermath of 
«un’esperienza di ripensamento critico radicale dei principi-base 
della propria tradizione di pensiero» dedicated themselves to 
politics in the broader effort to repair «il complesso dei 
convincimenti collettivi» that substantiated the moral and 
religious unity of a people (18). This had been similarly the case 
of Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744), who in his Préface to the 
French translation of Pufendorf’s De iure naturae et gentium, a 
text well known to Jefferson (19), had claimed that «les principes 
foundamentaux de la Religion Naturelle, qui doit être la base de 
toutes les Religions, son le plus ferme, ou plutôt l’unique 
fondement de la Science des Mœurs» (20).  
                                                
17 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to James Fishback, 27 September 1809, in ID., 
Jefferson’s Extracts from the Gospels, «The Philosophy of Jesus» and «The 
Life and Morals of Jesus», cit., p. 343. 
18 Anna Maria BATTISTA, Nuove riflessioni su «Montaigne politico», cit., p. 
826. 
19 See Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. 2, cit., p. 69. 
20 Jean BARBEYRAC, Préface du traducteur, in Samuel PUFENDORF, Le droit 
de la nature et des gens, ou Systeme general des principes le plus importans 
de la morale, de la jurisprudence, et de la politique, traduit du Latin par 
Jean Barbeyrac, vol. 1, a Londres: Chez Jean Nours, 1740, p. XL, Thomas 
Jefferson Collection, Rare Books and Special Collections Division of the 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. The quoted passage proceeds thusly: 
«Sans la Divinité, on ne voit rien qui impose une nécessité indispensable 
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In its essence, this understanding of religion as the 
naturalized foundation of morality and jurisprudence was 
largely influenced by to the works of Hugo Grotius, whom 
Jefferson considered to be, along with Erasmus, an 
Antitrinitarian and, in particular an Arian (21). The Prolegomena 
                                                                                                     
d’agir ou de ne pas agir d’une certaine manière. Les idées d’ordre, de 
convenance, de conformité avec la Raison, ont sans doute quelque réalité; 
elles son fondées sur la nature des choses, sur certaines relations très-
véritables: ceux-là mêmes qui ne les développent pas distinctement & dans 
toute leur étendue, en ont un sentiment confus, nos Esprits son faits de telle 
manière, qu’ils ne peuvent qu’y acquiesce dès qu’on les leur propose; c’est 
ainsi que l’Honnête a fait de tout temps impression sur les Hommes, parmi 
les Nations tant soit peu civilisées; j’en conviens. Mas pour donner à ces 
idées toute la force qu’elles peuvent avoir, pour les rendre capables de tenir 
bon contre les passions & l’intérêt particulier, pour établir le Devoir, 
proprement ainsi nommé, qui mette un frein à nos Volontez, & qui les lie de 
maniere qu’il ne soit pas en notre disposition de nous dégager quand il nous 
plaira; il faut un Etre Supérieur, un Etre plus puissant que nous, qui ait droit 
manifestement de nous assujettir, & qui nous assujettisse actuellement à 
régler notre conduit sur les lumieres de notre propre Raison».  
21 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on Heresy, in The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 554: «Arians. [Christian] heretics. They avow there 
was a time when the Son was not, that he was created in time, mutable in 
nature, & like the Angels liable to sin. They deny the three persons in the 
trinity to be of the same essence. Erasmus & Grotius were Arians». This 
proximity of Grotius to Erasmus has been recalled, among others, by Hugh 
Trevor-Roper who has insisted that, like Erasmus, Grotius «deplored the 
schism of the Church and thought that it could be healed if exact scholarship 
were used to extract the true meaning, and thus show the essential rationality, 
of Christian doctrine – what Erasmus had called philosophia Christi», see 
Hugh TREVOR-ROPER, Hugo Grotius and England, in ID., From Counter-
Reformation to Glorious Revolution, The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1992, p. 48. In this same essay, Trevor-Roper then went on to 
illustrate how the Erasmian program had been resumed in France, where, «in 
the circle of Jacques-Auguste de Thou, the architect of the Edict of Nantes, 
the great historian of his age, and one of the central figures in the European 
Republic of Letters, Huguenots and Catholics conceived the idea of a 
reunion, within their country, of the two religions, so recently at war, and 
dared to cite the officially forbidden name of Erasmus», ibid., p. 49. Not only 
did de Thou welcome Grotius in his circle, but his Historia eventually found 
its way among the works held in Jefferson’s library.  See Emily Millicent 
SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p. 
73. On the religious views held by Erasmus see the classic Johan HUIZINGA, 
223 
 
to his De iure belli ac pacis (22), as well as the first three 
chapters of his De veritate religionis Chistianae (23), were a 
reaction to the relativism that had unhinged law from a fixed 
principle of justice, intelligible to men and recognized by 
nations (24). Once Christianity had turned against itself and 
devastating wars had obliterated the religious foundation that for 
centuries had guaranteed political obligations (25), the 
restoration of a universal foundation of law required the 
capacity to look beyond «alla mutevolezza e alla parzialità delle 
religioni storiche» and to see in the common tenets of 
Christianity «una religione divino-naturale» that articulated 
itself through laws both divine and natural, capable of 
transcending and unifying the inevitable relativity of human 
norms (26). This aspiration towards a natural-divine religion had 
                                                                                                     
Erasmus and the Age of Reformation, Harper & Row, New York, 1957, re-
issued by Dover, Mineola, 2001, pp. 109-116. 
22 See Franco TODESCAN, Le radici teologiche del giusnaturalismo laico, vol. 
1, Il problema della secolarizzazione nel pensiero giuridico di Ugo Grozio, 
Giuffè, Milano, 1983; Paolo PRODI, Una storia della giustizia, cit., p. 359-
363. 
23 See Jan-Paul HEERING, Hugo Grotius as Apologist for the Christian 
Religion. A Study of his Work De Veritate Religionis Christianae (1640), 
Brill, Leiden and London, 2014. See also Henk NELLEN, Hugo Grotius. A 
Lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church and State, 1583-1645, Brill, Leiden 
and Boston, 2014, especially pp. 422-437. 
24 Grotius wrote his De iure belli ac pacis «pro iustitia», as he declared in the 
dedication of the treatise to Luis XIII. See Diego QUAGLIONI, La giustizia nel 
Medioevo e nella prima età moderna, cit., pp.136-137.   
25 See Anna Maria BATTISTA, Nuove riflessioni su Montaigne politico, cit., p. 
803.  
26 See Diego QUAGLIONI, «Sans violence ny peine quelconque au port de 
salut», Il problema della libertà di coscienza nella «République» di Jean 
Bodin, in La formazione storica della alterità. Studi di storia della tolleranza 
nell’età moderna offerti a Antonio Rotondò, vol. 1, Secolo XVI, Olschki, 
Firenze, 2001, pp. 361-373, now re-published in ID. Machiavelli e la lingua 
della giurisprudenza. Una letteratura della crisi, cit., p. 170. 
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been cherished since the 16th century and animated the thought 
of Bodin, for whom «il pensiero religioso e quello politico» 
converged in «un’aspirazione ad un’eurotimia istituzionale in 
cui l’ordine cosmico si traduce in un ordine politico», a view he 
certainly articulated in the Republique, but expanded with even 
greater intensity in his last and highest achievement, the 
Colloquium Heptaplomeres (27). Grotius was indeed familiar 
with Bodin and had the opportunity to read his Colloquium 
during his French exile, when a copy of it was lent to him by 
Jean des Cordes (28). Jefferson, who possessed a copy of the 
English translation of the De veritate prepared by Simon 
Patrick, could read in the preface written by Patrick himself that 
the treatise of Grotius was deserving of praise, although some 
had criticized it for it had not «answered a Book of Bodin’s, 
which seemed to impugn it» (29). To which, Grotius reportedly 
replied, with an observation that was not immune from a certain 
impression of Nicodemism, that «whatsoever» seemed «to shake 
the foundations» he had laid, and «upon which the Christian 
Faith relie[d]», he had «already obviated» to it, «as far as [was] 
necessary to perswade a Reader that [was] not pertinacious» (30). 
Grotius appeared, in other words, to have been consciously 
                                                
27 See ibid., p. 165.  
28 See Henk NELLEN, Hugo Grotius. A Lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church 
and State, 1583-1645, cit., p. 362. 
29 Simon PATRICK, A Preface Giving Some Account of the Author and of the 
Work, in Hugo GROTIUS, The Truth of the Christian Religion, Translated into 
English with the Addition of a Seventh Book Against the Present Roman 
Church, London: Printed by J. L. for Luke Meredith, 1694, Thomas Jefferson 
Collection, Rare Books and Special Collections Division of the Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. No page number are printed for the Preface. 
30 Ibid. 
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claiming that through his scholarship a new foundation had been 
established for law, one that ultimately gave rise to a new school 
of thought to which Pufendorf and Barbeyrac, Hutchinson and 
Kames, Bolingbroke and later Jefferson were all bred.  
This Grotian school held «una concezione “religiosa” della 
giustizia e del diritto», not simply because it maintained «l’idea 
della sacralità o inviolablità dei princìpi giuridici fondamentali», 
but because it claimed that these principles where treasured by 
the religio, «il deposito di quella razionalità comune» inherent 
in each men’s conscience, that established «la giustizia del 
diritto civile», by reviewing, before the tribunal of conscience, 
the conformity of human norms to the higher laws of justice (31). 
In this sense, the religio was considered throughout the “Grotian 
moment” of the Western legal tradition as the foundation of 
jurisprudence (32), and Jefferson consistently placed «Religion» 
as the opening chapter of the section dedicated, in the 1783 
library catalogue, to his books on «Jurisprudence» (33).  
More broadly, the indirect presence of Grotius in Jefferson’s 
earlier Literary Commonplace Book is apparent in several 
entries extracted from Bolingbroke. The most transparent 
reference occurs in entry thirty-six. «I say that the law of nature 
                                                
31 Diego QUAGLIONI, La giustizia nel Medioevo e nella prima età moderna, 
cit., p. 29. 
32 I have borrowed the expression from Diego QUAGLIONI, Bodin e il 
“machiavellismo”: «conversiones rerumpublicarum» e diritto di guerra, in 
ID., I limiti della sovranità. Il pensiero di Jean Bodin nella cultura politica e 
giuridica dell’età moderna, cit., p. 139. 
33 See Douglas L. WILSON, Jefferson’s Books, Monticello Monograph Series, 
1996, pp. 42-43. 
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is the law of god» transcribed Jefferson approvingly (34). «Of 
this I have the same demonstrative knowledge that I have of 
god, the all-perfect being. I say that the all perfect being cannot 
contradict himself […]. [of] all this I have as certain, as 
intuitive, knowledge, as I have that two and two are equal to 
four, or that the whole is bigger than the part» (35). This 
intuitive, purely abstract, and almost mathematical knowledge 
claimed by Bolingbroke to attest the worldly presence of 
divinity was confirmed, according to Jefferson, by the physical 
experience and observation of divinity at work. A similar 
intuition of «design» drawn by «consummate skill and infinite 
power» arose necessarily in anyone contemplating the 
«movements of the heavenly bodies, so exactly held in their 
course by the balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces», or 
«the structure of earth itself, with it’s [sic] distribution of lands, 
waters and atmosphere, animal and vegetable bodies, examined 
in all their minutest particles, insects mere atoms of life, yet as 
perfectly organized as man or mammoth» (36). While the 
«missionary of supernatural religion», noted Bolingbroke, could 
appeal only «to the testimony of men he never knew, and of 
whom the infidel he labors to convert never heard, for the truth 
of those extraordinary events which prove the revelation he 
                                                
34 Henry Saint-John, Viscount BOLINGBROKE, Philosophical Works, fragment 
n. 21, quoted in Thomas JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s Literary Commonplace 
Book, cit., entry 36, p. 40. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to John Adams, 11 April 1823, in The Adams-
Jefferson Letters. The Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson 
and Abigail and John Adams, edited by Lester J. Cappon, The University of 
North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1956, re-published in 1987, p. 592. 
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preaches», the «missionary of natural religion», he went on, 
could appeal «at all times, and every where, to present and 
immediate evidence, to the testimony of sense and intellect, for 
the truth of those miracles which he [brought] in proof: the 
constitution of the mundane system being in a very proper sense 
an aggregate of miracles» (37). 
In this most crucial passage among those commonplaced by 
Jefferson, Bolingbroke reverted to the notion of miracle to 
distinguish between a supernatural and a natural religion. 
Whereas miracles had been traditionally understood as 
preternatural acts of god subverting, or at least suspending, the 
ordinary course of nature (38), Bolingbroke reversed the notion 
and contended that, instead of being a transgression capable of 
exceptionally suspending the laws of nature, miracles were the 
actual constitution of the worldly order. A constitution so firm 
that it was even «beyo[nd] omnipotence» itself to «cause that, 
which [had] been done, not to have been done» (39).  
In keeping with a long established doctrine consolidated in 
the 13th century by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225- 1274) and 
                                                
37 Henry Saint-John, Viscount BOLINGBROKE, Philosophical Works, essay n. 
4, section 2, quoted in Thomas JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s Literary 
Commonplace Book, cit., entry 26, p. 34. 
38 See the rich discussion on the “miraculous theorem of power” in Kenneth 
PENNINGTON, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600. Sovereignty and Rights in 
the Western Legal Tradition, cit., pp. 54-75.The 20th century totalitarian 
degeneration of this doctrine is well known, see Johan HUIZINGA, In de 
schaduwen van morgen. Een diagnose van het geestelijk lijden van onzen 
tijd, H. D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, Haarlem, 1935, translated into English as 
In the Shadow of Tomorrow, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1936. 
39 Henry Saint-John, Viscount BOLINGBROKE, Philosophical Works, fragment 
n. 68, quoted in Thomas JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s Literary Commonplace 
Book, cit., entry 52 p. 47. 
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implicitly recalled by Grotius as he renovated the foundations of 
modern law (40), Bolingbroke contended that not even god 
himself could undo his own creation and subvert the order 
according to which the world had been established. This would 
have entailed a contradiction within that most perfect of all 
beings, to whom, by definition, life in all its inexhaustible 
fullness had to be and actually was constantly present.  
«Est autem ius naturale adeo immutabile», wrote Gortius in 
the first chapter of his De iure belli ac pacis, «ut ne a Deo 
quidem mutari queat. Quanquam enim immensa est Dei 
potentia, dicit tamen quaedam possunt ad quae se illa non 
extendit, quia quae ita dicuntur, dicuntur tantum, sensum autem 
qui rem exprimat nullum habent; sed sibi ipsis repugnant: Sicut 
ergo ut bis duo non sint quatuor ne a Deo quidem potest effici, 
ita ne hoc quidem, ut quod intrinseca ratione malum est malum 
non sit» (41). 
Although this conception rejected the idea that god could 
subvert the world at will, it implied nonetheless a theological 
basis for each particular system of laws and informed, through 
its authority, both the principles of physical and moral systems. 
Jefferson retained this same persuasion throughout his entire life 
                                                
40 On Grotius’ debt towards Scholasticism see Franco TODESCAN, Le radici 
teologiche del giusnaturalismo laico, vol. 1, cit. especially pp. 43-77; as well 
as Brian TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, 
Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150-1625, Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1997, pp. 
316-342. 
41 Hugo GROTIUS, De iure belli ac pacis libris tres, in quibus ius naturae et 
gentium item iuris publici praecipua explicantur, edited by Bernardina J.A. 
De Kanter-Van Hettinga Tromp, Brill, Leiden, 1993, re-edited by Robert 
Feenstra and Caroline E. Persenaire, Scientia Verlag, Aalen, 1993, pp. 35-36. 
229 
 
and came to conceive god not simply as the «fabricator of all 
things», but as «their preserver and regulator», the spirit who 
maintained beings in their present form and who, by 
regenerating them, propelled them «into new and other forms», 
while remaining, of «necessity», the «superintending power» 
which secured «the Universe in its course and order» (42).  
All this led Jefferson «away from the incomprehensible 
jargon of the Trinitarian arithmetic» and compelled him to 
search for the primitive moral teachings of Jesus Christ, those 
principles of elementary and universal «benevolence» towards 
others that were most consistent with the unchanging laws of 
nature and constituted the common essence of all orderly human 
societies (43). According to Jefferson, in fact, Jesus had not 
                                                
42 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to John Adams, 11 April 1823, cit., p. 592. 
43 See Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Timothy Pickering, 27 February 1821, in 
ID., Jefferson’s Extracts from the Gospels, «The Philosophy of Jesus» and 
«The Life and Morals of Jesus», cit., p. 403. The full passage reads: «No one 
sees with greater pleasure than myself the progress of reason in it’s advances 
towards rational Christianity. when we shall have done away the 
incomprehensible jargon of the Trinitarian arithmetic, that three are one, and 
one is three; when we shall have knocked down the artificial scaffolding, 
reared to mask from view the simple structure of Jesus, when, in short, we 
shall have unlearned every thing which has been taught since his day, and got 
back to the pure and simple doctrines he inculcated, we shall then be truly 
and worthily his disciples: and my opinion is that if nothing had ever been 
added to what flowed purely from his lips, the whole world would at this day 
have been Christian. I know that the case you cite, of Dr Drake, has been a 
common one. the religion-builders have so distorted and deformed the 
doctrines of Jesus, so muffled them in mysticisms, fancies and falsehoods, 
have caricatured them into forms so monstrous and inconceivable, as to 
shock reasonable thinkers, to revolt them against the whole, and drive them 
rashly to pronounce it’s founder an imposter. had there never been a 
Commentator, there never would have been an infidel. in the present advance 
of truth, which we both approve, I do not know that you and I may think 
alike on all points. as the Creator has made no two faces alike, so no two 
minds, and probably no two creeds. we well know that among Unitarians 
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impressed himself onto men for his miraculous subversion of 
natural laws, but rather for the determination of his spiritual 
resistance to the challenges posed by history (44). This was true 
to the point that what distinguished Jefferson’s harmonization of 
the Gospels, in both The Philosophy and The Life and Morals of 
Jesus, was the elision of all passages on miracles (45). This same 
                                                                                                     
themselves there are strong shades of difference, as between Doctors Price 
and Priestley for example. so there may be peculiarities in your creed and in 
mine. they are honestly formed without doubt. I do not wish to trouble the 
world with mine, nor to be troubled for them. these accounts are to be settled 
only with him who made us; and to him we leave it, with charity for all 
others, of whom also he is the only rightful and competent judge», see ibid., 
pp. 402-403. Had there never been a Commentator, there never would have 
been an infidel wrote Jefferson in his attack against the artificial divisions 
brought by dogmatism. Grotius had similarly indicted theology for its 
divisive definition of dogmas and «remarked that theologians would do well 
to follow the examples of lawyers, who as a rule were very well aware of the 
danger of too many definitions […] Omnem in iure definitionem periculosam 
esse tradunt Iuris auctores. De theologicis idem quis merito dixerit, vetus 
enim esse sentantia, ‘de Deo etiam vera dicere periculosum est’», see See 
Jan-Paul HEERING, Hugo Grotius as Apologist for the Christian Religion. A 
Study of his Work De Veritate Religionis Christianae (1640), cit., p. 71 and 
note 32. See also Thomas JEFFERSON., letter to William Short, 4 August 
1820, in ibid., p. 369. 
44 The first of these challenges being the reformation of previous moral 
doctrines. See Thomas JEFFERSON, Syllabus of an Estimate of the Merit of the 
Doctrines of Jesus compared with Those of Others, enclosed in his letter to 
Benjamin Rush, 21 April, 1083, in ID., Jefferson’s Extracts from the Gospels, 
«The Philosophy of Jesus» and «The Life and Morals of Jesus», cit., p. 334: 
«[Jesus’] moral doctrines relating to kindred and friends were more pure and 
perfect, than those of the most correct philosophers, and greatly more so than 
those of the Jews. And they went far beyond both in inculcating universal 
philanthropy, not only to kindred and friends, to neighbors and countrymen, 
but to all mankind, gathering all into one family, under the bonds of love, 
charity, peace, common wants, and common aids. […] The precepts of 
Philosophy, and of the Hebrew code, laid hold of actions only. He pushed his 
scrutiny into the heart of man; erected his tribunal in the region of his 
thoughts, and purified the waters at the fountain head. The taught, 
emphatically, the doctrine of a future state: which was either doubted or 
disbelieved by the Jews: and wielded it with efficacy, as an important 
incentive, supplementary to the other motives to moral conduct». 
45 See See Eugene R. SHERIDAN, Introduction, cit., p. 4-12. 
231 
 
elision had defined, about ten years earlier, the interpretation 
given to Jesus by another eminent reader of Grotius, Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel had composed in 
1795 a work on the life of Jesus, a work he had not published 
and was not presented to the public at large until 1844, when 
Karl Rosencranz described its content in his biography of Hegel, 
insisting on its abstraction from all physical manifestation of 
miracles (46).  
This coincidence between Das Leben Jesu and Jefferson’s 
edited versions of the Gospels could be thought of as unique 
only by reading these works in isolation from the common 
Grotian tradition they interpreted (47). Their closeness does 
reveal an essentially shared understanding of Jesus as the 
                                                
46 See Karl ROSENKRANZ, Hegels Leben, Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin, 1844, 
translated in Italian by Remo Bodei as Vita di Hegel, Bompiani, Milano, 
2012, pp. 171-185, see especially p. 175 on Hegel’s reading of Grotius, and 
p. 181 on Hegel’s abstraction from miracles in Das Leben Jesu. I am unaware 
of any English translation of Rosenkranz’s biography. Hegel’s Das Leben 
Jesu has instead been translated in English, see Georg W.F. HEGEL, Three 
Essays, 1793-1795. The Tübingen Essay, Berne Fragments, and The Life of 
Jesus. edited by Peter Fuss and John Dobbins, University of Notre Dame 
Press, Notre Dame, 1984. 
47 See Henk NELLEN, Hugo Grotius. A Lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church 
and State, 1583-1645, cit., p. 427: «[…] it is important to detect the dawn of 
a new age in De veritate. The miracles of Christ and his Apostles functioned 
as an essential piece of evidence in Grotius’ argument, but by stressing the 
exceptional nature of the New Testament miracles, he underplayed the 
importance of miracles in later ages down to his own day. This was the 
beginning of a tradition that continued down to the Enlightenment». See also 
Karl ROSENKRANZ, Vita di Hegel, cit., pp. 177- 179 for a review of the 
several lives of Jesus that were composed in the late 18th century, along with 
the numerous comparisons of his teachings to the doctrines of ancient 
masters of morality. Jefferson himself sketched one of these comparisons, see 
Thomas JEFFERSON, Syllabus of an Estimate of the Merit of the Doctrines of 
Jesus compared with Those of Others, cit., pp. 332-336. He also prompted 
Joseph Priestly to expand the comparison further, see Eugene R. SHERIDAN, 
Introduction, cit., pp. 20-30. 
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exemplary human embodiment of moral agency (48). To borrow 
the notation Enrico de Negri advanced in his seminal study on 
Hegel’s philosophy, Jesus incarnated, for both Hegel and 
Jefferson, the very possibility of realizing morality «nella vita 
quotidiana dell’uomo» (49), because the actions of his life 
challenged all forms of tyranny over the body and mind of men, 
beginning with the historical tyranny exercised by a pharisaic 
priestcraft that had subjugated man’s conscience to the 
enforcement of its arbitrary and divisive dogmas (50). Thus, the 
example set by Jesus ignited for Hegel and, with shades of 
different color and intensity, for Jefferson as well «quel pathos 
[…] per la Wirklicheit» that turned conscience into action and 
effected the revolution of society by emancipating each 
individual’s religio from the external compulsions of a 
tyrannical jurisdiction (51).  
 
 
 
                                                
48 See Karl ROSENKRANZ, Vita di Hegel, cit., p. 181. 
49 See Enrico DE NEGRI, Interpretazione di Hegel, Sansoni, Firenze, 1969, p. 
15. 
50 For Hegel see ibid., p. 29. As for Jefferson’s hostility to priestcraft and 
pastoral government see Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Elbridge Gerry, 29 
March 1801, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 33, 17 February to 30 
April 1801, edited by Barbara B. Oberg et al., Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2006, pp. 490: «The mild and simple principles of the Christian 
philosophy, would produce too much calm, too much regularity of good, to 
extract from it’s disciples a support for a numerous priesthood, were they not 
to sophisticate it, ramify it, split it into hairs, and twist it’s texts till they 
cover the divine morality of it’s author with mysteries, and require a 
priesthood to explain them». 
51 Remo BODEI, La civetta e la talpa. Sistema ed epoca in Hegel, Il Mulino, 
Bologna, 2014, p. 32. 
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2. The distinction between spiritual and temporal 
jurisdictions 
Jefferson understood that securing religious freedom by 
exempting the individual conscience from outward compulsions 
could be achieved only by limiting the purview of external 
jurisdictions and distinguishing them from the spiritual 
jurisdiction that each individual enjoyed over his own beliefs. 
This realization came early on and animated his effort to 
implement the «free exercise of religion» that had been 
proclaimed in 1776 by the Virginia Declaration of Rights (52).  
The wording chosen by the Declaration to acknowledge this 
particular right had represented in itself a powerful swerve in the 
history of religious freedom.  Whereas the original draft of the 
Declaration had simply called for toleration in matters of 
religious beliefs, qualifying the right to profess a particular 
creed as a concession granted freely by the state, the final 
wording of the Declaration incorporated in its text an 
amendment drafted by James Madison recognizing the equal 
entitlement inherently held by all men to profess their own 
beliefs according to the dictates of their conscience alone. This 
shift from «the language of toleration» to «the language of 
entitlement», recently emphasized by Jack Rakove in an essay 
exploring the authoritative background of Jefferson’s advocacy 
                                                
52 For the drafting history and the text of the Virginia Declaration of Rights 
see The George Mason Papers, edited by Robert A. Rutland, vol. 1, 1725-
1792, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1970, pp. 287-
289. 
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for the separation of church and state, perfected a conception of 
religious rights that had been developing in American societies 
for about a century (53).  
The several 17th and 18th century American declarations of 
rights had, in fact, acknowledged the existence of a higher law, 
inherent in the human condition, binding municipal legislators. 
This law stood, according to a fascinating essay published in 
1895 by Georg Jellinek (1851-1911), over and against positive 
law and compelled states to secure its effectiveness by 
transposing its principles within their legislation. Leading to the 
acknowledgement that «the principle of religious liberty [had] 
acquired constitutional recognition [firstly] in America», 
Jellinek argued that protecting religious liberty required 
«establishing by law a universal right of man» (54). American 
municipal jurisdictions had recognized in their several charters 
the existence of a freedom that transcended their own laws 
because they had been willing to yield to the conviction, arising 
from the great religious and political movement of reformation 
out of which American democracy was coming to light, that 
there existed «a right not conferred upon the citizen» but held by 
each man in scrinio pectoris, and that «acts of conscience and 
                                                
53 Jack RAKOVE, Beyond Locke, Beyond Belief. The Nexus of Free Exercise 
and Separation of Church and State, in Religion, State, and Society. 
Jefferson’s Wall of Separation in Comparative Perspective, edited by Robert 
Fatton, Jr. and R.K. Ramazani, Palgrave, Macmillan, New York, 2009, p. 38. 
54 Georg JELLINEK, Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte. Ein 
Beitrag zur modernen Verfassungsgeschichte, Duncker & Humbolt, Leipzig, 
1895, translated in English as The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
Citizens. A contribution to Modern Constitutional History, edited by Max 
Farrand, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1901, p. 59, 
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expressions of religious convictions» stood «inviolable over 
[and] against the state as the exercise of a higher right» not 
enacted by the state, but rather proclaimed by the Gospel (55). 
This conviction had far-reaching consequences, as it 
increasingly persuaded men like Madison and Jefferson of the 
existence of a realm of human activity removed from the sway 
of external authorities, over which «government could no longer 
be allowed to regulate» (56). The most immediate consequence 
this conviction generated, once the adoption of the Declaration 
of Rights had been finalized, was the wide-spread determination 
with which several parties within Virginia’s society began to 
challenge the establishment of the Anglican church. Since 
before the Revolution, dissenting Presbyterians and Baptist had 
protested against the prosecution of their ministers and had 
petitioned the Virginia assembly to extend to their benefit the 
Parliamentary Act of Toleration of 1689 (57). As these petitions 
increased once the Declaration had been adopted, Jefferson 
resolved himself, «with a fervor that, if itself not religious, at 
least expressed a powerful moral and political commitment», to 
champion the cause of disestablishment (58).  
Serving on the Committee on Religion in his capacity as 
member of the Virginia legislative assembly, Jefferson drafted a 
Resolution for Disestablishing the Church of England and 
                                                
55 Ibid., pp. 74-75.  
56 Jack RAKOVE, Beyond Locke, Beyond Belief. The Nexus of Free Exercise 
and Separation of Church and State, cit., p. 43. 
57 See ibid., p. 39. 
58 Ibid. 
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Repealing Laws Interfering with Freedom of Worship in 
November of 1776 (59). Many of his preparatory works are still 
extant and have been published in The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson along with the characteristically shorthanded Outline 
of Argument that summarized his general doctrine on religious 
freedom (60). As Bernhard Fabian argued back in 1955, in the 
edition of Jefferson’s Outline he prepared by expanding its 
original abbreviations and inserting the missing words that had 
left out from the notes, the thoughts condensed in this working 
paper were meant by Jefferson to be shared with fellow 
committee members in support for the Resolution on 
disestablishment and, once this Resolution failed to win a 
majority of the vote in the Virginia legislature, they informed 
Jefferson’s later Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 
drafted in 1779 and ultimately approved in 1786, as well as 
query XVII of Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia, which 
had been written to address the religious mores of the 
commonwealth (61).  
Jefferson began his Outline by reviewing the several English 
Parliamentary and Virginia assembly acts that had criminalized 
                                                
59 Thomas JEFFERSON, Rough Draft of Jefferson’s Resolutions for 
Disestablishing the Church of England and Repealing Laws Interfering with 
Freedom of Worship, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit. pp. 530-
531. 
60 Thomas Jefferson, Outline of Argument, in The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., pp. 535-539. 
61 Bernhard FABIAN, Jefferson’s Notes of Virginia: The Genesis of Query 
XVII. The Different Religions Received into that State?, in The William and 
Mary Quarterly, vol. 12, n. 1, 1955, pp. 124-138.  
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over time particular religious practices and beliefs (62). His 
emphasis fell especially on the repeal of those norms that had 
criminalized heresies. His preparatory works reveal, in fact, an 
acute interest both in the normative definition of heresy and in 
the historical review of the main Christian heresies, which 
Jefferson mostly associated with early Antitrinitarian 
denominations (63). To this end, he had compiled a separate set 
of notes on heresies, on which he relied in drafting his Outline 
(64). By drawing attention to the systematic prosecution of 
heretical movements, Jefferson was determined to prove to his 
colleagues and to the public writ-large that the state itself, in its 
public capacity, had adopted a particular religious creed and had 
consistently reverted to its coercive powers to enforce religious 
                                                
62 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Outline of Argument, in Bernhard FABIAN, 
Jefferson’s Notes of Virginia: The Genesis of Query XVII. The Different 
Religions Received into that State?, cit., p. 126: «Before entering on [the 
subject of] proper redress, [let us] see what is [the] injury [to] the status of 
religious liberty. […]». See also Thomas JEFFERSON, List of Acts of 
Parliament and of Virginia Assembly, 1661-1759, Concerning Religion, in 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., pp. 539-541; as well as ID., 
Notes on Acts of Parliament and of Virginia Assembly Concerning Religion, 
in ibid., pp. 541-544. 
63 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Outline of Argument, cit., p. 126: «Heresy 
<1.El.c.1.> [De] heretic combur[endo]. [The] state has adopted [the] 
Athanasian creed: [the] Arians [are] therefore heretics. Either civil or 
ecclesiastical [authorities may] judge in [cases of] burn[ing], [according to] 
1.H.P.c.405. 2. Arians [were punishable by beign] burnt in El. And Jac. 
Socinians». 
64 Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on Heresy, cit., pp. 553-555. On Jefferson’s 
Antitrinitarianism see especially p. 553: «A heretic is an impugner of 
fundamentals. What are fundamentals? The protestants will say those 
doctrines which are clearly & precisely delivered in the holy scriptures. Dr. 
Waterland would say the Trinity. But how far this character [of being clearly 
delivered] will suit the doctrine of the Trinity I will leave others to determine. 
It is no where expressly declared by any of the earliest fathers, & was never 
affirmed or taught by the church before the council of Nice […]».  
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orthodoxy upon its subjects. Moreover, he identified in the 
«Athanasian creed» – the first explicitly Trinitarian creed of 
Christianity, that had been articulated in the aftermath of the 
Council of Nicaea as an explicit rejection of Arianism (65) – the 
religious profession adopted by the state and thus the standard in 
force of which either «civil or ecclesiastical» authorities had 
been, in his assessment, entitled to judge heretics and condemn, 
in particular, «Arians» and «Socinians» to the stake (66).  
These considerations led Jefferson to ask whether the state 
had a right «to adopt an opinion in matter[s] of religion» (67). 
Jefferson did not so much address this question as it would 
eventually be addressed by Francesco Ruffini in his works on 
religious freedom. He did not, in other words, raise the question 
with the intention of proving that the state, as such, possessed no 
conscience and could not hold therefore any religious belief of 
its own. The personification of statehood had not yet advanced, 
in Jefferson’s time, to the point of suggesting the absurdity 
against which Ruffini would ultimately react (68). In fact, 
Jefferson’s purpose in raising the question had less to do with 
the state’s personhood, than it had to do with its competence, or 
rather with the precise definition of the purview within which its 
                                                
65 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Outline of Argument, in Bernhard FABIAN, 
Jefferson’s Notes of Virginia: The Genesis of Query XVII. The Different 
Religions Received into that State?, cit., p. 126. On the Athanasian creed see 
John N. D. KELLY, The Athanasian Creed, Harper & Row, New York, 1964. 
66 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Outline of Argument, in Bernhard FABIAN, 
Jefferson’s Notes of Virginia: The Genesis of Query XVII. The Different 
Religions Received into that State?, cit., p. 126. 
67 Ibid., p. 128. 
68 See Francesco RUFFINI, Diritti di libertà, Piero Gobetti Editore, Torino, 
1926, re-issued by Edizioni di storia e letteratura, Roma, 2012, pp. 65-85. 
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powers might be legitimately exercised. Jefferson contended 
that states did not possess the right to hold opinions in matters of 
religion not because they lacked a conscience, as they obviously 
did, but because they lacked the necessary jurisdiction over 
spiritual affairs. Such jurisdiction had not been conferred to 
them by individuals entering into political societies, since they 
themselves, who were indeed entitled to exercise the spiritual 
jurisdiction over their own consciences, were not however 
entitled to dispose of it.  
«When men enter society», he noted in his Outline, «[they] 
surrender [as] little as possible. Civil rights [are] all that are 
necessary to civil government. Religious rights [are not 
necessary [to be] surrendered. [The] individual cannot surrender 
[them] – [for he is] answerable to God.  It [there] is [any] 
unalienable right, [it] is religious» (69). 
To corroborate his assertions, Jefferson incorporated in his 
preparatory notes summarized passages from Locke’s Epistola 
de tolerantia (70). In these notes, Jefferson maintained, in 
accordance with Locke, that «the magistrate’s jurisd[iction] 
extend[ed] only to civil rights» (71).  Such jurisdiction could not 
extend any further than civil rights, because magistrates enjoyed 
exclusively the powers that had been conferred to them by the 
people, and the people had not entrusted to civil magistrates 
                                                
69 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Outline of Argument, in Bernhard FABIAN, 
Jefferson’s Notes of Virginia: The Genesis of Query XVII. The Different 
Religions Received into that State?, cit., p. 129. 
70 Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., pp. 544-551. 
71 Ibid., p. 545. 
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«the care of [their] souls» (72). Nor could they have, since 
Jefferson rejected the idea that man could «abandon [the] care of 
his salvation to another» (73). «No man has power to let another 
prescribe his faith» he went on, nor can any man «conform his 
faith to the dictates of another», because the very «life & 
essence of religion consists in the internal persuasion or belief of 
mind» (74). Where Jefferson left off, Locke had carried on and 
specified that it was in the nature of understanding to not be 
compelled by any particular outward force.  
«Cum autem vera et salutifera religio consistit in interna 
animi fide, sine qua nihil apud Deum valet, ea est humani 
intellectus natura, ut nulla vi externa cogi possit» (75).  
This last passage, on which Jefferson, rested his entire 
doctrine, articulated a conception of religious freedom which 
appears to have been strongly, and perhaps even consciously, 
reminiscent of a formula coined by Cassiodorus (c. 485 – c. 
585) to illustrate the conception of religious freedom held by the 
first Antitrinitarian heresy of Christianity, Arianism: religionem 
imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogitur invitus (76). Locke, 
                                                
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 John LOCKE, Epistola de tolerantia, A Letter on Toleration, edited by 
Raymond Klibansky, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968, p. 68. 
76 See Diego QUAGLIONI, «Religio sola est, in qua libertas domicilum 
conlocavit». Coscienza e potere nella prima età moderna, in Religious 
obedience and political resistence in the early modern world. Jews, Christian 
and Islamic philosphers addressing the Bible, Obbedienza religiosa e 
resistenza politica nella prima età moderna. Filosofi ebrei, cristiani e 
islamici di fronte alla Bibbia, edited by Luisa Simonutti, Brepols, Turnhout, 
2014, p. 51. 
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who himself had been influenced by modern currents of 
Antitrinitarianism (77), seems not only to have adopted the same 
understanding of religious freedom underling this formula, but 
to have done so consistently with its main modern interpretation, 
which had been provided by Jean Bodin, another Antitrinitarian, 
in the Republique and later in the Colloquium Heptaplomeres, to 
sustain «la neutralità dello Stato nelle dispute religiose» (78). In 
this perspective, it is not surprising that Jack Rakove retraced 
Locke’s influence on Jefferson’s doctrine to the political 
meditations that had been provoked in the 17th century by the 
revocation of the Edict of Nantes (79), the cornerstone piece of 
legislation that had been enacted to settle the Wars of Religion 
which had torn France and Europe apart a century earlier, as 
Bodin was attempting «la costruction historique et systématique 
d’un pouvoir souverain dégagé de tout lien confessionnel» (80).   
Jefferson reverted to an additional argument to prove the 
untamable freedom of the individual conscience and its 
exemption from the external jurisdiction of civil authorities. 
Regardless of man’s actions, God had not chosen «to propagate 
his religion by temporal [punishments] or civil incapacitation» 
                                                
77 On Locke’s indebtedness to Antitrinitarianism see John MARSHALL, Locke, 
Socinianism, «Socinianism», and Unitarianism, in English Philosophy in the 
Age of Locke, edited by Michael A. Stewart, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000, 
pp. 111-182. 
78 Diego QUAGLIONI, «Religio sola est, in qua libertas domicilum 
conlocavit». Coscienza e potere nella prima età moderna, cit., p. 51. 
79 Jack RAKOVE, Beyond Locke, Beyond Belief. The Nexus of Free Exercise 
and Separation of Church and State, cit., p. 43. 
80 Georg ROELLENBLECK, Jean Bodin et la liberté de conscience, in La 
liberté de conscience (XVIe-XVIIe siècles), edited by Hans R. Guggisberg, 
Frank Lestringant, Jean-Claude Margolin, Droz, Genève, 1991, p. 97. 
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(81). On the contrary, he had chosen «to extend it by it’s [sic] 
influence on reason» (82), thereby allowing that matters of 
religion could be «supra ratione et humanum captum» but never 
«contra rationem sensumque comunem», as would indeed be 
claimed centuries later by Socinian movements and more 
generally by the Antitrinitarians (83). So, if God himself had 
avoided compulsion in matters of religion, how could «fallible 
men» revert to it instead? (84) Jefferson considered compulsion 
to be so foreign to the relationship between God and his people 
that it seemed to him, after having read Bayle’s Dictionnaire 
Hitorique et Critique, that even within the «Jewish theocracy» 
there was still room for religious persuasions, such as the one 
held by the «Sadducees», that contested the very existence and 
dogma of a «future state» of justice and retribution (85). 
                                                
81 Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., p.544 
82 Ibid. 
83 See Francesco RUFFINI, La libertà religiosa. Storia dell’idea, cit., p. 78. 
84 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Outline of Argument, in Bernhard FABIAN, 
Jefferson’s Notes of Virginia: The Genesis of Query XVII. The Different 
Religions Received into that State?, cit., p. 129 
85 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Outline of Argument, in Bernhard FABIAN, 
Jefferson’s Notes of Virginia: The Genesis of Query XVII. The Different 
Religions Received into that State?, cit., p. 129. Jefferson was familiar with 
the debate on the respublica hebraeorum as he owned, among the several 16th 
and 17th century works that debated Jewish republicanism and theocracy, See 
Emily Millicent SOWERBY, (ed.), Catalogue of the Library of Thomas 
Jefferson, vol. III, cit., pp. 60-61. See Lea CAMPOS BORALEVI, Classical 
Foundational Myths of European Republicanism: The Jewish 
Commonwealth, in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, vol. 1. 
Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, edited by 
Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2002, pp. 247-261; as well as ID., Mitzvoth Beneh Noah: il 
diritto noaico nel dibattito seicentesco sulla tolleranza, in La formazione 
storica dell’alterità. Studi di storia della tolleranza nell’età moderna offerti a 
Antonio Rotondò, edited by Henry Méchoulan, Richard H. Popkin, Giuseppe 
243 
 
Compulsion thus stood at odds with the very notion of religious 
freedom. 
Not only did Jefferson maintain that individual consciences 
were removed from civil jurisdictions, he also rejected the 
proposition according to which religion itself would «decline if 
not supported» by civil authorities (86). This was an argument 
that Jefferson drew directly from John Milton and specifically 
from the first of his antiprelatical tracts, Of Reformation in 
England, written in 1641 to counter the establishment of the 
Anglican Church (87).  
Milton’s influence on Jefferson, his specific influence over 
Jefferson’s understanding of the contentious relationship 
between the spiritual and temporal jurisdictions, has been amply 
studied by George Sensabaugh (88). In an essay published back 
                                                                                                     
Ricuperati, and Luisa Simonutti, vol. 2, Secolo XVII, Olschki, Firenze, 2001, 
pp. 473-494. The impact of this doctrine on English political thought has 
been reviewed recently in Eric NELSON, The Hebrew Republic, Jewish 
Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought, cit. On the 
Jewish theocracy see more specifically Martin BUBER, Königtum Gottes, 
Scocken Verlag, Berlin, 1932, translated in Italiana as La regalità di Dio, 
Marietti, Genova, 1989, especially, pp. 168-202. And finally Lea CAMPOS 
BORALEVI and Diego QUAGLIONI, (eds.), Politeia biblica, Olschki, Firenze, 
2002. 
86 See Thomas JEFFERSON, Outline of Argument, in Bernhard FABIAN, 
Jefferson’s Notes of Virginia: The Genesis of Query XVII. The Different 
Religions Received into that State?, cit., p. 129. 
87 See John MILTON, Of Reformation Thouching Church Discipline in 
England: And the Causes that Hitherto Have Hindered It, in ID., Complete 
Prose Works of John Milton, vol. 1, 1624-1642, edited by Don M. Wolfe, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 11953, pp. 514-617. See also, for a 
commentary, John WITTE, Jr., Prophets, Priests, and Kings of Liberty: John 
Milton and the Reformation of Rights and Liberties in England, in Emory 
Law Journal, vol. 57, 2008, pp. 1527-1604.  
88 See George F. SENSABAUGH, Milton in Early America, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1964, re-printed in 2015. 
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in 1955, Sensabaugh claimed that Jefferson’s Outline 
incorporated within its arguments Milton’s historical 
understanding of Christianity’s progressive decay (89). 
According to Milton, «the establishment of Christianity as a 
state religion under Emperor Constantine» (c. 272 – 337) had 
led to the corruption of the primitive Christian Church (90). 
Whereas Christianity had flourished with only minor blemishes 
«during the first three hundred years» of its existence, «once the 
Christian faith» had become «established by law, once it gained 
the support of civil authority, degeneration followed apace» (91). 
According to Milton, it had been Constantine who had 
accelerated the corruption of Christianity by supporting the 
otherwise exclusively spiritual jurisdiction of the Church 
through public action. It had been under his reign that the 
distinction between the two fundamentally polar dimensions of 
power had been undermined (92), to the point that «the temporall 
and spirituall power» had «close[d] in one beliefe» (93).  Not 
only had Constantine «appointed certaine times for Fasts, and 
Feasts», but he also «built stately Churches», and «gave large 
Immunities to the Clergie, great Riches and Promotions to 
Bishops», and moreover «gave and minister’d occasion to bring 
                                                
89 See George F. SENSABAUGH, Jefferson’s Use of Milton in the 
Ecclesiastical Controversies of 1776, in American Literature, vol. 26, n. 4, 
1955, pp. 552-559. 
90 Ibid., p. 558. 
91 Ibid. 
92 On this fundamental polarity between the spiritual and temporal 
jurisdiction see Diego QUAGLIONI, Introduzione, in Dante ALIGHIERI, 
Monarchia, cit., pp. lxxi-lxxix 
93 John MILTON, Of Reformation Thouching Church Discipline in England: 
And the Causes that Hitherto Have Hindered It, cit., pp. 553-554. 
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in a Deluge of Ceremonies» that «set a gloss upon the 
simplicity, and plainesse of Christianity» (94).  Hence, «the 
Prelates both then and ever since coming from mean, and 
Plebeyan Life on a sudden to be Lords of stately Palaces […] 
and Princely attendance, thought the plain and homespun verity 
of Christs Gospell unfit any longer to hold their Lordships 
acquaintance […]» (95). And so «the Church that before by 
insensible degrees welk’t and impair’d, now with large steps 
went downe hill decaying» (96). Nor did Milton allow, as some 
did, «that the times of Constantine were unsettled and that 
therefore the Church needed the strength of temporal authority» 
(97). To these voices, Milton had replied that he did not consider 
«the Church a Vine in this respect», in other words he did not 
believe that «she» could not «subsist without clasping about the 
Elme of worldly strength, and felicity, as if the heavenly City 
could not support it selfe without the props and buttresses of 
secular Authoritie» (98). 
These claims were further sustained by the authority of 
Dante, whom Milton quoted in support of his argument, first by 
                                                
94 Ibid., p. 556. 
95 Ibid., pp. 556-557. 
96 Ibid., p. 557. 
97 George F. SENSABAUGH, Jefferson’s Use of Milton in the Ecclesiastical 
Controversies of 1776, cit., p. 558. 
98 John MILTON, Of Reformation Thouching Church Discipline in England: 
And the Causes that Hitherto Have Hindered It, cit., p. 554. 
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transcribing a much commented upon tercet from the 19th Canto 
of the Inferno (99), 
 
Ahi, Costantin, di quanto mal fu matre,  
non la tua conversion, ma quella dote  
che da te prese il primo ricco patre!  
 
and then by referring to the equally controversial remarks in the 
20th Canto of the Paradiso (100): 
                                                
99 Ibid., p. 558. On Dante’s relation with the Western legal tradition, as well a 
sample commentary on the quotes passages see Claudia DI FONZO, Dante e 
la tradizione giuridica, Carocci, 2016. 
100 Ibid., p. 559. Milton then goes on to quote Petrarch’s 108th sonnet and 
Ariosto’s 34th Canto of the Orlando Furioso, see ibid., pp. 559-560: «[…] it 
may be concluded for a receiv’d opinion even among men professing the 
Romish Faith that Constantine marr’d all in the Curch. Dante in his 19. Canto 
of Inferno hath thus, as I will render it you in English blanck Verse 
Ah Constantine, of how much ill was cause 
Not thy Conversion, but those rich demaines 
That the firt wealthy Pope receiv’d of thee. 
So in his 20. Canto of Paradise hee makes the like complaint, and Petrarch 
seconds him in the same mind in his 108. Sonnet which is wip’t out by the 
Inquisitor in some Editions; speaking of the Roman Antichrist as meerly bred 
up by Constatine. 
Founded in chast and humble Povertie, 
‘Gainst them that rais’d thee dost thou lift thy horn, 
Impudent whoore, where hast thou plac’d thy hope? 
In thy Adulterers, or thy ill got wealth? 
Another Constantine comes not in hast. 
Ariosto of Ferrare after both these in time, but equall in fame, following the 
scope of his Poem in a difficult knot how to restore Orlando his chiefe hero 
to his lost sense, brings Astolfo the English Knight up into the moone, where 
S. John, as he feignes, met him. Cant. 34.  
And to be short, at last his guid him brings 
Into a goodly valley, where he sees 
A mighty masse of things strangely confus’d, 
Things that on earth were lost, or were abus’d. 
And amongst these so abused things listen what hee met withall, under the 
Conduct of the Evangelist. 
Then past hee to a flowery Mountaine greene, 
Which once smelt sweet, now stinks as odiously; 
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L’altro che segue, con le leggi e meco, 
sotto buona intenzion che fé mal frutto, 
per cedere al pastor si fece greco: 
 
ora conosce come il mal dedutto 
dal suo bene operar non li è nocivo, 
avvegna che sia ’l mondo indi distrutto. 
 
These references to Dante appear to be the key necessary to 
unlock Milton’s stance on the relationship between the spiritual 
and temporal jurisdictions. As Milton would later write in his 
Commonplace Book, quoting first Dante’s Monarchia and then 
the 16th Canto of his Purgatorio, not only did «the authority of 
the king […] not depend upon the Pope» (101), but «the 
combining of ecclesiastical and political government», which 
according to Milton occurred whenever «the magistrate  act[ed] 
as minister of the Church and the minister of the Church act[ed] 
as magistrate», was «equally destructive to both religion and the 
State», as had been showed by «Dante, the Tuscan poet» (102): 
 
Soleva Roma, che ’l buon mondo feo, 
due soli aver, che l’una e l’altra strada 
facean vedere, e del mondo e di Deo. 
 
L’un l’altro ha spento; ed è giunta la spada 
col pasturale, e l’un con l’altro insieme 
                                                                                                     
This was that gift (if you the truth will have)  
That Constantine to good Sylvestro gave. 
And this ws a truth well knowne in England before this Poet was borne, as 
our Chaucers Plowman shall tell you by and by upon another occasion». 
101 John Milton, Commonplace Book, in ID., Complete Prose Works of John 
Milton, vol. 1, cit., p. 438. 
102 Ibid., p. 476. 
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per viva forza mal convien che vada; 
 
però che, giunti, l’un l’altro non teme  
[…] 
 
Dì oggimai che la Chiesa di Roma, 
per confondere in sé due reggimenti, 
cade nel fango, e sé brutta e la soma. 
 
Hence, by following Milton, who had rejected the asserted 
superiority of the state’s civil jurisdiction over the spiritual one 
of the church, and had found in Dante the most authoritative 
interpreter of the permanent dualism between the spiritual and 
secular jurisdiction inherent in the Western legal tradition (103), 
Jefferson articulated his own reflection on the fundamental 
polarity between the spiritual and temporal dimension of human 
activity that rejected, what Peter Onuf has called, the «unholy 
alliance of church and state» (104).  
«Christianity», wrote Jefferson echoing Milton, «flourished 
three hundred years without establishment. [As] soon as [it was] 
established, [it] declined from purity. [It] betrays [a] want [of] 
confidence in [the] doctrines of [the] church to suspect that 
reason or intrinsic excellence [are] insufficient without [a] 
secular prop. [The] gates of hell shall not prevail» (105).  
                                                
103 See Diego QUAGLIONI, Introduzione, in Dante ALIGHIERI, Monarchia, 
cit., pp. v-lxxix. 
104 Peter S. ONUF, Jefferson’s Religion: Priestcraft, Enlightenment, and the 
Republican Revolution, in ID., The Mind of Thomas Jefferson, cit., p. 160. 
105 Thomas JEFFERSON, Outline of Argument, in Bernhard FABIAN, 
Jefferson’s Notes of Virginia: The Genesis of Query XVII. The Different 
Religions Received into that State?, cit., pp. 130-131. 
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Of course, whereas Dante had written against the Church’s 
asserted superiority over civil authorities, Jefferson and Milton 
were committed to challenge civil authority over ecclesiastical 
and religious affairs. This new authority had been acquired by 
civil institutions at the turn of the 16th century through that 
historical process described by Harold Berman as the 
«spiritualization of the secular» that followed and sustained the 
confessionalization of European polities (106). In so much as 
Christian confessions were identified with particular states and 
individual consciences were subjected to external jurisdictions, 
Jefferson reacted against the contraction of the original dualism 
of Western jurisprudence, brought about by the Protestant 
Reformations, and claimed, most forcefully in his Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom, that  «Almighty God hath 
created the mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free 
is shall remain by making it altogether insusceptible of 
restraints» (107).  
Should one choose to follow Berman and maintain that the 
«dualism of spiritual and secular jurisdictions and the pluralism 
of secular jurisdictions within the same polity», that «were at the 
heart of the formation of the Western legal tradition», had 
entered into crisis once the Protestant Reformations had 
«transferred spiritual authority and spiritual responsibilities to 
                                                
106 Harold J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution, II. The Impact of the Protestant 
Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition, cit., pp. IX-X, see also pp. 61-
62, 64. 
107 Thomas JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, cit., p. 545. 
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the secular lawmakers of the various principalities and nation-
states, whose supreme authority now embraced all the 
jurisdictions that had previously been autonomous», than 
Jefferson’s contribution to the great revolution of the Wester 
legal tradition brought about in America in the 18th century 
appears to have been aimed at restoring that compromised 
dualism (108). In truth, Jefferson does not seem to have had any 
appreciation of the originally medieval separation of the 
spiritual and temporal jurisdictions. His aversion to all forms of 
pastoral government was too strong to allow him any 
recognition of the kind. However, his advocacy for a «wall of 
separation» between church and state had the effect to restore to 
the Western legal tradition, albeit on new grounds, the 
juxtaposition between the individual conscience and the external 
jurisdiction (109). 
Hence, Jefferson insisted in his Bill that «the impious 
presumption of legislators and rulers, civil as well as 
ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired 
men, have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up 
their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and 
infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on others, 
hath established and manifested false religions over the greatest 
                                                
108 Harold J. BERMAN, Law and Revolution, II. The Impact of the Protestant 
Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition, cit., pp. IX-X. 
109 Thomas JEFFERSON, Letter to the Danbury Baptists, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 35, 1 August to 30 November 1808, edited by Barbara 
B. Oberg et al., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008, pp. 407-409. 
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part of the world and through all time» (110). Consequently, 
Jefferson argued that «the opinions of men are not the object of 
civil government» nor are they «under its jurisdiction» (111). For, 
«to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field 
of opinion and to restrain the profession or propagation of 
principles on supposition of their ill tendency is a dangerous 
fallacy, which at once destroys all religious liberty […]» (112). In 
sum, the Bill Jefferson drafted acknowledged that «all men» 
were «free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their 
opinions in matters of religion», and that such opinions were in 
no way grounds to «diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil 
capacities» (113). 
Because of this complex genealogy behind Jefferson’s 
understanding of religion, the individual conscience assumed in 
his doctrine «la natura di ambito non coercibile del potere, anzi 
di ambito del puro consenso, sottratto al commando e affidato a 
forme “censorie” di disciplina» (114). The freedom each 
individual enjoyed over his own conscience became, even more 
than «the paradigmatic individual right» discussed by Rakove 
(115), the «souveraineté du for intérieur» as Hans Guggisberg, 
Frank Lestringant, Jean-Claude Margolin qualified it in their 
                                                
110 Thomas JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, cit., p. 545. 
111 Ibid., p. 546. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Diego QUAGLIONI, «Sans violence ny peine quelconque au port de salut», 
Il problema della libertà di coscienza nella «République» di Jean Bodin, cit., 
pp. 170-171.  
115 Jack RAKOVE, Beyond Locke, Beyond Belief. The Nexus of Free Exercise 
and Separation of Church and State, cit., p. 43. 
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preface to an important collection of essays on the freedom of 
conscience in the 16th and 17th centuries (116). So, in Jefferson’s 
thought, the sovereignty enjoyed by each individual over 
himself became the foundation of the federated sovereignty of 
the body politic or, in other words, the seat of spiritual 
jurisdiction became the foundation of political association: an 
entirely free association, in which the «difference in religious 
opinion» supplied the «place [of a] censor morum», since the 
«teachers [of] every [religious] sect» ultimately «inculcate[d]», 
though through a variety of different precepts, the «same moral 
principles» expressing the inherent sociability of mankind (117).  
Because of this teeming plurality of sovereign consciences in 
matters of faith, Jefferson wondered, back in his Outline, 
whether uniformity of belief could be attainable or even 
desirable (118). He answered both questions in the negative. 
Echoing the highest voices of European Humanism and their 
reading of the scholastic revolution in jurisprudence that has 
been described by Stephan Kuttner in his Harmony From 
                                                
116 Hans R. GUGGISBERG, Frank LESTRINGANT, Jean-Claude MARGOLIN, 
Préface, in La liberté de conscience (XVIe-XVIIe siècles), cit., p. 9. 
117 Thomas JEFFERSON, Outline of Argument, in Bernhard FABIAN, 
Jefferson’s Notes of Virginia: The Genesis of Query XVII. The Different 
Religions Received into that State?, cit., p. 130. Böckenförde has famously 
contended that the modern state rests on fountations it is not itself capable of 
guaranteeing. See Ernst-Wolfgang BÖCKENFÖRDE, Staat, Gesellschaft, 
Freiheit, Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht Inhalt, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1976, p. 60  This claim appears perfectly 
consistent with Jefferson’s perspective, given how he maintained that the 
beliefs supporting political bodies ultimately rested within the incoercibile 
consciences of its members. 
118 Ibid., pp. 129-130. 
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Dissonance (119), Jefferson aspired «a fondare la possibilità di 
un’unità di fede non nella forzata consonanza, ma nell’armonia 
che si produce per le dissonanze» (120). He strived for a unity of 
principle that, rather than dissolving each individuality, 
encompassed each of them into a higher order and, in the words 
of Shaftsbury that Jefferson approvingly transcribed in his notes, 
was able to produce from «these contrarieties» a more fulfilling 
«harmony» (121).
                                                
119 Stephan KUTTNER, Harmony from Dissonance. An Interpretation of 
Medieval Canon Law, in Wimmer Lecture, vol. 10, 1956, pp. 1-26, now in 
ID., The History of Ideas and Doctrines of Canon Law in the Middle Ages, 
Variorum Reprints, London, 1980, pp. 1-16. 
120 Diego QUAGLIONI, «Sans violence ny peine quelconque au port de salut», 
Il problema della libertà di coscienza nella «République» di Jean Bodin, cit., 
p. 167. 
121 Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on Locke and Shaftesbury, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., pp. 548-549. 
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AN INTEGRATIVE CONCEPTION OF JURISPRUDENCE 
 
 
4. Law’s plurality 
In the closing paragraph of the Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom, Jefferson pitted the transience of human laws against 
the perpetuity of natural rights. More specifically, he 
acknowledged that the freedom of conscience enshrined in the 
Bill had been enacted through an ordinary piece of legislation. 
As such, it remained within the power of the legislator to amend 
it or abrogate it altogether. Whereas an «Assembly, elected by 
the people for the ordinary purposes of legislation» could not 
«restrain», through the laws it passed, «the acts of succeeding 
Assemblies», natural rights outlasted the municipal laws 
enacting them (1). Thus, Jefferson concluded his Bill by having 
it declare that the rights it asserted belonged to «the natural 
rights of mankind» (2). As a consequence, any succeeding act 
repealing or narrowing «its operation» was to be considered 
void, as it integrated a violation of natural law (3).  
                                                
1 Thomas JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, cit., p. 546. 
2 Ibid., pp. 546-547. 
3 Ibid., p. 547. 
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The words chosen by Jefferson to articulate the final 
disposition of the Bill suggest that, in his understanding of the 
American legal experience, law was never reduced to the simple 
positive enactments of municipal legislators, nor were rights 
ever held to be the mere expression of an entirely positive 
obligation. Following Azo, Braton had taught to generations of 
jurists, and quite possibly to Jefferson himself, who had first 
read his De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae as a young 
student (4), that law lived in a variety of dimensions and could 
consequently be defined in several ways: «Ius […] pluribus 
modi dicitur» he had claimed (5). Jefferson did not disagree. He 
too maintained that rights were the expression of a plurality of 
different laws, some regarded as higher and unalterable, others 
as lower and amendable, some consolidated by time and reason, 
others enacted by the force of a transient majority. And, while 
the commonwealth was indeed one of the principle sources of 
the law, Jefferson certainly did not regard it as the exclusive 
one, for he believed that its most fundamental laws were meant 
to incorporate and secure the rights proclaimed by a 
transcendent source, be it nature, or as he further claimed, 
nature’s God (6).  
                                                
4 See David N. MAYER, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson, 
cit., p. 10. 
5 See Henry BRACTON, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, On the Laws 
and Customs of England, cit., p. 26. See also Kenneth PENNINGTON, The 
Prince and the Law, 1200-1600. Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal 
Tradition, cit., p. 122. 
6 See also Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Francis Gilmer, 7 June 1816, cit., p. 
154: «Our legislators are not sufficiently apprised of the rightful limitations 
of their power: that their true office is to declare and enforce only our natural 
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This complexity of sources is of particular relevance for the 
interpreter of Jefferson’s thought. It helps overcome those 
scholarly views that have regarded Jefferson’s understanding of 
rights as confused or inconsistent, in so much as the claims he 
articulated were drawn from a plurality of different sources, 
rather than being based on a single, supposedly coherent, one, 
be it natural, historical, or positive. Such charge has been levied 
most forcefully by Stephen Conrad, according to whom 
Jefferson invoked «rights so vastly different in basic 
conceptualization that, taken as a whole», his doctrine 
«evince[d] ambivalence and ambiguity to the point of 
incoherence» (7). But where Conrad has seen incoherence, 
Jefferson appears to have articulated instead an integrative 
conception of jurisprudence (8). His overall doctrine maintained, 
in fact, that law was a combination of «moral principles derived 
from reason and conscience», «historically developing» codes of 
mores, and bodies of rules enacted as «separate and distinct 
from both morality and history» (9). Through the integration of 
its various sources alone could law actualize justice and give to 
each his due, thus fulfilling the «reciprocation of rights» without 
                                                                                                     
rights and duties and to take none of them from us». See, for a broader view 
on the issue, Pietro PIOVANI, Giusnaturalismo ed etica moderna, Laterza, 
Bari, 1961. 
7 Stephen A. CONRAD, Putting Rights Talk in its Place. The Summary View 
Revisited, cit., p. 269. 
8 See Harold J. BERMAN, Towards an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, 
Morality, History, in California Law Review, vol. 76, n. 4, 1988, pp. 779-
801. 
9 Ibid., p. 780. 
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which law would merely be a set of «arbitrary rules of conduct, 
founded in force, and not in conscience» (10). 
 
2. Natural law 
While the American Revolution plunged the Founders in the 
midstream of European political thought, as they argued with 
the British over the question of sovereignty, their inquiry into 
the sources of power and the nature of its limitations compelled 
them to review the moral foundations of modern 
commonwealths and challenge any tyrannical use of power that 
disassociated the practice of government from the principles of 
honesty and justice, inscribed by nature into the hearts of men. 
So, it is hardly surprising that revolutionaries like John Adams 
and Thomas Jefferson conceived of sovereignty as the lawful 
exercise of supreme power. 
However, no more than a century earlier, this relationship 
between morals and politics had been brought into question and 
severely contested by a number of authors well known to the 
founders and especially to Jefferson (11). Following Montaigne, 
many, like his pupil Charron, had begun to disregard honesty 
                                                
10 Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, cit., p. 142. See also 
Ari HELO, Thomas Jefferson’s Ethics and the Politics of Human Progress. 
The morality of a Slaveholder, cit. p. 139. 
11 The political thought shaped by the wars of the sixteenth century is 
synthesized in Diego QUAGLIONI, Il “secolo di ferro” e la nuova riflessione 
politica, in Cesare VASOLI, Le filosofie del Rinascimento, Bruno Mondatori, 
Milano, 2002, pp. 326-349; and in Diego QUAGLIONI and Vittor Ivo 
COMPARATO, Italy, cit., pp. 55-101. 
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and justice as standards of political action (12). These moral 
principles had been shaken too greatly by the religious 
fanaticism and the civil turmoil that inflamed Europe in the 
aftermath of the Protestant Reformation to be still of any 
effectiveness. The political and religious universalism of the 
Middle Ages had been shattered in the clash of rival allegiances 
and creeds. And the moral foundation on which European 
societies had based their collective sense of security and order 
had been splintered. So, once the Wars of Religion spread 
through Europe, no law appeared firm enough not to be 
challenged and no principle high enough not to dragged into 
controversy. Although none seriously questioned the existence 
of a natural law, many argued it was beyond men’s 
comprehension. Pascal, Montaigne, and even Bodin – who had 
incorporated justice in his notion of a republic (13) – 
acknowledged that no two authorities seemed to agree on 
questions of natural law, «car la justice & raison qu’on dit 
naturelle, n’est pas tousiours si claire qu’elle ne treuue des 
aduersaires: & bien souuent les plus grands Iurisconsultes s’y 
trouuent empeschés, & du tout contrarires en opinions» (14). Nor 
                                                
12 The political skepticism of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century 
is examined in Anna Maria BATTISTA, Nuove riflessioni su “Montaigne 
Politico”, cit. pp. 801-848; Anna Maria BATTISTA, Alle origini del pensiero 
politico libertino. Montaigne e Charron, cit. 
13 See Margherita ISNARDI PARENTE, Introduzione, cit., pp. 64-69; Diego 
QUAGLIONI, La giustizia nel Medioevo e nella prima età moderna, cit., pp. 
119-129. 
14 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la République, cit., livre 3, chapitre 4, p. 416. 
See Diego QUAGLIONI, “Assolutismo laico” e ricerca del diritto naturale, in 
Il pensiero politico, vol. 25, n. 1, 1992, p. 101. For a discussion on similar 
remarks in Montaigne, Charron, and Pascal see Anna Maria BATTISTA, Alle 
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could history shed any light on the transcendent principles of a 
natural order. Despite Machiavelli arguing otherwise (15), 
Montaigne held that historical events established no clear 
precedent, but offered, to all who studied them, a disarming 
variety of manners and customs, so inconsistent with each other, 
no unitary set of principles or norms of conduct could be 
inferred from them. «Notamment aux affaires politiques, il y a 
un beau champ ouvert au bransle et à la contestation […]. Les 
discours de Machiavel, pour example, estoient assez solides 
pour le subject, si y a-il eu grand’ aisance à les combattre : et 
ceux qui l’ont faict, n’ont pas laissé moins de facilité à combatre 
les leurs. Il s’y trouveroit tousjours à un tel argument, dequoy y 
fournir responces, dupliques, repliques, tripliques, 
quadrupliques, et ceste infinie contexture de debats, que nostre 
chicane a alongé tant qu’elle a peu en faveur des procez […] : 
les raisons n’y ayant guere autre fondement que l’experience, et 
la diversité des evenements humains, nous presentant infinis 
examples à toutes sortes de forme» (16). Thus, because of the 
                                                                                                     
origini del pensiero politico libertino. Montaigne e Charron, cit., pp. 133-
169, and Renée KOGEL, Pierre Charron, Librairie Droz, Genève, 1972, p. 
132.  
15 See Diego QUAGLIONI, Machiavelli, the Prince and the Idea of Justice, in 
Italian Culture, cit., pp. 110-121. 
16 Michel de MONTAIGNE, Les Essais. Édition établie par J. Balsamo, M. 
Magnien et C. Magnien-Simonin, book II, chapter 17, De la presumption, 
Gallimard, Paris, 2007, p. 694. See Anna Maria BATTISTA, Nuove riflessioni 
su “Montaigne Politico”, cit., pp. 833-834. Likewise, John Locke shared 
several of Montaigne’s perplexities and, despite articulating a new idea of 
morality based on the Grotian persuasion that «principles absolutely 
necessary to hold society together» did exist, his prevailing attitude towards 
historical exempla of virtue and justice remained one of relativism and 
caution. «He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind, and look 
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absence of historical precedents and the remoteness of moral 
principles, the lawfulness of positive enactments could no 
longer depend on their consistency with a higher and firmer 
notion of justice. Government had been progressively 
disassociated from honesty, or rather honestas, and, as a result, 
the exercise of power seemed to be necessarily unchecked and 
arbitrary (17).  
American constitutionalism could not have been conceived 
had the relationship between morals and politics not been 
previously mended or, even better, reconstituted on new grounds 
(18). In the Prolegomena to the De iure belli ac pacis Grotius 
                                                                                                     
abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifferency survey their 
actions, will be able to satisfy himself that there is scarce that principle of 
morality to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on (those only excepted 
that are absolutely necessary to hold society together, which commonly too 
are neglected betwixt distinct societies), which is not, somewhere or other, 
slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, 
governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite the other». 
John LOCKE, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book I, chapter 3, 
par. 10, Men have contrary practical principles, in ID., The Works of John 
Locke in Ten Volumes, vol. 1, Printed in London for Thomas Tegg; W. 
Sharpe and Son; G. Offor; G. and J. Robinson; J. Evans and Co.; Also R. 
Griffin and Co. Glasgow, And J. Coming, Dublin, 1823, reprinted by Scientia 
Verlag, Aalen, 1963, p. 42. See Paul HAZARD, La crise de la conscience 
européenne (1680-1715), Boivin et Cie, Paris, 1935, English trans., The 
Crisis of the European Mind 1680-1715, New York Review of Books, New 
York, 2013, pp. 288-289. Locke’s reception of Montaigne is discussed in 
Carlo Augusto VIANO, John Locke: dal razionalismo all’illuminismo, 
Einaudi, Turin, 1960, p. 339. 
17 The English repercussions of Continental skepticism are analyzed in: 
Charles H. McIlwain, Whig Sovereignty and Real Sovereignty, in ID., 
Constitutionalism and the Changing World: Collected Papers, The 
Macmillan Company, New York, 1939, pp. 63-64. 
18 In opening his Commentaries on American Law, James Kent will 
eventually claim that «We ought not […] to separate the science of public 
law from that of ethics, nor encourage the dangerous suggestion, that 
governments are not strictly bound by the obligations of truth, justice, and 
humanity, in relation to other powers, as they are in the management of their 
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had argued that man was naturally inclined to live in well-
ordered societies, regulated «pro sui intellectus modo», 
according to his rational disposition and his capacity to discern 
right from wrong (19). In fact, not only did Grotius believe that 
natural law was self-evident, «Principia enim eius juris […] per 
se patent atque evidentia sunt», he also held that men could 
perceive its principles as clearly as they perceived the world 
through their outward senses, «ferme ad modum eorum quae 
sensibus externis precipimus» (20). This lesson was not lost on 
Jefferson, who paraphrased it in many of his writings and 
claimed that man’s moral sense was as much part of his nature 
«as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling» and considered it, in 
keeping with the Grotian moment of European jurisprudence, as 
«the true foundation of morality» (21).  
Like any other sense, the moral one needed to be exercised 
and put into practice. Only by practicing virtue and emulating 
the great moral exempla provided by history or poetry could 
                                                                                                     
own local concerns». James KENT, Commentaries on American Law, vol. 1, 
part 1, chap. 1, On the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations, O. 
Halted, New York, 1826, re-printed by The Legal Classics Library, 
Birmingham (Alabama),1986, pp. 2-3.  
19 Hugo GROTIUS, De jure belli ac pacis libris tres, in quibus ius naturae et 
gentium item iuris publici praecipua explicantur, cit., p. 7. See Franco 
TODESCAN, Le radici teologiche del giusnaturalismo laico, vol. 1, Il 
problema della secolarizzazione nel pensiero giuridico di Ugo Grozio, cit., 
pp. 49-50. 
20 Ibid., p. 20. 
21 Thomas JEFFERSON to Peter Carr, 10 August 1787, in The Paper of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 12, 7August 1787 to 31 March 1788, edited by Julian 
P. Boyd et al., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1955, p. 15. I have 
borrowed the expression from Diego QUAGLIONI, Bodin e il 
“machiavellismo”: «conversiones rerumpublicarum» e diritto di guerra, in 
ID., I limiti della sovranità. Il pensiero di Jean Bodin nella cultura politica e 
giuridica dell’età moderna, Cedam, Padova, p. 139.  
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man apprehend the highest principles of justice (22). In this 
sense, Jefferson belonged to a current of thought running 
throughout Western history that maintained the superiority of 
moral agency over the abstract knowledge of the good. 
«L’azione è dunque molto di più del conoscere» would 
eventually write Giuseppe Capograssi in 1937, «l’azione è 
proprio la vita che si realizza nella profonda solidarietà delle sue 
posizioni e delle sue tendenze, è una parola che è detta da tutto 
lo spirito nella molteplicità delle sue forze e delle sue ricchezze. 
E appunto il conoscere come tale, il conoscere come fine di 
conoscere viene dopo l’agire ed ha per suo oggetto l’agire e non 
ha altro appoggio che l’agire: il conoscere è un agire per così 
dire impoverito, un agire, nel quale è rimasta viva e attiva solo 
la consapevolezza, con la quale cerca di fare la storia del drama 
a cui ha partecipato» (23). 
However, neither Grotius nor Jefferson could ignore the 
variety of human customs or the apparent inconsistencies 
between different notions of virtue and justice held over time by 
men and societies. Grotius warned that, despite appearances to 
the contrary, natural law was unchanging, although the objects 
of its prescriptions could vary according to the circumstances: 
«cum revera non jus naturae mutetur, quod immutabile est, sed 
                                                
22 See Ari HELO, Thomas Jefferson’s Ethics and the Politics of Human 
Progress. The Morality of a Slaveholder, cit., pp. 87-90. 
23 Giuseppe CAPOGRASSI, Il problema della scienza del diritto, edited by 
Pietro Piovani, Giuffrè, Milano, 1962, pp. 144-145. 
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res de qua jus naturae constituit, quaeque mutationem recipt» 
(24).  
David Hume provided an eloquent example of the interplay 
between fixed natural principles and their transient applications, 
that Jefferson transcribed in entry thirty-five of his Literary 
Commonplace Book, immediately after Bolingbroke’s 
aforementioned silent paraphrase of Grotius. «The natural 
reason why marriage in certain degrees is prohibited by the civil 
laws and condemned by the moral sentiment[s] of all nations, is 
derived from men’s care to preserve purity of manners; while 
they reflect, that if a commerce of love were authorized between 
the nearest relations, the frequent opportunities of intimate 
conversation, especially during early youth, would introduce an 
universal dissoluteness and corruption. But as the customs of 
countries vary considerably, and open [a]n intercourse more or 
less restrained, between different families or between the several 
members of the same family, so we find that the moral precept, 
varying with it’s cause, is susceptible, without any 
inconvenience, of very different latitude in several ages and 
nations of the world» (25).  
Late in life, Jefferson expanded on his early reading of 
Hume, Bolingbroke and Grotius in a letter written to John 
Adams on the 14th of October 1816. Rejecting the Hobbsean 
                                                
24 Hugo GROTIUS, De jure belli ac pacis libris tres, in quibus ius naturae et 
gentium item iuris publici praecipua explicantur, cit., p. 36. 
25 David HUME, The History of England from the Invasion of Julius Ceasar to 
the Revolution of 1688, Joseph Ogle Robinson, London, 1833, p. 315, quoted 
in Thomas JEFFERSON, Jefferson’s Literary Commonplace Book, cit., pp. 38-
39. 
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notion that justice was «founded on contract solely» and was 
therefore entirely disposable by the parties, Jefferson argued that 
justice belonged to the constitution of man. It was an instinct, an 
innate sense of morality, endowed to man by a «wise creator» 
who believed it necessary «in an animal destined to live in 
society». Most importantly, he contended, in direct opposition to 
European skepticism, that «the non-existence of justice [could] 
not to be inferred from the fact that the same act [was] deemed 
virtuous and right in one society, which [was] held vicious and 
wrong in another; because as the circumstances and opinions of 
different societies var[ied], so the acts which [might have done] 
them right or wrong must [have] var[ied] also: for virtue [did] 
not consist in the act [itself], but in the end it [was] to effect. If it 
[was] to effect the happiness of him to whom it [was] directed it 
[was] virtuous, while in a society under different circumstances 
and opinions the same act might [have produced] pain, and 
would [have been] vicious. The essence of virtue [was] in doing 
good to the others, while what [was] good [might have been] 
one thing in one society, and it’s contrary in another» (26). In 
short, Jefferson condensed in this paragraph the comparative 
approach towards politics and history taught by Bodin, 
Montaigne, and Montesquieu, who insisted on the vagaries of 
municipal societies (27); as well as the seventeenth century 
                                                
26 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to John Adams, 14 October 1816, in The 
Adams-Jefferson Letters. The Complete Correspondence between Thomas 
Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams, cit., p. 492. 
27 See Diego QUAGLIONI, “Assolutismo laico” e ricerca del diritto naturale, 
in Il pensiero politico, cit., p. 100; Vincenzo PIANO MORTARI, Il potere 
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struggle to reconstitute the moral and religious foundation of 
positive laws, first attempted by Grotius in reaction to the   
feverish proselytism of the sixteenth century, that had inflamed 
Europe and dissolved its earlier belief system.  
Such foundation rested firmly within man’s conscience. So, 
even those «who [wrote] treatise on natural law, [could] only 
declare what their own moral sense & reason dictat[ed] in the 
several cases they state[d]». And «[s]uch of them as happened to 
have feelings & reason coincident with those of the wise & 
honest part of mankind» should have been, in Jefferson’s 
opinion, «respected & quoted as witnesses of that is morally 
right or wrong in particular cases» (28). Thus, Jefferson 
incorporated within his doctrine the a priori and a posteriori 
demonstrations of natural law envisioned by Grotius (29), who 
Jefferson counted - along with «Pufendord, Wolf, & Vattel» - 
among the number of the most authoritative witnesses on 
questions of natural law. Whenever such authorities were in 
agreement, Jefferson considered they should be followed. But 
whenever they differed, «& they often differed» as Bodin had 
                                                                                                     
sovrano nella dottrina giuridica del secolo XVI, Liguori, Napoli, 1973, pp. 
99-100; Vincenzo PIANO MORTARI, Cinquecento giuridico francese. 
Lineamenti generali, Liguori, Napoli, 1990, pp. 322, 325; Catherine 
LARRÈRE, Montesquieu: l’éclipse de la souveraineté, cit., pp. 201-202. 
28 Thomas JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Treaties with France, cit., p. 613. 
29 Hugo GROTIUS, De jure belli ac pacis libris tres, in quibus ius naturae et 
gentium item iuris publici praecipua explicantur, cit., pp. 5-6. See Franco 
TODESCAN, Le radici teologiche del giusnaturalismo laico, vol. 1, Il 
problema della secolarizzazione nel pensiero giuridico di Ugo Grozio, cit., p. 
31. 
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previously noticed, men could only «appeal to [their] own 
feelings and reason to decide between them» (30).  
So, if pursuing justice meant fulfilling man’s inherent social 
disposition and effecting the happiness of others, the variety of 
manners and customs, rather than undermining the existence of 
a unitary principle of morality, proved how man was naturally 
inclined to give to each his own. In other words, by assuming 
«love of others» as the basis of morality (31), Jefferson 
paraphrased and translated in the language of the day the ancient 
Roman law principle, transcribed by Bracton in his De legibus 
et consuetudinibus Angliae, according to which iustitia est 
constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens (32).  
Not unlike Domat (33), Jefferson believed it was the heart 
who directed man’s moral actions, for nature «hath implanted» 
in scrinio pectoris «in our breasts a love of others» (34). The 
«feelings of sympathy, of benevolence, of gratitude, of justice, 
of love, of friendship», in one word, of morality were its 
                                                
30 Thomas JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Treaties with France, cit., p. 613. 
31 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Thomas Law, 13 June 1814, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol. 7, November 1813 to September 
1814, edited by J. Jefferson Looney et al. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2010, p. 414. See Maurizio VALSANIA, Nature’s Man. Thomas 
Jefferson’s Philosophical Anthropology, cit., pp. 51-58, 102-104. 
32 Henry de BRACTON, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, cit., p. 23. 
33 See Franco TODESCAN, Le radici teologiche del giusnaturalismo laico, II, 
Il problema della secolarizzazione nel pensiero di Jean Domat, Giuffrè, 
Milano, 1987, especially p. 17. 
34 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Thomas Law, 13 June 1814, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, cit., p. 414. 
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purview (35). And living according to this sentiment of morality 
was the foundation of an honest conduct.  
Peter Onuf and Ari Helo have aptly suggested that 
«Jefferson’s understanding of moral duties was compatible with 
the Ciceronean notion of […] honesty» (36), which strongly 
influenced Grotius and his neo-stoic refutation of utilitarian 
conceptions of justice and morality (37). Within this Ciceronian 
tradition, honestas had been understood as the obligation to 
willfully maintain personal and political duties. Hence, the 
                                                
35 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Maria Cosway, 12 October 1786, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 10, 22 June to 31 December 1786, edited 
by Julian P. Boyd et al., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1954, p. 450. 
36 Peter S. ONUF and Ari HELO, Jefferson, Morality, and the Problem of 
Slavery, in Peter S. ONUF, The Mind of Thomas Jefferson, University of 
Virginia Press, Charlottesville, 2007, p. 254. 
37 See Diego QUAGLIONI, La giustizia nel Medioevo e nella prima età 
moderna, cit., p. 137. The complex relationship between Grotius and 
Ciceronian soicism has recently been at the center of Banjamin STRAUMANN, 
Roman Law in the State of Nature. The Classical Foundations of hugo 
Grotius’ Natural Law, Cambridge University Press, 2015, see especially pp. 
37-50. Straumann contends that Grotius engaged in a close reading of 
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downplays the influence exercised by other sources. In this sene, perhaps, 
Michel Villey’s view would appear to be more balanced and more attentive 
to the theological  implications of the legal doctrine articulated by Gortius. 
See Michel VILLEY, La formation de la pensée juridique moderne, PUF, 
Paris, 1968, p. 605: «Synthèse à la mode érasmienne de Cicéron et de 
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un christianisme simplifié et réinterprété à l’aide de la raison stoïcienne, tout 
en se voulant évangélique : mais que dominent en fait la raison et la morale 
stoïcienne». other sources are Honesty was the foundation of natural law 
according to James Kent as well, who recalled how «[…] Cicero vindicated 
the truth, and inculcated the value of the precepts, that nothing was truly 
useful which was not honest». And thereafter added: «In the latter ages of the 
Roman empire, when their municipal law became highly cultivated, and 
adorned by philosophy and science, the law of nations was recognised as part 
of the natural reason of mankind. Quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes 
homines constituit, id apud omnes gentes peraeque custoditur, vocatur que 
jus gentium, quasi quo jure omnes gentes utuntur». James KENT, 
Commentaries on American Law, vol. 1, cit., p. 7. 
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masters of the ius commune had interpreted the moral obligation 
of the sovereign to act honestly as his duty to act within the rule 
of law (38). The laws emanating from the prince, therefore, could 
only be conceived as a sanctio sancta, jubens honesta et 
prohibens contraria (39). This principle had penetrated into the 
English legal tradition, first of all, through Bracton, who quoted 
the relevant passage of Azo’s Summa in his De legibus et 
consuetudinibus Angliae (40), and subsequently through 
Fortescue and Coke, who both recalled Bracton’s earlier 
allegation (41).  
                                                
38 Ennio CORTESE, Il problema della sovranità nel pensiero giuridico 
medievalecit., p. 147. 
39 The first formulation of this principle may be read in: M. Tullius CICERO, 
De Legibus, book 1, in ID., De Re Publica, De Legibus, Cato Maior De 
Senectute, Laelius De Amicitia, edited by J.G.F. Powell, Oxford Classical 
Texts, Oxford, 2006, p. 166: « lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae 
iubet ea quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria». 
40 Henry de BRACTON, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, vol. 2, 
Introductio, Quid sit lex et quid consuetudo, cit., p. 22: «Et licet largissime 
dicatur lex omne quod legitur, tamen specialiter significat sanctionem 
iustam, iubentem honesta, prohibentem contraria». Bracton is paraphrasing 
Azo, Summa Codicis, De legibus et consuetudinibus principis C.1.14: «Lex 
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honesta prohibens contraria.  Et ita regula est iustorum et iniustorum, ut 
dicitur in translatione greci, ut ff. eodem l.ii (Dig. 1.3.2)» quoted in Kenneth 
PENNINGTON, Lex Naturalis and Ius Naturale, in Crossing Boundaries at 
Medieval Universities, edited by Spencer E. Young, Brill, Leiden and 
Boston, 2011, p. 232. 
41 John FORTESCUE, De Laudis Legum Angliae, edited and translated with 
introduction and notes by S.B. Chrimes, Cap. 3, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1949, pp. 6-9; Edward COKE,   The Second part of the Institutes 
of the Laws of England, Containing the Exposition of Many Ancient, and 
Other Statutes, Statut. De Asportatis Religiosorum, Editum Anno 35 Edw. 1. 
Apud Carliolen, Printed by Rawlins, for Thomas Basset at the Georg near St. 
Dunstan’s Church in Fleet-Street, London, 1681, p. 587. The principale is 
also recalled by Algernon SIDNEY, in his Discourses on Government, chap. 3, 
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It is hard not to imagine that Jefferson had in mind this 
specific tradition while arguing in the Summary View of the 
Rights of British America that «[t]he whole art of government 
consists in the art of being honest» (42), or when, later in life, 
writing to Adams he claimed: «[t]his I hope will be age of 
experiments in government, and that their basis will be founded 
on principles of honesty, not mere force» (43). True, Jefferson 
retained Montaigne’s understanding of the law (44), for he 
believed that laws were «obligatory» in so much as they enacted 
the «will of the nation», rather than the iura naturalia (45). 
Nevertheless, he also acknowledged that municipal laws had full 
and unlimited power only over morally indifferent matters (46), 
beyond which their authority necessarily yielded to the one of 
natural law (47). Hence, Jefferson could conclude his Bill 
                                                                                                     
sect. xxi, It cannot be for the good of the people, that the magistrate have a 
power above the law: and he is not a magistrate, who has not his power by 
law. 
42 Thomas JEFFERSON, Draft Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the 
Continental Congress (MS Text of A Summary View, &c.), cit., p. 134. 
43 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to John Adams, 28 February 1796, in The 
Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John 
Adams, cit., p. 260. 
44 See Diego QUAGLIONI, La giustizia nel Medioevo e nella prima età 
moderna, cit., pp. 131-133.  
45 Thomas JEFFERSON, letter to Edmund Randolph, 18 August 1799, in The 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 31, 1 February 1799 to 31 May 1800, 
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Establishing Religious Freedom by reacting against the political 
skepticism that had ensued in European thought in the aftermath 
of the great religious wars of the sixteenth century.  
 
3. Municipal law 
Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom was not 
an isolated piece of legislation, but belonged to a larger project 
of revision and consolidation of the law applied in Virginia, that 
had been undertaken by a committee of the General Assembly, 
set up between October and November 1776 to adapt the 
existing body of laws ordering Virginia’s society to the 
principles proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence and 
enshrined in the newly adopted Constitution that had been 
enacted by the commonwealth only three months earlier (48). 
The committee, had the power to report to the whole Assembly 
proposed legislation, without having the power to approve it 
                                                                                                     
«They are inherently independent of all but moral law». Thomas Jefferson to 
Spencer Roane, 6 September 1819, in Thomas JEFFERSON, Thomas Jefferson, 
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pp. 132-143. 
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autonomously (49). So, of the 126 different pieces of legislation 
that the committee submitted separately to the Assembly, only 
some were approved immediately. Others were adopted after a 
long and tortuous parliamentary debate, as was the case 
regarding the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. While 
others still remained dead letter, as happened for instance to 
Jefferson’s Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments, that 
despite long and heated discussions, protracted for several years, 
end up never being adopted (50). 
This effort to revise the laws of Virginia, which did not lead 
to a proper codification, but rather to the compilation of select 
statutory reforms, that were meant to amend only marginally the 
continuity of pre-existing common law, has not been read by 
current legal historiography in relation to the contemporary 
advancement of codification, prompted throughout continental 
Europe, by a wide array of voices who found in Cesare Beccaria 
(1738 – 1794) one of their main references (51). Yet, the 
question of codification was openly discussed by the members 
of this committee, right from the very first of their meetings. 
Indeed, the choice of whether or not to codify a new legal order 
                                                
49 See Julian P. BOYD, The Revisal of the Laws 1776-1786, cit., p. 314: 
«Under the Act [for the revision of laws wrote by Jefferson in 1776] the 
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51 See Giovanni TARELLO, Storia della cultura giuridica moderna, Il Mulino, 
Bologna, 2010, p. 470. 
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was the chief question that the committee had to address before 
it could embark on any revision of existing laws.  
In two reports written between 1809 and 1821, Jefferson 
reconstructed the work of the committee thusly. According to 
his testimony, «at the first and only meeting of whole committee 
(of 5 persons) the question was discussed whether we would 
attempt to reduce the whole body of the law into a code, the text 
of which should become the law of the land» (52). Jefferson’s 
account did not relate why Pendelton had argued, along with 
Lee, in favor of repealing all existing law («abolish the whole 
existing system of laws») and establishing an entirely new code 
instead («and prepare a new and complete Institute»), but rather 
detailed the reservations that induce the committee to preserve 
«[...] the general system, and only modify it to the present state 
of things» (53). 
These reservations belonged to two sets of concerns: the 
misuse of power, on the one hand, and the uncertainty of the law 
on the other. 
The first concern may be easily summarized and, although it 
suggests a generally conservative attitude of the American 
Revolution (in itself worthy of note), as well as a propensity for 
a comprehensive reform of the law, it does not bear particularly 
rich legal implications. A total repeal of existing law and its 
replacement with a newly drafted code would have been, 
                                                
52 From Thomas Jefferson’s letter to Skelton Jones of July 28, 1809, in 
Edward DUMBAULD, Thomas Jefferson and the Law, cit., p. 134 
53 Thomas JEFFERSON, Autobiography, 1743-1790, in ID., Thomas Jefferson, 
Writings, cit., p. 37. 
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according to Jefferson, «a bold measure», «probably far beyond 
the views of the legislature», more prone to a gradual and 
selective reform of the legal system (54). It would have been, in 
short, a task well beyond the mandate given to the Committee 
by the Assembly and so a task of dubious legitimacy.  
The second concern was instead conceptually more complex 
and if, on the one hand, it fully reflected the cultural climate of 
the 18th century, largely concerned with the certainty of legal 
obligations, on the other it reversed one of the most 
characteristic assumptions of the time (55). According to 
Jefferson, the codification of the law would be fraught with 
uncertainty and, because of this, should not be undertaken. The 
adoption of a new code would not only have forced the repeal of 
pre-existing statutory law, it would have by necessity 
diminished the relevancy of previous case-law and scholarship. 
Hence, the reader of the new codification would have found 
himself devoid of any authoritative guide and could have only 
relied on a literal interpretation of the depositions, that would 
soon have revealed itself compromised by the inherent 
vagueness of language. Drafting a new code, or as Jefferson put 
it in 1809, composing «a new Institute like those of Justinian 
and Bracton, or that of Blackstone, which was the model 
proposed by Mr. Pendelton, would [have reduced law to a text]; 
and when reduced to a text, every word of that text, from the 
                                                
54 Ibid., p. 38. 
55 On the 18th century debate over codification see Pio CARONI, Saggi sulla 
storia della codificazione, Giuffrè, Milano, 1998. 
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imperfection of human language, and it’s [sic] incompetence to 
express directly every shade of idea, would [have] become a 
subject of question & chicanery until settled by repeated 
adjudication» (56). This, Jefferson concluded, «would involve us 
for ages in litigation, and render property uncertain until, like 
the statutes of old, every word had been tried, and settled by 
numerous decisions, and by new volumes of reports & 
commentaries» (57). 
Jefferson was adamant in opposing the reduction of the law 
to a single normative or dogmatic text. Not only did he reject 
codification, but he was truly skeptical of any attempt to offer a 
systematic and supposedly exhaustive account of the law. As 
Edward Dumbauld noted, Jefferson believed that excessive 
dependence upon the Commentaries [of Blackstone] as the 
staple of legal education resulted in superficiality» (58). «A 
student finds there a smattering of everything», he wrote to a 
correspondent in 1812, «and his indolence easily persuades him 
that if he understands that book, he is master of the whole body 
of the law» (59). Conversely, to appreciate the law in all its 
complexity and distinguish its effects according to its sources, it 
was indeed necessary to scour «the deep and rich mines» of 
Coke and Littleton as well as the complex stratification of 
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traditional authorities that constituted a legal system, without 
pretending to summarize and exhaust in any authoritative canon 
«the real fountains of the law» (60). 
Such appreciation for the inherent historicity of law and the 
plurality of its sources belonged to Jefferson’s earliest 
understanding of the legal science. Among the first extracts he 
transcribed in his Legal Commonplace Book were several 
extensive passaged taken from Henry Home, Lord Kames’s 
(1696 – 1782) Historical Law Tracts (61). In the Preface to his 
collection of essays, Kames had, in fact, admonished his readers 
that law could become a «rational study» only when «traced 
historically» and had then proceeded to quote himself an 
extensive passage taken from Boligbroke’s Letters on the Use of 
History, a collection of critical essays reviewing the 
historiographical doctrines of Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Davila, 
La Mothe Le Vayer, Montainge, and finally of Bodin and his 
Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem. (62).  
Jefferson put this lesson in practice while drafting his Bill for 
Proportioning Crimes and Punishments (63). Along the margins 
of his draft, in fact, he compiled extensive annotations, 
commenting on the provisions and referring to a variety of 
sources drawn from the remaining fragments of Saxon laws, 
pre-existing English statues, principles and maxims of the 
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common law, and contemporary scholarship, with particular 
emphasis on the works of Montesquieu, Pufendorf, and 
Beccaria. This wide breadth of historical and authoritative 
references exemplifies Jefferson’s appreciation for Kames and 
his effort to retrace the common legal core «of modern 
European nations» (64). Kames sought to find it in the feudal 
background of European societies and dedicated much of his 
Preface, and of the following tracts, to urge readers to study 
feudal law. Jefferson did indeed spend much of his early 
education studying it, as testified by numerous entries in his 
Legal Commonplace Book, among which one stand out for a 
direct reference to the Libri feudorum (65). But what he mostly 
retained from all this was the persuasion that the mutually 
binding obligation between lord and vassal, or in other words 
the fides they pledged each other, provided with legal substance 
their relationship and infused it with what Kames had called 
«the true sprit of the law» (66). This spirit constituted the 
fundamental political obligation between those who governed 
and those who were governed that Jefferson had attempted to 
repair when claiming that «whenever any form of government» 
became «destructive to» the principles of life, liberty, and the 
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extract drawn from Dalrymple’s Essay Towards a General History of Feudal 
Property in Great Britain. See Thomas JEFFERSON, The Commonplace Book 
of Thomas Jefferson. A Repertory of his ideas on Government, cit., p. 153. 
66 Henry Home, Lord KAMES, Historical Law Tracts, cit., p. XIII. 
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pursuit of happiness, it was «the right of the people to alter or 
abolish it, & to institute a new government, laying it’s 
foundation on such principles, & organizing it’s powers in such 
forms, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety & 
happiness» (67). 
Principles, thus, were key in Jefferson’s understanding of 
law, especially of municipal law. Jefferson’s several legislative 
reforms – his Bills on citizenship, religious freedom, criminal 
law, and education to recall but a few – were aimed overall at 
introducing within Virginia’s legal system principles that had 
been left out of the newly adopted constitution. As noted by 
Julian Boyd, the «failure of the Virginia Convention of 1776 to 
adopt» Jefferson’s «proposed Constitution undoubtedly 
emphasized the need he felt for reform of the laws. For his 
Constitution had included some provisions that he later 
incorporated in legislative bills that he thought would form ‘a 
system by which every fiber would be eradicated of ancient or 
future aristocracy; and a foundation laid for government truly 
republican’» (68). 
Though maintaining the distinction between ordinary and 
constitutional law, Jefferson claimed that if indeed it could be 
up to ordinary law to declare those substantial principles of 
constitutional law that had been left out of the constitution itself, 
then the legislation enacting them should have been written in a 
                                                
67 Thomsa JEFFERSON, The Declaration of Independence, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, cit., pp. 423-424. 
68 Julin P. BOYD, The Revisal of the Laws, 1776-1786, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2, cit., p. 305. 
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broad language, aimed specifically at transposing their main 
provisions into positive law, without clouding their effects by an 
overly detailed regulation.  According to Jefferson it was best, in 
such acts, «to lay down principles only» and leave more specific 
dispositions to separate pieces of legislations (69). In this way, he 
believed that the positive enactment of fundamental principles 
could have been sheltered from the vicious circle of rapid 
obsolescence and repeated amendment that would have 
inevitably concerned any legislative act too focused on 
articulating specific and detailed provisions. In other words, 
only a legislation meant to fix principle could hope to stand the 
test of time.  
This distinction between detailed regulation, broad legislation 
fixing fundamental principles, and constitutional law suggest 
Jefferson’s appreciation for the complexity of positive law and 
the variety of its sources and effects. Not only was law 
intrinsically multi-dimensional, but so too was positive law, in 
so much as it incorporated principles of natural law or was 
assisted by specific guarantees that rendered it «perpetual», 
«unalterable», and « transcendent » over the ordinary powers of 
legislation (70). 
Jefferson never denied that positive law was free to regulate 
morally indifferent subjects as it pleased. But he did repeatedly 
stress that the ultimate purpose of government was the 
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Cases Heretofore Capital, cit., p. 495. 
70 Thomas JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, cit., p. 122. 
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protection of the fundamental rights enjoyed by the people. 
Hence, he noted in one of his marginal comments to the Bill for 
Proportioning Crimes and Punishments, it was «wicked», i.e. 
malevolent and therefore tyrannical, «in a legislator to frame 
laws in opposition to the laws of nature», but it was, even more 
so, «vain», since those rights constituted the perennial check on 
human power (71).  
At the end of the day, Jeffersonian constitutionalism strived 
to substantiate those checkes and integrate the several strands of 
the Western legal tradition into a new worldview. It did so 
through a continuous engagement with the legacy of Western 
jurisprudence, which shaped Jefferson’s legal education 
throughout his lifetime and prompted him to digest 
contemporary political experience «attraverso tutto lo scibile 
della terra» (72).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
71 Thomas JEFFERSON, A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in 
Cases Heretofore Capital, cit., p. 502. 
72 Cesare PAVESE, Avere una tradizione è meno che nulla, è solo cercandola 
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Torino, 1990, p. 88. 
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